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INTRODUCTION

In revisiting standards of civil appellate review, this Article is a
substantial and comprehensive update of standards of review in Texas
civil appellate litigation, focusing on trial courts' rulings on pretrial,
trial, and posttrial proceedings.' This Article includes many other
categories of trial court rulings, as well as the applicable standard of
review. Additionally, the Article includes all substantive changes to
decisional law and to the Texas Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure. While standards of review are easy to define, their application
on appeal can be problematic. Nevertheless, defining and applying
the appropriate standard will generally determine the likelihood of
success of the appeal.
"Standards of review represent a distribution of political power
within the judicial branch: standards of review define the relationship
between trial and appellate courts." 2 Accordingly, standards of re1.W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Appellate Review in Civil Appeals, 21
865 (1990).

ST. MARY'S L.J.

2. Roger Townsend et al., Standardsof Review and Reversible Error: State and Federal
Court, in UNIVERSITY OF TEX. TECHNIQUES FOR HANDLING APPEALS IN STATE & FEDERAL
COURT 8-8 (1991).
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view define the parameters of a reviewing court's authority to determine whether a trial court has erred, and whether the error warrants
reversal. As a leading scholar has observed, "Standards of review
were never meant to be the end of the inquiry, but rather a frame and
a limit on the substantive law."' 3 Thus, the standard of review is the
appellate judge's "measuring stick." 4 A litigant must, therefore, analyze his or her factual and legal arguments in light of the appropriate
standard of review, or "measuring stick," to write an effective and
persuasive brief.
It is difficult to overstate the practical significance of the standard
of review. Because the appropriate standard of review and scope of
review generally determine the outcome of an appeal, a litigant must
shape factual and legal arguments in a manner that will satisfy the
relevant standard as applied to the relevant evidence. The standard of
review should be carefully distinguished from the scope of review.
The applicable standard of review determines whether the trial court
has committed an error. The scope of review defines what the reviewing court will examine to determine whether the trial court has committed an error. In other words, the scope of review defines what part
of the record is relevant to a particular appellate complaint. While
identification of the appropriate standard of review is very important,
a litigant must do more than simply recite the relevant standard in the
brief. Instead, the litigant must apply the standard of review to the
facts (scope of review) and the substantive law in a manner that will
convince the reviewing court that the case warrants reversal. One
case decided by the Seventh Circuit demonstrates how difficult, and
yet how important, it is to convince a reviewing court that the standard, as applied to the facts, requires reversal: In determining
whether a trial court's decision was clearly erroneous, the court observed that the "decision must strike us as more than just maybe or
probably wrong; it must... strike us as wrong with the force of a fiveweek-old, unrefrigerated dead fish." ' When a litigant is held to that
standard, it is clear that a great deal of thought and preparation is

3. STEVEN A. CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 1.3, at 21
(1986).
4. John C. Godbold, Twenty Pages and Twenty Minutes-Effective Advocacy on Appeal, 4
FIFTH CIRCUIT REPORTER 161, 169 (Jan. 1987).
5. Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988).
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required to convince a reviewing court that the trial court's decision
was in error, and that the error warrants reversal.
The litigant who ignores the standard of review merely loses credibility with the reviewing court. If a party does not identify the relevant standard and vigorously approach the standard in his or her
brief, the litigant leaves a void in the brief that will be necessarily
filled by his adversary, the reviewing court, or the court's clerks. Because the reviewing court will undoubtedly determine the relevant
standard on its own and review the appeal accordingly, only naive
litigants avoid the standard, thereby missing the opportunity to persuade the reviewing court that the standard, as applied to the facts
and the law, requires reversal.
While the standard of review may be easily identified, the application of the standard to a case often presents a difficult hurdle. For
example, while the abuse of discretion standard is the most common
standard of review, its application to the relevant record (scope of
review) presents tremendous problems to litigants and reviewing
courts. As one appellate court judge has observed, the abuse of discretion standard "means everything and nothing at the same time." 6
While the words used to describe standards of review often escape a
clear and precise definition, "[t]here are no talismanic words that can
avoid the process of judgment." 7
Undoubtedly, some standards of review escape precise definition.
Nevertheless, unless a litigant "is familiar with the standard of review
for each issue, he may find himself trying to run for a touchdown
when basketball rules are in effect."' 8 It is hoped this Article will provide to litigants and the courts the correct rules for reviewing orders
and judgments of a trial court.
II.
A.

ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD OF REVIEW

Abuse of Discretion on Appeal

Perhaps no standard of review is so misunderstood-and so
wrongly overused-as the abuse of discretion standard. Some decisions chant it almost talismanically to affirm the lower court when the
6. Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc., 724 S.W.2d 931, 935 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987,
no writ).
7. Universal Camera Work v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1981).
8. John C. Godbold, 4 Twenty Pages and Twenty Minutes-Effective Advocacy on Appeal,
FIFTH CIRCUIT REPORTER

at 169.
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question presented on appeal appears to be a question of law. Certainly, the review of a legal question must be de novo, inasmuch as the
primary function of trial courts is to find facts while that of appellate
courts is to declare law.
Theoretically, a conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion
should not be read as an insult to the lower judge. As one federal
court noted, "Abuse of discretion is a phrase which sounds worse
than it really is." 9 Abuse of discretion simply means that a higher
court disagrees with the lower court's action, but the higher court is
required to use that terminology in explaining the disagreement.
What is an "abuse of discretion?" Even when the abuse of discretion standard is confined to its proper sphere, appellate courts have
understandable difficulty in applying it consistently. This difficulty is
inherent in the standard itself. The amorphous concept of abuse of
discretion aids neither appellate courts nor trial courts in deciding
cases. It also makes briefing difficult for appellate counsel.
It has been said that "abuse of discretion" is a concept "not easily
defined." 1 "[Jiudicial attempts to define the concept almost routinely
take the form of merely substituting other terms that are equally unrefined, variable, subjective and conclusory." 11 The test is not
whether the facts present an appropriate case for the trial court's action;' 2 but, instead, whether the trial court acted without reference to
any guiding rules and principles, or in other words, acted in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.1 3 When an attempt is made to apply
this definition, however, it becomes clear that this definition is circular: a court could refer to guiding rules and principles, decide to act
directly contrary to them, and yet not "abuse" its discretion; similarly, an act that is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable must constitute an abuse of discretion.
The mere fact that a trial court may decide a matter within its dis9. In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 1954); see also Pearson v. Dennison, 353
F.2d 24, 28 n.6 (9th Cir. 1965) (commenting that pejorative connotation of "abuse of discretion" may be lessened by reframing test as "misuse of discretion").
10. Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc., 724 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987,

no writ).
11. Id. at 934.
12. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986).
13. Id. at 241-42; see also Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex.
1984); Landry v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 458 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. 1970); Craddock v. Sunshine
Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 393, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (1939).
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cretionary authority differently from what a reviewing court would
decide in similar circumstances does not demonstrate that an abuse of
discretion has occurred. 14 A mere error of judgment is not an abuse
of discretion. 5
Thus, the abuse of discretion standard requires a common-sense
combination of these definitions. By requiring that the trial court's
conduct has been arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, appellate
courts acknowledge the discretion the trial court must have to judge
the credibility of witnesses and make decisions within broad legal parameters. At the same time, though, it is only through the requirement that the trial court refer also to guiding rules and principles that
the appellate court can ensure that the trial court has acted reasonably. The trial court's action could have been reasonable and, therefore, not an abuse of discretion, only if it exercised its discretion
within the correct legal parameters.
Perhaps the best description of an abuse of discretion is the observation that it is the exercise of a "vested power in a manner that is
contrary to law or reason." 6 In Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger,
Inc.," Justice Powers explained in detail the amorphous abuse of discretion standard.'" Justice Powers's opinion provides a great deal of
insight into the dilemma often faced by the reviewing courts in determining whether a particular act of the trial court amounts to an abuse
of discretion. Justice Powers recommended the following analysis:
(1) Was the determination complained of on appeal a matter committed by law to the trial court's discretion?
(2) Did the trial court, in making the determination complained of on
appeal, recognize and purport to act in an exercise of the discretion
committed to it by law?
(3) Does the appellate record reveal sufficient facts upon which the trial
court could act rationally in an exercise of its discretion?
(4) Did the trial court exercise erroneously the discretion committed to
it by law?' 9
14. Downer, 701 S.W.2d 242 (citing Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 389 S.W.2d
645, 648 (Tex. 1965)); Jones v. Stryhorn., 159 Tex. 421, 428, 321 S.W.2d 290, 295 (1959)).
15. Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. 1989, orig. proceeding); Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Heard, 774 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989,
orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
16. Landon, 724 S.W.2d at 935.
17. 724 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).

18. Id. at 934-41.
19. Id. at 937-39.
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Justice Powers suggested that an analysis of the appellate record in
this manner is "more practical, logical, illuminating and consistent
with the important purposes the abuse of discretion standard is meant
20
to serve."
Subsequently, in Reyna v. Reyna,2 1 Justice Powers recited, in a
slightly different manner, four ways in which a trial court's exercise of
discretion is legally erroneous:
First, a court commits legal error if it attempts to exercise a power of
discretion that it does not legally possess .... Second, [a] court commits
legal error if it declines to exercise a power of discretion to it by law
when the circumstances require that the power be exercised ....
Third, [a] court commits legal error if it purports to exercise its discretion without sufficient information upon which a rational decision may
be made, as reflected in the appellate record .... Fourth, a court commits legal error if it exercises its power of discretion by making an erroneous choice as a matter of law, in any one of the following ways: (a)
by making a choice that was not within the range of choices permitted
the court by law; (b) by arriving at its choice in violation of an applicable legal rule, principle, or criterion; or (c) by making a choice that was
legally unreasonable in the factual-legal context in which it was made.22
B.

Abuse of Discretion in Mandamus Proceedings

Because the abuse of discretion standard applies in both appeals
and mandamus actions, 23 the question arises whether there is any distinction between the standard of review on appeal and the standard
required for the issuance of mandamus. Clearly, the concept of reversible error is removed in a mandamus action; indeed, the basis for
a mandamus proceeding is the appellant's (relator's) probable inability to show reversible error if relegated to an appeal. The Texas
Supreme Court has held, moreover, that a party is not required to
pursue the remedy of mandamus to preserve the right to complain on
appeal about discovery rulings. 24 Thus, mandamus is not required to
20. Id. at 937.
21. 738 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
22. Id. at 774-75.
23. In Walker v. Packer, the supreme court reaffirmed that a relator must show (1) that

the trial court's action constitutes a clear abuse of discretion, and (2) that he has no adequate
remedy by appeal. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-42 (Tex. 1992, orig. proceeding);

see National Tank Co. v. 30th Judicial Dist. Court, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 715, 716 (Apr. 7, 1993,
orig. proceeding) (restating two-part test in Walker v. Packer).
24. See Pope v. Stephenson, 787 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex. 1990).
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preserve a complaint for appellate review; however, mandamus may
be necessary to present a record showing that any error is reversible.
With regard to whether "error" has in fact occurred for purposes of
mandamus, the cases provide that mandamus will issue only for a
"clear" abuse of discretion,2 5 while the standard of review on appeal is
couched in terms of a simple abuse
of discretion, without any require'26
"clear."
be
abuse
the
ment that
In Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 27 and subsequently in
Walker v. Packer,2 both mandamus cases, the Texas Supreme Court
held that an abuse of discretion occurs whenever the trial court's action is "so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be a clear and prejudicial
error of law." In Walker, the court observed that the standard has
"different applications in different circumstances. ' 29 With respect to
the resolution of factual matters, the relator must establish that the
trial court could have reasonably reached only one decision.30 The
trial court's decision must be arbitrary and unreasonable. 31 Mandamus review of a trial court's determination of the controlling legal
32
principles is "reviewed with limited deference to the trial court.
Therefore, when a trial court fails to analyze or apply the law correctly or interprets the law erroneously, the trial court commits a
clear abuse of discretion.33
Unlike the test for abuse of discretion on appeal, when the record is
silent as to the facts that would show the reasons for the court's ruling, the relator will have failed to show a "clear" abuse of discretion.
Since Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 81 does not apply to mandamus actions, the trial court is probably not required to identify the
rules and principles upon which it relied.
By contrast, if "abuse of discretion" was a single standard, no advo25. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839 (noting that supreme court has used writ of manda-

mus to correct "clear abuse of discretion" committed by trial court).
26. Compare Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co., 739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1987)
(requiring only abuse of discretion); with Barker v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d 41, 42 (Tex. 1977)
(requiring clear abuse of discretion).
27. 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985, orig. proceeding).
28. 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992, orig. proceeding).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 839-40. Factual disputes may not be resolved in a mandamus proceeding.
Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183, 187 (Tex. 1973).

31. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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cate could ever show a "clear" abuse of discretion. An "arbitrary,
capricious, and irrational" decision remains so, no matter how
"clear" it may be: zero times zero equals zero, just as 100 times zero
equals zero. In either situation, the trial court abused its discretion,
regardless of whether the trial court's action was "clear" abuse, or
just abuse of discretion.
Despite these technical, theoretical possibilities, practical concerns
suggest a uniform standard of review for abuse of discretion in both
mandamus proceedings and appeals. Mandamus may better provide
meaningful relief when there is no adequate remedy by appeal only if
the test for abuse of discretion is the same for both mandamus and
appeal. Otherwise, a party could be deprived of relief by mandamus
for inability to meet the higher standard of review-the "clear" abuse
of discretion standard. If mandamus is denied and the party later
receives an adverse judgment, he can then appeal from the very same
ruling about which he complained by petitioning the court for writ of
mandamus. The standard of appellate review, however, would be
based on Downer v. Aquamarine Operators,Inc.3 4 On appellate review, the party could meet the lower standard (abuse of discretion),
but would have been deprived of real relief, since the predicate for
seeking mandamus was the absence of an adequate remedy by appeal.
And in the subsequent appeal, the party would be required to demonstrate harm in the usual manner. This anomaly is a true "Catch-22."
Consequently, the real issue is how to define the single standard; it
comes down to a policy choice for the supreme court as to which
standard of review best serves one system of justice.

III.
A.

REVERSIBLE ERROR

Preservationof Complaints and the Issue of Harm

The question of preservation of complaints and waiver must be
carefully distinguished from the question of harm on appeal from an
erroneous ruling. The fact that a party failed to preserve a complaint,
or expressly waived it, does not lessen the harm from an error. Appellate advocates and courts should be careful to analyze first the case
in terms of waiver, rather than harmless error. Indeed, unless the
court wants to make alternative holdings, a court that holds the complaint was not preserved need never reach the separate second ques34. 701 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex. 1985).
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tion of whether any error in fact occurred below, or the distinct third
question of whether any error was reversible.
B. Reversible Errorand Harmless Error
Similarly, the question of harm from an error is analytically distinct
from the question of whether error, in fact, occurred. Judges and advocates often confuse these terms and, thus, the law.
If a court decides that no error has been committed, it is not required to look further to determine whether any error would have
been reversible. Of course, the court is free to make that alternative
holding, but the option to write an opinion should not skew the
court's original analysis of whether error in fact occurred in the trial
court. A party can be grievously harmed by a trial court ruling that is
perfectly correct under the law. Likewise, a trial court can make an
error of the worst magnitude that has absolutely no effect on a party's
rights. By keeping the two concepts of error and harm perfectly distinct, the appellate court will not only improve their own decisionmaking, but will make the handling of future appeals much easier for
counsel and the courts. Similarly, by presenting the concepts separately, appellate lawyers can aid the court's decision-making and the
future development of the law.
If no error exists under the applicable standard of review, the court
can stop its inquiry unless it wishes to make alternative holdings.
Only if the court finds error under the applicable standard of review
must the court confront the concept of reversible error. The requirement of reversible error serves administrative policies by moving cases
through the system. It also mitigates expense to the parties and taxpayers by not reversing cases for technical errors that in reality did
not affect the outcome. Similarly, errors that made a difference, but
did not cause an incorrect result, will not be grounds for reversal.
Before a judgment can be reversed and a new trial ordered on the
ground that an error of law has been committed by the trial court, the
reviewing court must find, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 81 (b), "that the error complained of amounted to such a denial
of the appellant's rights as was reasonably calculated to cause and
probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment," or that
the error probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting
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the case on appeal. a5 In determining whether an error is reversible
error, the courts do not apply a "but for" test; instead, they apply a

test of probability.36 Various formulations of the test all reach the
same end: Is it more likely than not-is it probable-that the preserved error caused an improper judgment?3 7 If the reviewing court
answers in the affirmative, then the error is reversible; if, on the other

hand, the reviewing court answers in the negative, then the error is
harmless.
The harmless error rule applies to all errors. 38 The reviewing court
will review the record to determine if the complaining party received
a materially unfair trial. If the complaining party failed to prove his
cause of action or defense, the trial court's error could not have resulted in a materially unfair trial.3 9 If, however, the trial is contested

and the evidence is sharply conflicting, the trial court's error results in
a materially unfair trial without showing more.'

This is a judgment

call entrusted to the sound discretion and good sense of the reviewing
court after evaluating the whole case.4"
C.

Fundamental Error

Fundamental error is a rarity. 2 It "survives today only in those
rare instances in which the record on appeal shows on its face that the
court lacked jurisdiction or that the public interest is directly and adversely affected as that interest is declared in the statutes or the Texas

Constitution.

43

Fundamental error may be raised for the first time

35. TEX. R. App. P. 81(b)(l); see also Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835,
839-40 (Tex. 1979); Crown Plumbing, Inc. v. Petrozak, 751 S.W.2d 936, 940 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
36. Texas Power & Light Co. v. Hering, 148 Tex. 350, 352, 224 S.W.2d 191, 192 (1949).
37. E.g., King v. Skelly, 452 S.W.2d 691, 696 (Tex. 1970); Aultman v. Dallas Ry. &
Terminal Co., 152 Tex. 509, 516, 260 S.W.2d 596, 599 (1953).
38. Lorusso v. Members Mut. Ins. Co., 603 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex. 1980); Prezelski v.
Christiansen, 775 S.W.2d 764, 768 n.4 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989), rev'd on other grounds,
782 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1990).
39. Lorusso, 603 S.W.2d at 821 (citing Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914,
921 (Tex. 1979)).
40. Id.
41. First Employees Ins. Co. v. Skinner, 646 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. 1983).
42. American Gen. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Weinberg, 639 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex. 1982).
43. Central Educ. Agency v. Burke, 711 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Tex. 1986); Grounds v. Tolar Ind.
Sch. Dist., 707 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex. 1986); Texas Indus. Traffic League v. Railroad Comm'n,
633 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1982); Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982); Ramsey
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on appeal. 44

D.

Cumulative Error

Generally, when an appellant argues that a case should be reversed

because of cumulative error, she is alleging that the trial court's errors, non-reversible or harmless errors individually, pervaded the
trial, and "in the aggregate caused the rendition of an improper verdict.''45 Reversal based upon cumulative error is predicated upon
meeting the standards of reversible error in Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 81(b)(1).

46

That is, the errors complained of must

"amount to such a denial of the rights of the appellant as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause rendition of an improper judgment or prevented the appellant from making a proper
presentation of the case to the court. '47 The cumulative error doctrine, however, "has evolved almost exclusively in cases involving im-

proper jury argument or jury misconduct."48
IV.

A.

PRETRIAL RULINGS

Subject Matter Jurisdictionand Standing
At a hearing on a plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court determines

the issues of subject matter jurisdiction and standing solely by the
allegations in the plaintiff's pleading, and the allegations must be

taken as true.49 Unless the petition affirmatively demonstrates an absence of jurisdiction, the trial court construes the petition liberally in
v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196, 206, 205 S.W.2d 979, 985 (1947); Elbar, Inc. v. Claussen, 774 S.W.2d
45, 52 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ dism'd).
44. Pirtle, 629 S.W.2d at 920; McCauley v. Consolidated Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475,
478, 304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (1957); Claussen, 774 S.W.2d at 52.
45. McCormick v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 751 S.W.2d 887, 892 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied); see Strange v. Treasure City, 608 S.W.2d 604,
609 (Tex. 1980) (considering whether cumulative effect of acts of misconduct resulted in
injury).
46. TEX. R. App. P. 81(b)(1); Mercy Hosp. v. Rios, 776 S.W.2d 626, 637 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1989, writ denied); McCormick, 751 S.W.2d at 892.
47. McCormick, 751 S.W.2d at 892.
48. Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v. Gray, 730 S.W.2d 796, 809-10 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1987, no writ). See generally Jack Kenneth Dahlberg, Analysis of Cumulative Error in the
Harmless-ErrorDoctrine: A Case Study, 12 TEX. TECH L. REV. 561 (1981) (noting that cumulative error frequently involves jury argument).
49. Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 36 Tex. Sup Ct. J. 607, 611 (Mar.
3, 1993); North Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Texas Dep't of Health, 839 S.W.2d 455, 457
(Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied); Goad v. Goad, 768 S.W.2d 356, 358 (Tex. App.-
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favor of jurisdiction. 50 If, however, a trial court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, it has no discretion and must dismiss the case.5" A trial
court's ruling when it lacks subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental
error, which must be noted and reviewed by the appellate court at any
52
time it appears.
Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of
law reviewable by mandamus or appeal.53 When reviewing an order
of dismissal for want of jurisdiction, the reviewing court construes the
pleadings in favor of the pleader in an effort to look to the pleader's
intent.54 Only matters presented to the trial court will be reviewed
upon appeal from the order dismissing the case for want of
jurisdiction.55
A court determines whether an individual has standing by analyzing whether there is a real controversy between the parties, which is
determined by the judicial declaration sought.56 An association has
standing to sue on behalf of its members if "(a) its members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c)
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. '"57 The standard of review applicable to subject matter jurisdiction applies to standing.58

Texarkana 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990); Huston v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
663 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
50. Peek v. Equipment Serv. Co., 779 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. 1989).
51. Qwest Microwave, Inc. v. Bedard, 756 S.W.2d 426, 440 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987,

orig. proceeding).
52. Texas Employment Comm'n v. International Union of Elect., Radio & Mach. Workers, 163 Tex. 135, 135, 352 S.W.2d 252, 253 (1961); Fincher v. City of Texarkana, 598 S.W.2d

22, 23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Rogers v. Clinton, 794 S.W.2d
9, 11 (Tex. 1990, orig. proceeding) (stating that court order made in absence of jurisdiction
constituted abuse of discretion for which mandamus could issue).
53. North Alamo Water Supply Corp., 839 S.W.2d at 457; Qwest Microwave, Inc., 756
S.W.2d at 436.
54. Texas Ass'n of Business, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 611; Huston, 663 S.W.2d at 129;
Paradissis v. Royal Indem. Co., 496 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1973), afd, 507 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1974).
55. Huston, 663 S.W.2d at 129 (citing Paradissis,496 S.W.2d at 148).
56. Texas Ass'n of Business, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 611; Board of Water Eng'g v. City of
San Antonio, 155 Tex. 111, 114, 283 S.W.2d 722, 724 (1955).
57. Texas Ass'n of Business, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 611 (citing Hunt v. Washington St.
Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
58. Id.
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Special Appearance
"By entering a special appearance pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil

Procedure 120a, a nonresident bears the burden of proof to show his
lack of amenability to long-arm process. . . . "9 The nonresident defendant has the burden to negate all bases of personal jurisdiction the

plaintiff alleged to support personal jurisdiction.'

A trial court hear-

ing a Rule 120a motion should "only consider arguments regarding

the forum's jurisdiction over the defendant, and not any arguments
concerning defects in service."6 All of the evidence before the trial
court on the question of personal or in rem jurisdiction is considered
in determining the propriety of the trial court's ruling.62 In one case,
the supreme court exercised de novo review of the facts found by the
trial court.6 3
C.

Venue

In determining whether the trial court improperly transferred a
case to another county under Rules 86 and 87, 6' the reviewing court
must consider the entire record, including the trial on the merits.65
Appellate review of the venue determination, thus, differs greatly

from the scope of the decision made by the trial court because the
appellate court must rule solely on the basis of certain documents,
without the benefit of live testimony and the entire record. 66 Thus,
59. Runnells v. Firestone, 746 S.W.2d 845, 848 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), writ
denied per curiam, 760 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1988).
60. Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 203 (Tex. 1985); Siskind v. Villa
Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. 1982).
61. Middleton v. Kawasaki Steel Corp., 687 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.]), writ ref'd n.r.e., 699 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1985).
62. Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 359 (Tex. 1990); Hotel Partners v. KPMG
Peat Marwick, 847 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ); Carbonit Houston,
Inc. v. Exchange Bank, 628 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
63. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 359. Contra Hotel Partners, 847 S. W.2d at 632 (holding
that standard of review is factual sufficiency, not de novo review); Runnells, 746 S.W.2d at 849
(indicating that when trial court overrules special appearance, parties should request trial
court to make findings of fact, which are reviewable for factual and legal sufficiency).
64. TEX. R. Civ. P. 86, 87.
65. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (Vernon 1986); Ruiz v. Conoco,
Inc., 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 412, 417-18 (Dec. 31, 1992). See generally TEX. R. Civ. P. 255-59
(allowing change of venue based on prejudicial venue).
66. TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(a); Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Carter, 778 S.W.2d 911, 915
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied); Texas City Refining, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 767
S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
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the trial court might properly overrule a motion to transfer venue and
later determine, based on additional evidence or evidence presented
during trial, that venue lies in another county.6 7 Appellate courts
have criticized this review standard and have observed that review of

venue decisions is the one situation when an appellate court may review a matter upon which the trial court had no opportunity to act.68
Nevertheless, the appellate court reviews the trial court's determina-

tion by examining the entire record. 69 If venue was improper, the
case must be reversed.7 ° When venue was proper in both the county

from which the case was transferred and the county to which the case
was transferred, the appellate courts are split on the issue of whether
the transfer constitutes harmless error or reversible error.7 '
D.

Default Judgment

A default judgment is entered against a defendant who fails to
make timely answer although she was properly served.7 2 A postan-

swer default occurs when a defendant has answered, but has failed to
make an appearance at trial. 73 Different rules apply to set aside a
default judgment depending on whether the judgment was proper (it
was secured in accordance with the statutes and rules) or was defective (it was not secured in accordance with the statutes and rules).

1. Proper Default Judgment
A three-part test for determining whether a court should grant a
motion for new trial to set aside a proper default judgment was set
forth in the leading case, Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc.74 A
67. Texas City Refining, Inc., 767 S.W.2d at 185.
68. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 778 S.W.2d at 915; Texas City Refining, Inc., 767 S.W.2d at
185.
69. See Ruiz, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 417 (rejecting "preponderance of the evidence" review
and noting confusion in interpreting, applying, and harmonizing Rule 87 and § 15.064(b)).
70. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (Vernon 1986).
71. Compare Marantha Temple v. Enterprise Prods. Co., 833 S.W.2d 736, 740-41 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (holding error is reversible) and Cox Eng'g v.
Funston Mach. & Supply Co., 749 S.W.2d 508, 511-12 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ)
(holding error is reversible) with Lewis v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 786 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied) (holding error is harmless) and Lone Star Steel Co. v. Scott,
759 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied) (holding error is harmless).
72. TEX. R. Civ. P. 239; see Michael A. Pohl & David Hittner, Judgments by Default in
Texas, 37 Sw. L.J. 421, 422 (1983) (discussing grounds for default judgment).
73. Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex. 1979).
74. 134 Tex. 388, 392-93, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (1939); see also Holt Atherton Indus., Inc.
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trial court may set aside a default judgment and order a new trial in
any case when the defendant's failure to answer before judgment was
not intentional, or the result of conscious indifference on his part, but
was due to a mistake or an accident.75 The motion for new trial must
set up a meritorious defense 76 and must be filed at a time when the
granting of the motion will occasion no delay, or otherwise work an
injury to the plaintiff.7 7 The Craddock standards apply also to a post-

answer default judgment. 71 If the facts underlying the default judgment are disputed, the trial court may, but is not required to, make
findings in support of its ruling. 79 These findings will be reviewed
under sufficiency of the evidence standards. In the absence of fact
findings, the judgment must be upheld on any legal theory having sufficient support in the evidence.8 0
The trial court determines whether the defendant has satisfied the
Craddock test, and the court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion.8 ' "However, the trial
courts should exercise liberality in favor of a defaulted party having a
day in court in passing on a motion for new trial and the sufficiency of
v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Tex. 1992); Bank One, N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81, 82-83 &
n.2 (Tex. 1992) (reaffirming three-part test).
75. A slight excuse will suffice. Harmon Truck Lines, Inc. v. Steele, 836 S.W.2d 262, 265
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ dism'd). If there is controverting evidence on this issue, the
court must judge the credibility and weight of the witnesses' testimony. See Strackbein v.
Prewitt, 671 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Tex. 1984) (analyzing evidence presented in motion for new trial).
The conclusion that the failure to answer was intentional must be supported by evidence and
be correct as a matter of law. Id.
76. A meritorious defense is one that if proved would cause a different result upon retrial
of the case, although it does not have to be a totally opposite result. See Holliday v. Holliday,
72 Tex. 581, 585, 10 S.W. 690, 692 (1889) (stating that defense must be set forth to establish at
least prima-facie case). The defendant must allege facts which in law would constitute a defense to the plaintiff's claim and are supported by evidence. Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212,
214 (Tex. 1966).
77. Craddock, 134 Tex. at 391, 133 S.W.2d at 126; see Angelo v. Champion Restaurant
Equip. Co., 713 S.W.2d 96, 97 (Tex. 1986) (reaffirming Craddock).
78. E.g., LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 778 S.W.2d 865, 865 (Tex. 1989); Lopez v. Lopez, 757
S.W.2d 721, 722 (Tex. 1988); Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778, 779 (Tex. 1987); Grissom v.
Watson, 704 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Tex. 1986); Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966).
79. See Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc., 724 S.W.2d 931, 940 (Tex. App.-Austin
1987, no writ) (explaining value of trial court record, fact findings, and conclusions); Dallas
Heating Co., Inc. v. Pardee, 561 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(recognizing that if facts are undisputed, trial court findings of fact are unauthorized).
80. Strackbein, 671 S.W.2d at 38; O'Connell v. O'Connell, 843 S.W.2d 212, 217 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ); Cope v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 752 S.W.2d 608,
609 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ).
81. Cliff, 724 S.W.2d at 778; Grissom, 704 S.W.2d at 326; Strackbein, 671 S.W.2d at 38.
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the supporting evidence." 82 Further, when the court determines that
the guidelines of Craddock have been met, it is an abuse of discretion
to deny a new trial.83
2.

Defective Default Judgment

If the default judgment is not rendered in compliance with the statutes and rules and the defect is apparent on the face of the record, the
judgment may be set aside by: a motion to set aside, a motion for new
trial, an appeal, or a writ of error to the court of appeals. In reviewing a default judgment under any of these remedies, both trial and
reviewing courts may only consider errors that appear on the face of
the record.84 A motion for new trial following a defective default
judgment does not have to meet the Craddock requirements, and
should not be confused with a motion for new trial after a proper
default judgment.85 It is imperative that the record affirmatively show
strict compliance with the provided mode of service." "This showing
must be made from the record as it existed before the trial court when
the default judgment was signed, unless the record is amended pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 118. "87
A defendant against whom a defective default judgment has been
82. Sexton v. Sexton, 737 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
83. J.H. Walker Trucking v. Allen Lund Co., 832 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Blake v. Blake, 725 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1987, no writ); O'Hara v. Hexter, 550 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). If the facts underlying the default judgment are disputed, the trial court may
make findings in support of its ruling, which will be reviewed under the same factual and legal
standards as those for findings of fact after a trial on the merits. Dallas Heating Co., Inc., 561
S.W.2d at 19; see also Landon, 724 S.W.2d at 940. In the absence of fact findings, the judgment must be upheld on any legal theory that finds support in the evidence. Strackbein, 671
S.W.2d at 38; see also Cope, 752 S.W.2d at 609.
84. Stubbs v. Stubbs, 685 S.W.2d 643, 644-45 (Tex. 1985); see also United Nat'l Bank v.
Travel Music, 737 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); First Dallas
Petroleum, Inc. v. Hawkins, 727 S.W.2d 640, 642-44 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ). See
generally Part XIV, infra.
85. Dan Edge Motors, Inc. v. Scott, 657 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983,
no writ).
86. Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. 1985);
McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965).
87. Cox Marketing, Inc. v. Adams, 688 S.W.2d 215, 217-18 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985);
see Higginbotham v. General Life & Accident Ins. Co., 796 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. 1990) (Phillips, C.J., dissenting, joined by Cook, Hightower & Hecht, JJ.) (quoting Cox Marketing, 688
S.W.2d at 217-18); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 118 (allowing amendment to record regarding
proof of service).
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taken may urge the error for the first time on appeal, unless the nature
of the error requires that evidence be presented and a finding of fact
be made by the trial court. 88 Absent this need for evidence, the default judgment is reviewed to determine whether it was rendered in
compliance with the statutes and rules on appeal.
E. Plea in Abatement
"A plea in abatement is a plea setting forth some obstacle to further
prosecution of the cause until it is removed, and if the plea is sustained the action is abated until the impediment is removed."8 9
Abuse of discretion is the standard of review in determining a trial
court's action granting or denying a plea in abatement.9 0 The propriety of sustaining or overruling a plea in abatement depends upon the
evidence adduced at the hearing on the plea, and, on appeal, the party
challenging the trial court's action must file a statement of facts from
the hearing.9 1 If the trial court sustains the plea without hearing evidence, the appellate court "must accept allegations of fact in the petition as true and indulge every reasonable inference" in support of the
allegations.92
F.

Special Exceptions

"A petition is sufficient if it gives fair and adequate notice of the
facts on which the pleader bases his claim." 9 3 If no special exceptions
are filed, the court will construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the
pleader.94 If a pleading fails to give fair notice,9 5 the defendant should
88. TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(1); see also Bronze & Beautiful, Inc. v. Mahone, 750 S.W.2d
28, 29 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, no writ).
89. Mercure Co. v. Rowland, 715 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Hartley v. Coker, 843 S.W.2d 743, 746-48 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1992, no writ) (discussing mandatory abatement, its exceptions, and discretionary abatement).
90. Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1988); Arbor v. Black, 695
S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985); Dolenz v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 620 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex.
1981); Project Eng'g USA Corp. v. Gator Hawk, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 716, 724 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Space Master Int'l, Inc. v. Porta-Kamp Mfg. Co., 794
S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
91. Vestal v. Jackson, 598 S.W.2d 724, 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
92. Jenkins v. State, 570 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978,
no writ).
93. City of Houston v. Howard, 786 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]

1990, writ denied) (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 45).
94. Texas Health Enters., Inc. v. Krell, 828 S.W.2d 192, 206 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi), vacated by agr., 830 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1992); see Paramount Pipe & Supply Co. v.
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specially except to the petition pursuant to Rule 91.96 Special exceptions must "point out intelligibly and with particularity the defect,
omission, obscurity, duplicity, generality, or other insufficiency in the
allegations, ' 97 or otherwise require the adverse party to clarify his
pleadings "when they [the pleadings] are not clear or sufficiently specific." 98 In fact, the trial court has wide latitude "in hearing, construing, and sustaining special exceptions." 99 If a trial court sustains one
party's special exceptions, the opposing party must be given an opportunity to amend its pleading before the case is dismissed.' °° If the
defect in the pleading is not cured after amendment, the trial court
may dismiss the case.'° In reviewing the trial court's order of dismissal upon special exceptions, the appellate court is required to accept

"as true all material factual propositions alleged and all factual statements reasonably inferred from the allegations" set forth in the plead-

ing.1°2 The trial court's ruling is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. 103
If, however, the pleading deficiency cannot be cured by an amendment, a special exception is unnecessary and a summary judgment
based on the pleadings is appropriate." ° The distinction is that "in-

Muhr, 749 S.W.2d 491, 496 (Tex. 1988) (holding that petition gave fair notice of attorney's
fees demand, although would have been properly attacked by special exception).
95. "The test of fair notice is whether an opposing attorney of reasonable competence,
with the pleadings before him, can determine the nature of the controversy and the testimony
probably relevant." Howard, 786 S.W.2d at 393.
96. TEX. R. Civ. P. 91.
97. Id.
98. Villareal v. Martinez, 834 S.W.2d 450, 451 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no
writ).
99. City of Austin v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 844 S.W.2d 773, 783 (Tex. App.Dallas 1992, writ denied) (citing Bader v. Cox, 701 S.W.2d 677, 686 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
100. Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1983) (quoting Texas Dep't
of Corrections v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Tex. 1974)); Parras v. McLelland, 846 S.W.2d 44,
45 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
101. Massey, 652 S.W.2d at 934; Russell v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 746
S.W.2d 510, 512-13 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied).
102. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 844 S.W.2d at 783; Villareal, 834 S.W.2d at 452;
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Shubert, 646 S.W.2d 270, 277-78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1983, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Armendariz v. Bill Sears Supermarket No. 1, 562 S.W.2d 529, 530 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
103. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 844 S.W.2d at 783 (citing Bader, 701 S.W.2d at 686).
104. Hidalgo v. Surety Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 462 S.W.2d 540, 543 n.1 (Tex. 1979); e.g.,
James v. Hitchcock Indep. Sch. Dist., 742 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1987, writ denied); Gay v. State, 730 S.W.2d 154, 158-59 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, no
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adequately pleading a cause of action" warrants a special exception,
while "utterly failing to plead a viable cause of action" warrants a
summary judgment. 105 Nevertheless, the cautious practitioner should
specially except to the pleading deficiency. If the plaintiff fails to correct the deficiency after being given an opportunity to replead, then
the defendant should move for summary judgment. 106
G. Temporary and PermanentInjunctions
At a hearing upon the request for a temporary injunction, the only
question before the trial court is "whether the applicant is entitled to
the preservation of the status quo of the subject matter of the suit
pending trial on the merits."' 7 To be entitled to a temporary injunction, the movant must show: (1) a probable right to recovery; (2) that
imminent, irreparable harm will occur in the interim if the request is
not granted; and (3) that no adequate remedy at law exists.'O1
Every order granting a temporary injunction must "include an order setting the cause for a trial on the merits with respect to the ultimate relief sought."' 9 Failure to include an order setting the matter
for a trial on the merits mandates dissolution of the injunction." 0
Furthermore, "the trial court's stated reasons for granting or denying
a temporary injunction must be specific and legally sufficient and not
merely conclusory. ' " 11 The trial court is not required to explain its
writ); Jacobs v. Cude, 641 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
105. Chambers v. Huggins, 709 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985,

no writ).
106. See Baubles & Beads v. Louis Vuitton, S.A., 766 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1989, no writ) (explaining that summary judgment may be based on plaintiff's failure to plead cause of action after given opportunity to replead).
107. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978); e.g., University of Tex. Med.
School at Houston v. Than, 834 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1992, no
writ); Alamo Say. Ass'n v. Forward Constr. Corp., 746 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1988, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
108. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 424 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. 1968); Inex Indus., Inc. v.
Alpar Resources, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ); see TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.011 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993) (listing general
grounds for injunctive relief); Bob E. Shannon et al., Temporary RestrainingOrders and Temporary Injunctions in Texas-A Ten Year Survey, 1975-1985, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 689, 700-21
(1986) (setting forth factors courts considered in determining whether to issue injunctive
relief).
109. TEX. R. Civ. P. 683.
110. InterFirst Bank San Felipe v. Paz Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1986).
111. Arrechea v. Plantowsky, 705 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
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reasons for concluding that the applicant has shown a probable right
to final relief, but the court is required to give the reasons why it
1 12
believes injury will result if the interlocutory relief is not ordered.
Failure to meet these requirements renders the order "fatally defective
and void, thereby requiring reversal, even if the issue is not raised
specifically by [a] point of error."' 13
Because an appeal of an order granting or denying a temporary
injunction, or granting or overruling a motion to dissolve a temporary
injunction, is an appeal from an interlocutory order," 4 the merits of
the movant's case are not considered upon appeal.'" Appellate review is, therefore, strictly limited to whether the trial court has clearly
abused discretion." 6 The appellate court should not substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court, but rather it should merely determine whether the trial court's action was so arbitrary that it exceeded
the bounds of reasonable discretion.' 17 The trial court abuses its discretion when the court misapplies the law to "the established facts or
when the evidence does not reasonably support the conclusion that
the applicant has a probable right of recovery.""'
Additionally,
1985, no writ); Martin v. Linen Sys. for Hosps. Inc., 671 S.W.2d 706, 710 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ); University Interscholastic League v. Torres, 616 S.W.2d 355,
357-58 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
112. TEX. R. Civ. P. 683; State v. Cook United, Inc., 464 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Tex. 1971);
Transport Co. v. Robertson Transp. Inc., 152 Tex. 551, 556, 261 S.W.2d 549, 552 (1953); e.g.,
Than, 834 S.W.2d at 428; Hellenic Inv., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 766 S.W.2d 861, 863-64 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ); Public Util. Comm'n v. City of Austin, 710 S.W.2d
658, 660 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ); Beckham v. Beckham, 672 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
113. Arrechea, 705 S.W.2d at 189; Torres, 616 S.W.2d at 358.
114. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (defining
when person may appeal from interlocutory order).
115. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex. 1978); Sherrod v. Moore, 819 S.W.2d 201,
202 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, no writ).
116. Davis, 571 S.W.2d at 861-62; State v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 526 S.W.2d 526,
528 (Tex. 1975); Janus Films, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 163 Tex. 616, 358 S.W.2d 589, 590
(1962); Transport Co., 152 Tex. at 556, 261 S.W.2d at 552; Uniden Am. Corp. v. Trunking
Assoc., 841 S.W.2d 522, 523 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, no writ).
117. Davis, 571 S.W.2d at 862; Sherrod, 819 S.W.2d at 202; Philipp Bros., Inc. v. Oil
Country Specialists, Ltd., 709 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1986, writ
dism'd).
118. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 526 S.W.2d at 528; Uniden Am. Corp., 841 S.W.2d at
523; Than, 834 S.W.2d at 429; City of San Antonio v. Bee-Jay Enter., Inc., 626 S.W.2d 802,
804 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ). The court should also consider public interest as
a factor when reviewing a temporary injunction. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Baker,
838 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ).
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"where the facts conclusively show a party is violating the substantive
law, it becomes the duty of the court to enjoin the violation and there
is, therefore, no discretion to be exercised. 19 In reviewing an order
granting or denying a temporary injunction, the appellate court
should draw all legitimate inferences from the evidence in a manner
most favorable to the trial court's judgment. 20
In an appeal from a permanent injunction, the standard of review is
clear abuse of discretion.' 2 ' While "a litigant has a right to a trial by
jury in an equitable injunction action, only ultimate issues of fact are
submitted for jury determination."' 122 A jury will not "determine the
expediency, necessity or propriety of equitable relief."' 23 Thus, the
trial court's order granting or denying a permanent injunction, based
upon the ultimate facts, is reviewed in the same manner as a tempo124
rary injunction is reviewed.
H. Severance and Consolidation of Causes
Pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 41 and 174,' 25 the trial
court may sever or consolidate causes. A trial court will consider essentially the same factors in determining either severance or consolidation. 26 A claim is properly severable if "(1) the controversy
involves more than one cause of action, (2) the severed claim is one
that would be the proper subject of a lawsuit if independently asserted, and (3) the severed claim is not so interwoven with the remaining action that they involve the same facts and issues."'' 27 The
119. Priest & Van Comm'n, Inc. v. Texas Animal Health Comm'n, 780 S.W.2d 874, 876
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ); City of Houston v. Memorial Bend Util. Co., 331 S.W.2d
418, 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1960, writ refd n.r.e.).
120. Miller v. K & M Partnership, 770 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1989, no writ).
121. University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tex. App.Austin, 1993, n.w.h.); Priest & Van Comm'n, Inc., 780 S.W.2d at 875.
122. Id. at 876 (citing State v. Texas Pet Foods, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Tex. 1979)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. TEX. R. Civ. P. 41 (governing misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties); TEX. R. Civ.
P. 174 (authorizing consolidation and separation of trials).
126. Dal-Briar Corp. v. Baskette, 833 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, orig.
proceeding).
127. Guaranty Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex.
1990) (citing Saxer v. Nash Phillips-Copus Co. Real Estate, 678 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. App.Tyler 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); e.g., State Dep't of Highways & Publ. Transp. v. Cotner, 845
S.W.2d 818, 819 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam); Coalition of Cities for Affordable Util. Rates v.
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primary justifications for granting a severance are to "do justice,
avoid prejudice, and further convenience."

'2 8

Rule 41 gives the trial

court broad discretion in the matter of severance, and the trial court's
decision to grant a severance will not be reversed absent an abuse of
that discretion.1 29 A trial court may not, however, sever a case after it

30
has been submitted to the trier of fact.'
Similarly, the trial court has broad discretion to consolidate cases
pursuant to Rule 174.13' The express purpose of Rule 174 is to fur32

ther convenience, avoid prejudice, and promote the ends of justice.

The trial court's rulings on consolidation are within the discretion of
the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion
33
that is prejudicial to the complaining party.1
I.

Intervention

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 60'14 allows a party to intervene in
an existing cause of action, "subject to being stricken by the court for
sufficient cause on the motion of any party."'' 35 A party, however,
may not intervene during the time period after a judgment has been
Public Util. Comm'n of Tex., 798 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Tex. 1990); McGuire v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co. of N.Y., 431 S.W.2d 347, 351 (Tex. 1968); Kansas Univ. Endowment Ass'n v.
King, 162 Tex. 599, 611-12, 350 S.W.2d 11, 19 (1961).
128. Guaranty Fed. Sav. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 658 (citing St. Paul Ins. Co. v. McPeak,
641 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ refd n.r.e.)); State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Wilborn, 835 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992,
orig. proceeding).
129. Guaranty Fed. Say. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 658; Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause,
641 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. 1982); McGuire, 431 S.W.2d at 351; Tracy v. Annie's Attic, Inc.,
840 S.W.2d 527, 540 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied); see Wilborn, 835 S.W.2d at 261
(stating that "trial court has wide discretion to order or not order separate trials when judicial
convenience is served and prejudice avoided").
130. Cotner, 845 S.W.2d at 819 (quoting Coalition of Citiesfor Affordable Util. Rates, 793
S.W.2d at 564).
131. Cherokee Water Co., 641 S.W.2d at 525 (Tex. 1982); Adams v. Petrade Int'l, Inc.,
754 S.W.2d 696, 721 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
132. Womack v. Berry, 156 Tex. 44, 51, 291 S.W.2d 677, 683 (1956); Dal BriarCorp., 833
S.W.2d at 615.
133. Cherokee Water Co., 641 S.W.2d at 525; Allison v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 624
S.W.2d 566, 528 (Tex. 1981); Womack, 156 Tex. at 51, 291 S.W.2d at 683; Lone Star Ford,
Inc. v. McCormick, 838 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied);
General Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Handy, 766 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989,
no writ); Marshall v. Harris, 764 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig.
proceeding); Adams, 745 S.W.2d at 721.
134. TEX. R. Civ. P. 60.
135. Id.
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signed and the trial court's jurisdiction has expired. 13 6 "[U]nder Rule
60, a person or entity has the right to intervene if the intervenor could
have brought the same action, or any part thereof, in his own name,
or if the action had been brought against him, he would be able to
defeat recovery, or some part thereof.' 3 7 The asserted interest may
' An intervenor does not have the burden of
be legal or equitable. 38
seeking permission to intervene; rather, "the party opposing the intervention has the burden to challenge it by a motion to strike."' 39 In
response to the motion, the trial court may: "(a) try the intervention
claim; (b) sever the intervention; (c) order a separate trial on the intervention issues; or (d) strike the intervention for good cause. ' "' ° The
party opposing the intervention must file a motion to strike, and while
the trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the motion, the trial
court abuses its discretion if "(1) the intervenor meets the above test,
(2) the intervention will not complicate the case by excessive multiplication of the issues, and (3) the intervention is almost essential to effectively protect the intervenor's interest." 4 ' Finally, the trial court
abuses its discretion if it strikes a plea in intervention absent a motion
42
to strike. ,

J. Interpleader
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 43, providing for interpleader actions, extends and liberalizes the equitable remedy of bill of inter136. Comal County Rural High Sch. Dist. v. Nelson, 158 Tex. 564, 565-66, 314 S.W.2d
956, 957 (1958); see Highlands Ins. Co. v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 794 S.W.2d 600, 60204 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ) (discussing decisions that denied postjudgment pleas of
intervention).
137. Guaranty Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex.
1990) (citing Inter-Continental Corp. v. Moody, 411 S.W.2d 578, 589 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); Texas Supply Center, Inc. v. Daon Corp., 641 S.W.2d
335, 337 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.)).
138. Guaranty Fed. Say. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657 (citing Moody, 411 S.W.2d at 589);
Mendez v. Bower, 626 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex. 1982).
139. Guaranty Fed. Sav. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657; e.g., Mendez, 626 S.W.2d at 499.
140. Saldana v. Saldana, 791 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
141. Guaranty Fed. Say. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657 (citing Moody, 411 S.W.2d at 589;
Daon Corp., 641 S.W.2d at 337)); H. Tebbs, Inc. v. Silver Eagle Distrib., 797 S.W.2d 80, 84
(Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ); see Metromedia Long Distance, Inc. v. Hughes, 810
S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied) (noting that interventions favored to avoid multiplicity of lawsuits).
142. Tony's Tortilla Factory, Inc. v. First Bank, No. 01-91-00226-CV, 1993 WL 81228 at
*8 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 25, 1993, n.w.h.) (citing Guaranty Fed. Say. Bank,
793 S.W.2d at 657 (Tex. 1990)).
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pleader. 143 Rule 43 permits a disinterested and innocent stakeholder,
who has reasonable doubts about the identity of the party entitled to
the funds or property in his possession, to file in good faith an interpleader action against the claimants.'4" A stakeholder is not required
to be wholly disinterested in the suit, 4 ' he need only show that he
may be exposed to double or multiple liability caused by conflicting
claims, thereby justifying a reasonable doubt, either of law or fact, as
to which claimant is entitled to funds or property. 146 Rule 43 requires
a party filing an interpleader action to establish (1) that he is either
subject to or has reasonable grounds to anticipate rival claims to the
same fund or property, 14 (2) that he has not unreasonably delayed
filing his action for interpleader; 14 s and (3) that he has unconditionally tendered the fund or property to the court. 149 Every reasonable
doubt is resolved in favor of allowing the interpleader.15 0 The granting of interpleader, a final judgment, 1 is within the discretion of the
1 52
trial court.
143. Downing v. Laws, 419 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, writ refd
n.r.e.); Barnett v. Woodland, 310 S.W.2d 644, 747 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1958, writ refd
n.r.e.); see Savings & Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Employees v. Stubbs, 734 S.W.2d 76, 79-80
(Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ) (discussing early and current interpleader practice); I R.
MCDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE IN DISTRICT AND COUNTY COURTS § 564, at 577-83
(rev. 1992) (discussing early and current interpleader practice).
144. United States v. Ray Thomas Gravel Co., 380 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. 1964).
145. Downing, 419 S.W.2d at 219-20.
146. Davis v. East Texas Say. & Loan Ass'n, 163 Tex. 361, 365-66, 354 S.W.2d 926, 930
(1962); K & S Interests, Inc. v. Texas Am. Bank/Dallas, 749 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tex. App.Dallas 1988, writ denied); Stubbs, 734 S.W.2d at 79.
147. Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 525 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. 1975); Ray
Thomas Gravel Co., 380 S.W.2d at 580; Davis, 163 Tex. at 365-66, 354 S.W.2d at 930; Stubbs,
734 S.W.2d at 70.
148. Stubbs, 734 S.W.2d at 79.
149. Id.; Cockrum v. Cal-Zona Corp., 373 S.W.2d 572, 574-75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas

1963, no writ).
150. Nixon v. Malone, 100 Tex. 250, 262-63, 98 S.W. 380, 385 (1906); Stubbs, 734
S.W.2d at 79; Dallas Bank & Trust Co. v. Commonwealth Dev. Corp., 686 S.W.2d 226, 230
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
151. K & S Interests, 749 S.W.2d at 889; Taliaferro v. Texas Commerce Bank, 660
S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
152. Danner v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 496 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1973, no writ); Reid v. Uhlhorn, 359 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962,
writ dism'd w.o.j.).
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Discovery Rulings
1. Requests for Admissions

After a lawsuit is commenced, a party may "serve on any other
party a written request" for admissions pursuant to Rule 169.153 If
the party to whom the request is directed does not respond within
thirty days after service of the request (fifty days if served with the
citation and petition), the subjects of the request "are automatically
deemed admitted and the trial court has no discretion to deem, or
refuse to deem, the admissions admitted." ' ' The admitted matter "is
conclusively established as to the party making the admission, unless
the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the
15 5
admission."
When admissions are deemed against a party, the party should file
56
a motion to withdraw or amend the admissions as soon as possible.'
Rule 169(2) permits the trial court to allow a party to withdraw or
amend admissions "upon a showing of good cause for such withdrawal or amendment if the court finds that the parties relying upon
the responses and deemed admissions will not be unduly prejudiced
and that the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby.""5 7 The motion should, therefore, allege that: (1) there is
good cause for not having responded to the request on time; (2) allowing withdrawal of the admissions will not "unduly" prejudice the
party relying on the deemed admissions; and (3) the case can be
presented on the merits following the withdrawal of the admission.
"The 'good cause' requirement is a threshold issue, which must be
determined before the trial judge can even consider the remaining requirements set forth in the rule."'5 8 The moving party should also
attach affidavits setting out detailed facts supporting the elements of

153. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169(1).
154. Fibreboard Corp. v. Pool, 813 S.W.2d 658, 682 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no
writ).
155. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169(2); see Smith v. Home Indem. Co., 683 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ) (stating that admissions may not be contradicted by evidence once they are deemed).
156. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Halton, 792 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1990, writ denied) (finding counsel's speedy action in moving to withdraw admissions factor in
good cause determination).
157. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169(2).
158. Boone v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 790 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1990, no writ).
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the rule, and attach the answers it would have filed.'" 9
A trial court has wide latitude to permit "the withdrawal or
amendment of admissions, and its ruling will only be set aside on appeal on a showing of clear abuse of discretion."' 16 The reviewing
court should consider that the objective of the rules of procedure is
"to obtain a just, fair, equitable and impartial adjudication of the
rights of the litigants,"' 6' and that "the purpose of Rule 169 is to
simplify trials and eliminate matters about which there is no real controversy."'' 62 The court should also consider that the rules "should
not be construed in such a manner that they will prevent a litigant
163
from presenting the truth to the trier of facts."'
In Employers Insuranceof Wausau v. Halton, '6 the court observed
the similarity between a motion to set aside a default judgment, occasioned by a failure to file a timely answer, and a motion to set aside
admissions of fact, occasioned by a party's failure to file timely proper
responses. 65 Thus, a party may establish "good cause" by showing
that she did not act intentionally or with conscious disregard in failing
to file timely answers to the requests. 66 Under this lenient standard,
"even a slight excuse will suffice, especially where delay or prejudice
' 67
will not result against the opposing party.'
159. The party seeking to withdraw admissions should request a hearing on its motion. It
should notify the court reporter that a record of the hearing will be required. At the hearing,
the moving party must present evidence, and witnesses that are necessary to convince the trial
court to permit withdrawal of the deemed admissions. See Laycox v. Jaroma, Inc., 709 S.W.2d
2, 3 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ refd n.r.e.) (presenting scenario where failure to
file timely answers resulted in summary judgment). Following the presentation of evidence,
the party should obtain a ruling on its motion. See id. (explaining that failure to obtain ruling
precluded further complaint of trial court action).
160. Bell v. Hair, 832 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied); e.g., Rosenthal v. National Terrazzo Tile & Marble, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ). Mandamus relief is not available to review a trial
court's actions on deemed admissions. Sutherland v. Moore, 716 S.W.2d 119, 120-21 (Tex.
App.-E1 Paso 1986, orig. proceeding).
161. North River Ins. Co. v. Greene, 824 S.W.2d 697, 700 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992,
writ denied) (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 1).
162. Id. (citing Sanders v. Harder, 148 Tex. 593, 597, 227 S.W.2d 206, 208 (1950)).
163. Id. (citing Bynum v. Shatto, 514 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1974, writ refd n.r.e.)).
164. 792 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
165. Id. at 465-66.
166. Id.; see Fibreboard Corp. v. Pool, 813 S.W.2d 658, 683 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1991, no writ) (noting that "[g]ood cause can be shown even though a party may have been
negligent, if his negligence does not rise to the level of conscious indifference").
167. Greene, 824 S.W.2d at 700; Esparza v. Diaz, 802 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. App.-
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Under Rule 215(4), an evasive or incomplete answer may be treated
as a deemed admission. 168 The requesting party may challenge the
sufficiency of the answers or objections, and if the court finds the answer insufficient under Rule 169, the court may order the matter admitted or an amended answer be served.169 The trial court's order is
170
reviewed for an abuse of discretion based upon the entire record.
2.

Supplementation of Discovery Responses

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166b(6), 1 71 a party
whose responses to a discovery request were correct and complete
when made is generally under no duty to supplement the response to
include after-acquired information. 172 Under certain circumstances,
however, a duty to supplement may exist. A duty to supplement may
1 73
be ordered by the court or created by agreement of the parties.
Furthermore, a party must supplement if he or she obtains information, and on the basis of that information "knows that the response
either was incorrect or incomplete when made,"'' 74 or discovers that
"though correct and complete when made, [the response] is no longer
true and complete and the circumstances are such that failure to
amend the response is in substance misleading."'' 75 Finally, a duty to
supplement arises when a party expects to call an expert witness and
the expert's identity or the subject matter of the expert's testimony
"has not been previously disclosed in response to an appropriate in176
quiry directly addressed to the matter."'
The party supplementing discovery must serve his supplemental
discovery "not less than thirty days prior to the beginning of trial
unless the court finds good cause" for allowing late supplementaHouston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ). While a clerical error may constitute good cause, being
busy and overworked is not good cause. Greene, 824 S.W.2d at 700-01.
168. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(4)(a).

169. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(4)(b); see U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Maness, 775 S.W.2d 748, 749-50
(Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1989, writ refused) (rendering insufficient answers as deemed

admissions).
170. Maness, 775 S.W.2d at 751.
171. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(6).

172. Id.
173. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(6)(c).
174. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(6)(a)(1).

175. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(6)(a)(2); Boothe v. Hausler, 766 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Tex. 1989).
176. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(6)(b).
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tion.' 77 Pursuant to Rule 215(5),178 the sanction for failing to comply
with the duty to supplement is exclusion of the evidence affected by
the violation, unless the offending party demonstrates good cause for

the failure to supplement. 1 79 "The salutary purpose of Rule 215(5) is

to require complete responses to discovery so as to promote responsible assessment of settlement and to prevent trial by ambush."1 0 The
party offering the evidence has the burden of establishing good
cause.18 ' The trial court's determination on the issue of good cause
will not be set aside unless there is an abuse of discretion. 8 2 If the
party offering the evidence fails to establish good cause, and the trial
court admits the evidence over the opposing party's objection, the objecting party must show that the trial court's error "was reasonably
calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment."' 8 3 The appellate court will determine if the error
probably caused the
rendition of an improper judgment in light of the
18 4
whole.
a
record as
a. Fact Witnesses
If a fact witness is not disclosed at least thirty days prior to the
beginning of trial after a proper discovery request, the witness cannot
be called to testify.18 5 There are two exceptions to this harsh sanc177. TEX. R. Cv. P. 166b(6).
178. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5).
179. Id.
180. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Specia, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 673, 674 (Mar. 24, 1993)
(orig. proceeding) (quoting Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Tex. 1992)).
181. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5); e.g., Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394, 395
(Tex. 1989). The automatic exclusion in Rule 215(5) no longer applies when the original trial
date is continued and the date set is more than thirty days from the date of the original trial
date. H.B. Zachary Co. v. Gonzalez, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 526, 527 (Feb. 3, 1993).
182. Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1986).
183. TEX. R. App. P. 81(b); McKinney v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 772 S.W.2d 72,
75 (Tex. 1989).
184. McKinney, 772 S.W.2d at 75; Pittman v. Baladez, 158 Tex. 372, 381, 312 S.W.2d
210, 216 (1958).
185. See Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 830 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Tex. 1992) (citing Sharp
v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 784 S.W.2d 669, 670-72 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam)); Rainbow Baking
Co. v. Stafford, 787 S.W.2d 41, 41-42 (Tex. 1990); Gee, 765 S.W.2d at 395-97; McKinney, 772
S.W.2d at 73-76; Clark v. Trailways, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 644, 644 (Tex.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1074 (1989); Boothe, 766 S.W.2d at 645-48; E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d
363, 364 (Tex. 1987); Gutierrez v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 729 S.W.2d 691, 693-94 (Tex.
1987); Morrow, 714 S.W.2d at 297-98; Yeldell v. Holiday Hills Retirement & Nursing Ctr.,
Inc., 701 S.W.2d 243, 244-45 (Tex. 1985)) (noting that exclusory sanction has been problematic for courts).
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tion. Under the first exception, a party offering unidentified witness
testimony may demonstrate good cause, on the record, so that the
trial court will allow the testimony. 8 6 However, trying to define
"good cause" is like trying to define "abuse of discretion." It is easier
to define what is not "good cause." 11 7 The good cause concept does
not require the proponent of the witness to show good cause for failing to designate the witness timely; rather, the proponent must show
good cause for admitting the late-designated witness's testimony.'
Under the second exception, a party to the suit, although not disclosed as a person with knowledge of relevant facts in response to
interrogatories propounded by the opposing party, may testify at trial.
This exception applies when the identity of the party "is certain and
when his or her knowledge of relevant facts has been communicated
to all other parties, through pleadings by name and response[s] to

186. Gee, 765 S.W.2d at 395-96.
187. See Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914 (noting that defining good cause rule is very problematic). The Texas Supreme Court has stated that the importance of the witness to the case
should not be considered as an element in determining good cause. Clark, 774 S.W.2d at 646.
Lack of surprise does not constitute good cause. Morrow, 714 S.W.2d at 298. However, lack
of surprise may be considered as a factor in determining good cause. Gee, 765 S.W.2d at 395
n.2. The importance of the testimony cannot be considered in determining whether good cause
exists for failure to properly designate the witness. Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 915; Clark, 774
S.W.2d at 645-46. Likewise, a party's claim that a denial of the testimony will cause it "great
harm" does not establish good cause. Boothe, 766 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Tex. 1989). In one case,
the plaintiff attempted to introduce the testimony of an investigating officer who had not been
located until ten days before trial. Clark, 774 S.W.2d at 647. The court indicated that if a
witness has been difficult to locate, the party attempting to introduce the evidence must
demonstrate: (1) when the use of the witness was anticipated; (2) when the witness was located; and (3) what good faith efforts were made to locate the witnesses. Id. Mere failure to
locate the witness until the last minute, then, will not suffice absent sufficient efforts to locate
the witness. Id.; see also K-Mart Corp. v. Grebe, 787 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1990, writ denied) (finding plaintiffs search for witness insufficient). The fact that a
party expected a case to settle, and, therefore, did not contact a witness until the day of trial,
does not constitute good cause. Rainbow Baking Co., 787 S.W.2d at 41. "The fact that a
witness' identity is known to all parties is not in itself good cause for the failure to supplement
discovery." Sharp, 784 S.W.2d at 671. The supreme court noted that a party is entitled to
prepare for trial "assured that a witness will not be called because opposing counsel has not
identified him or her in response to a proper interrogatory." Id. Accordingly, the court held
that the fact that a witness has been fully deposed (even if only his deposition testimony will be
offered at trial) is not enough to show good cause for admitting the witness' testimony when
the witness was not identified in response to a proper discovery request. Id. Inadvertence of
counsel does not satisfy the good cause exception. Remington Arms Co. v. Canales, 837
S.W.2d 624, 625 (Tex. 1992, orig. proceeding); Sharp, 784 S.W.2d at 672.
188. Clark, 774 S.W.2d at 645-46.
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other discovery at least thirty days in advance of trial."' 8 9 Though an
undisclosed witness is a party, such does not in and of itself constitute
"good cause. ' 190

b.

Expert Witnesses

Under Rule 166b(2)(e), there are four types of experts: (i) the testifying expert (if an expert will testify at trial, her identity and reports
are discoverable); (ii) the nontestifying expert, whose opinions or reports are reviewed by testifying experts (if a testifying expert reviews
the opinions, impressions, or report of the nontestifying expert, the
nontestifying expert's identity and reports are discoverable); (iii) the
consultant not hired in anticipation of litigation (this consultant's
identity and reports are discoverable, whether or not he testifies);' 9'
and (iv) the nontestifying consultant hired in anticipation of litigation
(this consultant's identity and reports are not discoverable). 92 After
a proper request, if an expert witness is not designated as required by
procedural guidelines, the expert shall not be allowed to testify at
trial, absent a showing of good cause.' 93

Rule 166b(6) provides that expert witnesses must be disclosed in
response to a proper discovery request "as soon as is practical, but in
no event less than thirty days prior to the beginning of trial except on
leave of court."'' 94 The courts of appeals cases have considered the
"as soon as practical" provision and have reached inconsistent results.
189. Smith v. Southwest Feed Yards, 835 S.W.2d 83, 91 (Tex. 1992); e.g., Henry S. Miller
Co. v. Bynum, 836 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1992); Rogers v. Stell, 835 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Tex.
1992) (per curiam); Despain v. Davis, 848 S.W.2d 312, 313-14 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no
writ); Browne v. Las Pintas Ranch, Inc., 845 S.W.2d 370, 372-73 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st

Dist.] 1992, no writ); Guerrero, 846 S.W.2d at 356-57.
190. Smith, 835 S.W.2d at 89; see Guerrero, 846 S.W.2d at 356-57 (limiting good-cause
exception of Rule 215(5) to facts in Smith).
191. See Axelson, Inc., 798 S.W.2d at 554 (stating consulting-only experts who gain information solely through consultation fall within exemption).
192. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(e).
193. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(6)(b) (delineating designation of experts); TEX. R. Civ. P.
215(5) (providing sanction for failure to designate); Sharp, 784 S.W.2d at 671-72 (noting that

finding of good cause for failure to supplement may allow admission of testimony); Clark, 774
S.W.2d at 646 (Tex. 1989) (requiring finding of good cause to excuse failure to respond to
discovery request). In the absence of good cause, a party may not call another party's expert
where the expert was not properly designated in response to discovery. See Bullock v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 843 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ requested) (re-

fusing to allow undesignated witness to be called).
194. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(6).
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In Builder's Equipment Co. v. Onion,19 the defendants did not begin looking in earnest for experts until the case was specially set for
trial. After a three-month search, they hired three experts. One was
designated thirty-five days after being hired, the second was designated forty-six days after being hired, and the third was designated
forty-eight days after being hired. Even though all were designated
more than thirty days prior to trial, the court of appeals held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the defendants had not used due diligence in searching for and identifying its
expert witnesses. 196 The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the
trial court's ruling, which excluded the testimony of experts disclosed
more than thirty days before trial but many months after they were
known to the plaintiff, did not amount to an abuse of discretion.1 97
The appellate court held that the trial court could refuse to allow such
experts to testify if they were not disclosed "as soon as is practical."g19
In other words, the mere fact that an expert is designated more than
thirty days before trial will not preclude the trial court from excluding
the expert's testimony.
In Williams v. Crier,199 the trial court struck the plaintiffs' designation of three expert witnesses 200 pursuant to Builder'sEquipment. On
writ of mandamus, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the defendants-the parties seeking to exclude the expert's testimony-had the
burden to produce evidence that the witnesses had not been designated "as soon as practical."'20 ' The court ruled that there was no

evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that the
plaintiffs had not used due diligence in searching for new witnesses.2 "2
The Williams holding turns on the lack of evidence to support the
trial court's finding.
In Mother FrancesHospital v. Coats,20 3 the trial court struck eight
expert witnesses who were designated thirty-two days before trial.
The plaintiff, who sought to strike the experts, relied upon Builder's
195. 713 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, orig. proceeding).

196. Id. at 788.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id.
734 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, orig. proceeding).
Id. at 192-93.
Id. at 193.
Id.
796 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, orig. proceeding).
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Equipment and argued that the defendants' designation was untimely
and that the defendants failed to show good cause for the late designation. The Tyler Court of Appeals held that Rule 166b(6) only requires a party to show good cause for late designation of witnesses
when the designation is made less than thirty days before trial.2° The
court held also that without a specific pretrial order, a party is not
required to "seek out" her expert witness at any particular time during the pretrial process. 20 5 The court declined to follow Builder's
Equipment and concluded that the rationale of the decision was incorrect. Accordingly, the trial court was instructed to set aside its order,
except as to one of the defendant's witnesses. The defendants had
relied on that witness one year earlier by using her affidavit in support
of a motion for summary judgment.20 6 As to that witness, the court
held that the designation was not "as soon as practical" by any definition.2 °7 Despite this part of the holding, the Tyler court's decision
cannot be reconciled with Builder's Equipment and Williams.
Finally, in Tinsley v. Downey,2 °8 the plaintiff amended his response
to interrogatories to designate eight potential testifying experts four
years after filing his case. On the day of the amendment, the case was
set for trial, with a trial date nine months in the future. The defendant moved to strike the experts and the trial court granted the motion
as to four reconstruction and train experts, but denied the motion as
to the medical experts.
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston set aside the trial
court's order.20 9 Recognizing the disagreement among the courts of
appeals regarding the amount of time that satisfies the "as soon as
practical" requirement,210 the court held that parties are not required
to designate experts as soon as they are contacted, whether they are
contacted for investigative purposes or to testify at trial. 21 The court
concluded that based upon the nature of the lawsuit and the length of
time between the designation of the experts and the trial date, striking
204. Id. at 570-71.

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Coats, 796 S.W.2d at 571.
Id.
822 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding).
Id. at 787.
Id. at 786.
Id. at 787.
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the four expert witnesses was an abuse of discretion.212
c.

Rebuttal Witnesses

The fact that a witness will be used only as a rebuttal witness does
not eliminate the obligation to disclose the witness pursuant to the

duty to supplement discovery. The party offering the witness's testimony must demonstrate good cause for the late disclosure.21 a Good
cause may be established when counsel could not anticipate needing
the evidence.2 14

3. Mandamus Review of Discovery Rulings
In Walker v. Packer,21 5 the supreme court attempted to establish
tighter writ of mandamus parameters to limit future review of discov-

ery rulings. The court identified approximately six categories of discovery rulings that are proper subjects of mandamus review: (1)

when a trial court erroneously orders the discovery of privileged, confidential, or otherwise protected information that will "materially affect the rights of the aggrieved party; '2 16 (2) when a trial court
"compels the production of patently irrelevant or duplicative documents, such that it clearly constitutes harassment or imposes a burden
on the producing party far out of proportion to any benefit that may
obtain to the requesting party; ' 2 17 (3) when a trial court's order vitiates or severely compromises a party's ability to present a viable claim

212. Tinsley, 822 S.W.2d at 787.
213. Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 916-17; AMSAV Group, Inc. v. American Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 796 S.W.2d 482, 486-87 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Ramos v.
Champlin Petroleum Co., 750 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied); Greenstein, Logan & Co. v. Burgess Mktg., Inc., 744 S.W.2d 170, 178-79 (Tex. App.Waco 1987, writ denied).
214. See Gannett Outdoor Co. of Tex. v. Kubeczka, 710 S.W.2d 79, 84 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ) (holding admission of expert's testimony to be based on
good cause when need for testimony as rebuttal witness could not have been anticipated prior
to unexpected false testimony of opponent's witness).
215. 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992, orig. proceeding).
216. Id. at 843 (citing West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1978, orig. proceeding) (concerning attorney-client privilege) and Automatic Drilling Mach. v. Miller, 515 S.W.2d 256
(Tex. 1974, orig. proceeding ) (dealing with trade secrets)).
217. Id. (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Ramirez, 824 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1992) (considering demand for tax returns); General Motors Corp. v. Lawrence, 651 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1983)
(covering demand for information about all vehicles for all years)); see Texas Water Comm'n
v. Dellana, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 680, 682 (Mar. 24, 1993) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (granting mandamus relief vacating order compelling production of "patently irrelevant" discovery).
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or defense, making trial a waste of judicial resources;"' (4) when a

trial court's denial of discovery goes "to the heart" of a party's
case;2 19 (5) when "a trial court disallows discovery and the missing
discovery cannot be made part of the appellate record;" 2 20 and (6)

when a trial court denies discovery and refuses to make the requested
discovery part of the record.221

An appellate court will issue mandamus to set aside a discovery
order when the trial court refuses to perform a ministerial act or duty,
or commits a clear abuse of discretion,222 and when there is no ade-

quate remedy by appeal.22 3 A trial court abuses its discretion when its
order is "so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and
prejudicial error of law."' 224 As to the resolution of fact issues, the
trial court's decision is binding and may only be set aside if the trial
court could have reached only one decision. 225 As to the resolution of
legal issues, the trial court has no discretion in determining what the
law is or in applying the law to the facts.2 26 Accordingly, a clear fail-

218. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843 (citing TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811
S.W.2d 913, 919 (Tex. 1991, orig. proceeding) (striking pleadings and rendering default
judgment)).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. In Chapa v. Garcia, 848 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1993, orig. proceeding), Justice Hecht
observed that Walker holds:
An ordinary appeal is not adequate to correct trial court discovery errors in three instances: (1) when the appellate court will be unable to cure the error, as when privileged
information is ordered produced; (2) when a party's ability to present a viable claim or
defense is vitiated or severely compromised; or (3) when the trial court disallows discovery and the requested materials cannot be made a part of the appellate record.
Id. at 679 (Hecht, J., dissenting, joined by Phillips, C.J., and Gonzalez & Cornyn, JJ.) (citing
Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843).
222. McGough v. First Court of Appeals, 842 S.W.2d 637, 640 (Tex. 1992, orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. 1992, orig. proceeding); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840; Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917
(Tex. 1985, orig. proceeding); Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 573 (Tex. 1984, orig.
proceeding).
223. McGough 842 S.W.2d at 640; Jack B. Anglin Co., 842 S.W.2d at 271; Walker, 827
S.W.2d at 840; Johnson, 700 S.W.2d at 917; Jampole, 673 S.W.2d at 573.
224. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839 (quoting Johnson, 700 S.W.2d at 917); see McGough, 842
S.W.2d at 640 (holding that clear abuse of discretion is arbitrary and capricious act made
without reference to guiding principles").
225. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839-40 (citing Flores v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 777
S.W.2d 38, 41-42 (Tex. 1989)); Johnson, 700 S.W.2d at 918. Simply because the reviewing
court would have decided the case differently is not a basis to disturb the trial court's ruling
unless it is arbitrary and unreasonable. Id. at 840.
226. Id.
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ure to analyze or apply the law correctly constitutes an abuse of
discretion.227
A fundamental tenet of mandamus review requires that the party
seeking relief establish that there is no adequate remedy at law. 228 Because mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, it is available "only in
situations involving manifest and urgent necessity and not for grievances that may be addressed by other remedies. ' 229 Remedy by appeal is not inadequate merely because it may cause more expense or
delay than mandamus review.230 Mandamus review is justified only
"when parties stand to lose their substantial rights."' 23'
The scope of review in a mandamus proceeding includes certified or
sworn copies of the disputed order and other relevant exhibits,232 as
well as a statement of facts from the relevant hearing.233 The failure
to include the statement of facts may cause the appellate court to presume that the trial court's ruling is supported by the record not included on appeal. 3 In some instances, there is no need for a
statement of facts because the trial court made its determination without a hearing. In that event, the relator should file an affidavit stating
that the trial court's decision was made without a hearing.235 Instead
of a statement of facts, the relator may include a verified affidavit of
all facts necessary to establish the right to mandamus relief;236 but, a
statement of facts from the hearing is preferable.237

227. Id. (citing Joachim v. Chambers, 815 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. 1991)); NCNB Tex.
Nat'l Bank v. Coker, 765 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. 1989); Eanes Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Logue, 712
S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tex. 1986)).
228. Id. (citing Holloway v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 767 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tex. 1989)).
229. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840 (citing Holloway, 767 S.W.2d at 684 and quoting James
Sales, OriginalJurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Courts of Civil Appeals of Texas, in
APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN TEXAS, § 1.4[1][b], at 47 (2d ed. 1979)).

230. Id. at 842.
231. Id. (quoting Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 368, 311 S.W.2d 648, 652 (1958)).
232. TEX. R. APP. P. 121(a)(4).

233. TEX. R. APP. P. 121(a)(2)(c), 121(a)(4).
234. See Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806, 806 (Tex. 1968) (upholding presumption in favor of trial court findings in light of incomplete record).
235. Barnes v. Whittington, 751 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. 1988).
236. TEX. R. App. P. 121; see also Barnes, 751 S.W.2d at 495.
237. If the court reporter cannot prepare the statement of facts as quickly as necessary,
the relator should file the relevant exhibits and include a verified statement that the statement
of facts has been requested and will be filed as soon as it is prepared. See TEX. R. APP. P. 121
(describing mandamus procedure).
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4. Appellate Review of Discovery Rulings
In an appeal from a discovery or evidentiary ruling, the appellant
must preserve error by (1) presenting to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion setting forth its specific basis and (2) ob23
taining a ruling on the request, objection, or motion. 1
In discovery matters, the appellate record should contain the discovery request at issue, along with any relevant objections and motions. Before a party can raise an issue at the appellate court level, the
party must have raised the argument at the trial court. 239 The record
must also contain a statement of facts from any evidentiary hearing
held on the discovery issue. Finally, the standard of review is whether
the trial court's order, in light of the entire record, "was reasonably
calculated to cause, and probably did cause, the rendition of an improper judgment." 2"
L.

Discovery Sanctions

The purpose of discovery is "to allow the litigants to obtain the
fullest knowledge of the facts and issues prior to trial. ' 24 1 Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure 215(3), which authorizes trial courts to impose appropriate sanctions upon persons who abuse the discovery process,
provides that orders imposing such sanctions "shall be subject to review on appeal from the final judgment. ' 24 2 There is no provision for
interlocutory appeal; "[d]iscovery sanctions are not appealable until

238. TEX. R. App. P. 52(a).
239. H. E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Williams, 751 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tex. App.-San Antonio

1988, orig. proceeding) (stating that failure to raise waiver at trial court level precludes raising
argument in appellate courts); Garcia v. Allen, 751 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1988, writ denied) (declaring that complaint that interrogatories were too broad cannot be

raised for first time on appeal).
240. TEx. R. App. P. 81(b)(l); see SoefJe v. Stewart, 847 S.W.2d 311, 314-15 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied) (analyzing discovery sanction of exclusion of witness
testimony to determine whether error was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did
cause rendition of improper judgment); Bruner v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 752 S.W.2d 679, 682
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied) (requiring that "denial ... [must be such] as was rea-

sonably calculated to cause and probably did cause, the rendition of an improper judgment").
241. Chapa v. Garcia, 848 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1992, orig. proceeding) (quoting Axelson, Inc. v. Mcllhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990, orig. proceeding)); see State v. Lowry,
802 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. 1991) (stating that "[d]iscovery is... the linchpin in the search for

truth ....
").
242. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(3).
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' 243

A sanctioned party

may not pursue a mandamus unless the trial court abused its discre2
tion and the party does not have an adequate remedy by appeal. 1 If
a sanctioned party has an adequate remedy at law, then mandamus is
not available.245 In TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell,246
the supreme court held that if sanctions "have the effect of adjudicating a dispute, whether by striking pleadings, dismissing an action or
rendering a default judgment, but do not result in rendition of an appealable judgment, then the eventual remedy by appeal is
247
inadequate.

Whether a trial court's sanction is reviewable by mandamus or by
appeal is not clear in every case. "Death penalty" sanctions (striking
pleadings and dismissing causes or defaulting defendants) are clearly
reviewable by mandamus.

248

A monetary sanction may be reviewed

by mandamus if it "raises the real possibility that a party's willingness
' 249
or ability to continue the litigation will be significantly impaired.
243. Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1991) (quoting Bodnow Corp. v. City
of Hondo, 721 S.W.2d 839, 840 (Tex. 1986)).
244. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992, orig. proceeding); see TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 919 (Tex. 1991) (focusing on whether
adequate remedy by appeal existed).
245. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 919 (citing State v. Walker, 679 S.W.2d 484, 485
(Tex. 1984)).
246. 811 S.W.2d 913, 919 (Tex. 1991).
247. Id. at 919.
248. See id. (reviewing death penalty sanctions by mandamus). Death penalty sanctions
are also limited by constitutional due process. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1;
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19.
249. Braden, 811 S.W.2d at 929 (Tex. 1991, orig. proceeding) (noting that large monetary
sanction that must be paid before supersedeas and appeal reviewable by mandamus). But cf
Stringer v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex. 1986, orig. proceeding) (per
curiam) (finding sanction of $200 attorney fee not reviewable by mandamus); Street v. Second
Court of Appeals, 715 S.W.2d 638, 639-40 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (sanction of $1,050 in
attorney's fees or striking of pleadings not reviewable by mandamus); Kern v. Gleason, 840
S.W.2d 730, 734, 739 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, orig. proceeding) (sanction of $5,100 in
attorney's fees not reviewable by mandamus); Susman Godfrey, L.L.P. v. Marshall, 832
S.W.2d 105, 107, 109 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding) (sanction of $25,000 against
law firm and client not reviewable by mandamus). If the court's imposition of monetary sanctions threatens a party's ability to continue the litigation, appeal is an adequate remedy if the
court defers payment of the sanction until the court renders final judgment. Braden, 811
S.W.2d at 929; Susman Godfrey, 832 S.W.2d at 108. To preserve the issue, the sanctioned
party must complain that the monetary sanction precludes his access to the court. Braden, 811
S.W.2d at 929. If the sanctioned party complains, the trial court must either provide that the
sanction is payable at the time a final judgment is rendered or make express written findings
after a prompt hearing explaining why the sanction does not have a preclusive effect. Id. at
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There is a split among the courts of appeals on the issue of whether
250
the striking of a party's witnesses may be reviewed by mandamus.
Rule 215 permits a wide range of sanctions for a variety of purposes: to secure compliance with the discovery rules, to deter other
litigants from similar misconduct, to punish violators,2 51 to ensure a
fair trial, to compensate a party for past prejudice, and to deter cer'25 3
tain bad-faith conduct.25 2 The sanctions, however, must be 'just.
Whether the sanctions are just-in other words, whether the trial
court abused its discretion-is determined by a two-prong analysis.
First, a direct relationship must exist between the offensive conduct
and the sanction imposed. 25 4 The sanction imposed against the offending party must be directed against the abuse and toward remedying the prejudice to the innocent party.2 5 In other words, the
sanctions must relate directly to the abuse.2 56
929 (citing Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988)); e.g., Chrysler Corp. v.
Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex. 1992, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Conway, 843 S.W.2d
765, 766 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.).
250. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the striking of all of a party's expert
witnesses is not reviewable by mandamus because the affected party may make a bill of exceptions and present the complaint on appeal. City of Port Arthur v. Sanderson, 810 S.W.2d 476,
477 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, orig. proceeding); see also Pope v. Davidson, No. B14-9201247-CV, 1993 WL 73491, at *9 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 18, 1993, orig.
proceeding) (striking of witness's testimony in part may be presented to and reviewed by court
on appeal); Humana Hosp. Corp. v. Casseb, 809 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1991, orig. proceeding) (striking of expert witness may be reviewed on appeal); Forscan Corp.
v. Touchy, 743 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, orig. proceeding)
(holding that exclusion of two experts not reviewable by mandamus). However, at least one
court has held that when an order striking witnesses amounts to an emasculation of a party's
defense, then appeal is not an adequate remedy and mandamus will lie. Mother Frances Hosp.
v. Coats, 796 S.W.2d 566, 571-72 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, orig. proceeding) (per curiam); e.g.,
Williams v. Crier, 734 S.W.2d 190, 193 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, orig. proceeding) (striking of
three witnesses reviewable by mandamus). Until a bright line rule is created, which probably
will not occur, one must note the analysis of Justice Peeples who succinctly stated: "The law
does not permit pretrial mandamus review of witness-exclusion rulings except in extreme cases
of complete emasculation [of a party's case]." Humana Hosp. Corp., 809 S.W.2d at 548 (Peeples, J., concurring).
251. Chrysler Corp., 841 S.W.2d at 849; Bodnow, 721 S.W.2d at 840 (Tex. 1986).
252. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Specia, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 674, 674-75 (Mar. 24, 1993)
(orig. proceeding).
253. Remington Arms Co., Inc. v. Martinez, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 547, 549 (Feb. 10, 1993)
(orig. proceeding); Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 849; TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917; see Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 930 (Tex. 1991) (stating that "U]ustice should not tolerate
[discovery] abuse, but injustice cannot remedy it").
254. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917.
255. Id.
256. Id.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

41

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 24 [2022], No. 4, Art. 5

1086

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 24:1045

Second, the sanction must not be excessive-it must fit the crime. 2"
The sanction should not be more severe than necessary to satisfy its
legitimate purposes, for example, to promote compliance.25 8 In determining if the sanction is just, the appellate court may consider the
25 9
history of the case, up to and including the sanctions motion.
Therefore, the trial court is not limited to considering only the specific
violation, but may also consider other conduct that occurred during
discovery.26 °
In appropriate cases, the supreme court has encouraged trial judges
to prepare written findings that delineate the trial court's reasons for
imposing severe sanctions. 26' The reviewing court will review the
findings in the same manner as findings in a nonjury case tried on the

merits.2 62
M.

Inherent Power To Sanction

One Texas appellate court has held that Texas trial courts, similar
257. Id.
258. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917.
259. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Abascal, 831 S.W.2d 559, 561
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, orig. proceeding); Garcia Distrib., Inc. v. Fedders Air Conditioning, USA, Inc., 773 S.W.2d 802, 806-07 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied);
Overstreet v. Home Indem. Co., 747 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied);
Medical Protective Co. v. Glanz, 721 S.W.2d 382, 388 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ
refd).
260. Transamerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917. In TransAmerican, Justice Gonzalez identified
fourteen factors commonly used to analyze sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Id. at 920-21 (Gonzalez, J., concurring). In Pelt v. Johnson, 818 S.W.2d 212,
216 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, orig. proceeding), and Hanley v. Hanley, 813 S.W.2d 511, 517-18
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) the Waco and Dallas Courts of Appeals adopted the six
factors used by the Third Circuit in Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863,
868-70 (3d Cir. 1984), to analyze whether the conduct warranted the particular sanction imposed. See generally Lisa A. Mokry, Note, Discovery Sanctions Must Be "Just," Consistent
with Due Process,and Are Subject to Mandamus Review: Transamerican Natural Gas Corp. v.
Powell, 23 TEX. TECH L. REV. 617 (1992) (criticizing TransAmerican for failing to provide
guiding rules and principles for trial courts to follow).
261. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 850; TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 919 n.9. The supreme
court noted three benefits to making findings: first, such findings aid appellate review in that
they demonstrate whether the trail judge was guided by a reasoned analysis pursuant to the
TransAmerican and Braden standards; second, such findings assure that the decision was the
product of thoughtful judicial deliberation; and third, the articulation of the trail judge's analysis enhances the deterrent effect of the sanctions order. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 852.
262. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 852 (approving Rossa v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 830 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, writ denied) and disapproving Hartford, 831 S.W.2d at 560-61).
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to their federal counterparts, have the inherent power to sanction parties for bad faith abuse of the judicial process not covered by rule or
statute.26 3 The court found that the inherent power exists to deter,
alleviate, and counteract bad faith abuse of the judicial process.2
The record before the trial court must support use of such power, and
the trial court must make findings of fact that the abuse interfered
significantly with the core functions of the judiciary: hearing evidence, deciding issues of fact raised by the pleadings, deciding issues
of law, and entering and enforcing judgment. 265 Because of the amorphous nature of this inherent power and its potency, the court of appeals admonished trial courts to use this power sparingly, and to be
mindful of the sanctioned party's due process rights.266 The scope of
review is the entire record before the trial court, and the standard of
review is abuse of discretion.267
N. Rule 13 Sanctions
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13, similar to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, directs the trial court to impose appropriate sanctions,
under Rule 215(2)(b), if a pleading, motion, or other signed paper is
groundless and brought in bad faith or for purposes of harassment.268
263. Kutch v. Del Mar College, 831 S.W.2d 506, 509-10 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi
1992, no writ) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., - U.S. -.....
111 S. Ct. 2123, 2134, 115 L.
Ed. 2d 27, 46-47 (1991)); see Remington Arms Co., 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 550 (holding that
trial court has inherent and statutory power to discipline errant counsel for improper conduct
in exercise of its contempt power); Koslow's v. Mackie, 796 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990)
(holding that trial court has inherent power under Rule 166 to impose sanctions for violation
of pretrial order). But cf Shook v. Gilmore & Tatge Mfg. Co., No. 10-92-014-CV, 1993 WL
56255, at *3 (Tex. App.-Waco, Mar. 3, 1993, n.w.h.) (holding that Texas Supreme Court has
not recognized inherent power of Texas courts to sanction party's bad faith conduct during
litigation, court declined to follow Kutch wholeheartedly). In the federal system, the federal
district courts have the inherent powers to levy sanctions for abusive litigation practices.
Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980); see In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 901-02 (5th
Cir. 1993) (citing Eash v. Riggins Trucking, 757 F.2d 557, 562-64 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc))
(describing three categories of inherent powers of federal courts including power to impose
sanctions for abusive litigation practices).
264. Kutch, 831 S.W.2d at 510.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 510-11.
267. Id.
268. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13; TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b); Susman Godfrey, L.L.P. v. Marshall,
832 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding); see also TEX. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 105.002 (Vernon 1986) (providing for recovery of damages for frivolous
claims by state agency).
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Under Rule 13, a trial court must presume that the pleading, motion,
or other paper is filed in good faith, and may impose sanctions only
for good cause. 269 To find that a litigant has violated Rule 13, a trial
court must "examine the facts available to the litigant and the circumstances existing at the time the document is filed ... [and] whether...

the legal arguments asserted are 'warranted by a good faith argument
for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law.' "270 The
court may also consider the amount of time available to prepare the
pleading and may "examine the signer's credibility, taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstances available at the time of
the filing."'

271

A trial court's order under Rule 13 is reviewed under

an abuse of discretion standard.272
0.

Summary Judgment
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c), a summary
judgment is proper only when a movant establishes that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.273 In a summary judgment proceeding, the
burden of proof is on the movant, and all doubts as to the existence of
a genuine issue of fact are resolved against the movant.274 Once the
movant has established a right to summary judgment, the burden
shifts to the nonmovant. The nonmovant must then respond to the
motion for summary judgment and present to the trial court any issues that would preclude summary judgment.275
269. See Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex. 1991) (stating that court should
not impose monetary sanction to dispose of litigation); Susman Godfrey, 832 S.W.2d at 108
(noting same considerations as Braden).
270. Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Scheppler, 815 S.W.2d 884, 889 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (quoting, in part, TEX. R. Civ. P. 13).
271. Id. "Rule 13 imposes a duty on the trial court to point out with particularity the
acts or omissions on which the sanctions are based." Zarsky v. Zurich Management, Inc., 829
S.W.2d 398, 399 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ). "Unlike Rule 215, Rule 13
requires a [trial] court to state any reasons which create 'good cause.' " Id.; e.g., Kahn v.
Garcia, 816 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding).
272. Yang Ming Line v. Port of Houston Auth., 833 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Zarsky, 829 S.W.2d at 399; Rodriguez v. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 818 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ);
Scheppler, 815 S.W.2d at 889.
273. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. 1972).
274. Roskey v. Texas Health Facilities Comm'n, 639 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex. 1982).
275. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). See
generally Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, Summary Judgments in Texas, 20 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 243 (1989) (discussing procedures for responding to and opposing summary judg-
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The question on appeal "is not whether the summary judgment
proof raises a fact issue," but "whether the summary judgment proof
establishes as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of a material fact as to one or more of the essential elements of the plaintiff's
cause of action."2'76 Summary judgments are reviewed in accordance
with the following standards:
(1) The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
(2) In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be
taken as true.
(3) Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts resolved in its favor.2 77
The usual presumption that the judgment is correct does not apply to
summary judgments.278
On appeal, evidence that favors the movant's position will be considered rarely, unless it is uncontroverted.279 Summary judgment,
however, may be based on the uncontroverted testimonial evidence of
an interested witness or expert "if the evidence is clear, positive and
direct, otherwise credible and free from contradictions and inconsis2 80°
tencies, and could have been readily controverted.

The scope of review in an appeal from summary judgment is also
limited. "Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written
motion, answer, or other response shall not be considered on appeal
as grounds for reversal.

' 21

The grounds for summary judgment must

be presented in the motion for summary judgment itself, and the
grounds opposing the motion must be expressly presented in written
answer to the motion; neither the movant nor the nonmovant may
ments); David Hittner, Summary Judgments in Texas, 22 Hous. L. REV. 1109, 1133-43
(1985) (discussing summary judgment requirements).
276. Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. 1970).
277. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985); e.g.,
Black v. Victoria Lloyds Ins. Co., 797 S.W.2d 20, 23-24 (Tex. 1990); Turboff v. Gertner, Aron
& Ledet, Invs., 763 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
278. Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex. 1984); Great Am. Reserve Ins.
Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply, 391 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1965).
279. Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co., 391 S.W.2d at 47.

280. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); see also Republic Nat'l Leasing Corp. v. Schindler, 717
S.W.2d 606, 607 (Tex. 1986).
281. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d at 676.
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rely on reasons set forth in an accompanying brief or in the summary
judgment evidence.282 The appellate court can consider the record
only as it existed at the time summary judgment was signed. 28 3 Moreover, an appellate court may not raise grounds for reversing a summary judgment sua sponte.284
When the motion for summary judgment alleges more than one basis of support, and the order granting the motion is silent as to the
reason for granting the motion, the appellant must show that each
independent ground alleged in the motion is insufficient to support
summary judgment, and the summary judgment must be affirmed if
any of the theories are meritorious.28 5 If the judgment specifies the
basis for granting summary judgment, the appellate court cannot affirm on any ground not set forth in the judgment.286 If the reviewing
court determines that summary judgment was improperly granted,
the reviewing court will reverse the judgment and remand the cause
for a trial on the merits.287 When both parties file a motion for summary judgment, and one is granted and one is denied, the denial may
be considered by the reviewing court only if the appealing party complains of both the granting of the opponent's motion and the denial of
his own motion.2 88
P. Motion for Continuance
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 251, a trial court may
grant a continuance on sufficient cause supported by affidavit, by consent of the parties, or by operation of law.289 Whether to grant or
deny a motion for continuance is within the sound discretion of the
282. McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 792, 793-94 (Apr. 21,
1993).
283. Luker v. Arnold, 843 S.W.2d 108, 122 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, no writ);
Johnnie C. Ivy Plumbing Co. v. Keyser, 601 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no
writ).
284. San Jacinto River Auth. v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. 1990).
285. Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. 1989); Valles v. Texas
Comm'n on Jail Standards, 845 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied); Kyle
v. West Gulf Maritime, Ass'n, 792 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990,
no writ).
286. Maley v. 7111 Southwest Freeway, Inc., 843 S.W.2d 229, 234 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
287. Tobin v. Garcia, 159 Tex. 58, 63, 316 S.W.2d 396, 400 (1958).
288. Id.
289. TEX. R. Civ. P. 251; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 252 (granting continuance based on ab-

sence of material testimony); TEX. R. Civ. P. 253 (granting continuance based on absence of
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trial court. 2 90 The trial court's ruling will not be reversed unless the
record shows a clear abuse of discretion. 29' Before a reviewing court

can reverse the trial court's ruling, it should appear clearly from the
record that the trial court has disregarded a party's rights.2 92 An appellate court may reverse for abuse of discretion only if, after searching the entire record, "it is clear that the trial court's decision was
arbitrary and unreasonable.

Q.

' 293

Dismissalfor Want of Prosecution

A trial court has a duty and an obligation to maintain control of its
docket and to require that each party prosecute its suit with diligence. 294 Thus, "a trial court has the authority to dismiss a case for
want of prosecution pursuant to its inherent powers" or pursuant to
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a. 29' The trial court's power to
dismiss under Rule 165a(1) (the failure to appear at a hearing or
trial), under Rule 165a(2) (the failure to meet time standards promulgated by the supreme court), and under Rule 165a(4) (lack of diligence) are cumulative and independent.296
Whether the plaintiff prosecuted the case with diligence is an issue
counsel); TEX. R. CIV. P. 254 (granting continuance based on absence of counsel due to attendance in legislature).
290. State v. Wood Oil Distrib., Inc., 751 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. 1988); Yowell v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 703 S.W.2d 630, 634 (Tex. 1986).
291. Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986); State v. Crank, 666 S.W.2d 91,
94 (Tex.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
292. Yowell, 703 S.W.2d at 635; Metro Aviation, Inc. v. Bristow Offshore Helicopters,
Inc., 740 S.W.2d 873, 874 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ).
293. Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co., 739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1987); Gregg v.
Cecil, 844 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, no writ); Central Nat'l Gulfbank v.
Comdata Network, Inc., 773 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
294. Texas Soc'y, Daughters of the Am. Revolution, Inc. v. Estate of Hubbard, 768
S.W.2d 858, 861 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
295. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a (1), (4); State v. Rotello, 671 S.W.2d 507, 508-09 (Tex. 1984);
Veteran's Land Bd. v. Williams, 543 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Tex. 1976); Bevil v. Johnson, 157 Tex.
621, 625, 307 S.W.2d 85, 87 (1957); Hosey v. County of Victoria, 832 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ); Ellmossally v. Huntsman, 830 S.W.2d 299, 300-01 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ); Miller v. Kossey, 802 S.W.2d 873, 877 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1991, writ denied); Armentrout v. Murdock, 779 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
296. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a(4); Williams, 543 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Tex. 1976); City of Houston
v. Robinson, 837 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Ozuna v.
Southwest Bio-Clinical Lab., 766 S.W.2d 900, 901-03 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ
denied).
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confined solely to the trial court's discretion.2 97 To determine the issue of diligence, the court may consider the entire history of the litigation, and no single factor is dispositive.29 8 Whether the plaintiff
intended to abandon the litigation is not the inquiry, "nor is the existence of a belated trial setting or an asserted eagerness to proceed to
trial conclusive. ' 299 Settlement activity does not excuse want of diligent prosecution, 3°° nor does the passive attitude of opposing parties
excuse want of diligence. 3°1 Traditionally, the courts consider: "the
length of time the case was on file, the extent of activity in the case,
whether a trial setting was requested, and the existence of reasonable
excuses for the delay. ' 3 2 Other circumstances may also be considered, such as "periods of activity, intervals of inactivity, and the pas30 3
sage of time.
The dismissal may be pursuant to Rule 165a(3), as opposed to the

trial court's inherent power. Under Rule 165a(3), the trial court
"shall reinstate the case upon finding after a hearing that the failure of
the party or his attorney [to appear] was not intentional or the result
of conscious indifference but was due to an accident or mistake or that
the failure had been otherwise reasonably explained. ' ' 304 The reinstatement provisions in Rule 165a(3) apply only to dismissals for failure to appear at trial or at a hearing and are slightly similar to the
requisites for granting a new trial in a default judgment. 3 5 The standard of review of a dismissal for want of prosecution or the overruling
297. Rotello, 671 S.W.2d at 508-09 (Tex. 1984); Dolenz v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 620
S.W.2d 572, 575-76 (Tex. 1981); Ozuna, 766 S.W.2d at 903; Mercure Co. v. Rowland, 715
S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McCormick v. Shannon West Tex. Memorial Hosp., 665 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ refd
n.r.e.).
298. Brown v. Howeth Inv., Inc., 820 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1991, writ denied); Armentrout, 779 S.W.2d at 121; Ozuna, 766 S.W.2d at 903.
299. Ozuna, 766 S.W.2d at 903; see also Bard v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 767 S.W.2d 839,
843 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied). "A request at the dismissal docket call
hearing that the case be set for trial does not, of itself, preclude dismissal." Id. at 843.
300. Texas Socty, Daughters of the Am. Revolution, Inc., 768 S.W.2d at 860.
301. Id. at 861.
302. Bard, 767 S.W.2d at 843; e.g., NASA I Bus. Ctr. v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 747
S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]), writ deniedper curiam, 754 S.W.2d 152 (Tex.
1988).
303. Ozuna, 766 S.W.2d at 903.
304. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a(3); e.g., Brown, 820 S.W.2d at 902; Quita v. Haney, 810
S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991, no writ); Armentrout, 779 S.W.2d at 122.
305. Compare Ozuna, 766 S.W.2d at 903 (stating that Rule 165a(3) applies to reinstatement for failure to appear) with Moore v. Armour & Co., 748 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Tex. App.-
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of a motion to reinstate is whether the trial court committed a clear
30 6
abuse of discretion.
R. Jury Demand
While a party has a constitutional right to trial by jury,30 7 the right

is not unlimited. If a party desires a jury trial, Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 216 requires a party to file a written request for a jury trial
with the district clerk within a reasonable time before the trial date,
but not fewer than 30 days in advance. 30 ' Requests made before the
thirty-day deadline are "presumed to have been made a reasonable
time before trial."30 9 The court has no discretion to refuse a jury trial
if the fee is paid and the request is made on or before appearance
date.3 10 In determining whether a late request for a jury trial should
be granted or denied, the trial court should ascertain whether "the

granting of the jury trial would injure the adverse party" or would
result in an interference with the orderly handling of the court's
docket or delay the trial of the case.311 The court will review the
Amarillo 1988, no writ) (stating that reinstatement provisions of Rule 165a(3) do not apply to
dismissal for failure to prosecute with due diligence).
306. Rotello, 671 S.W.2d at 509; e.g., Veteran's Land Bd., 543 S.W.2d at 90; Robinson,
837 S.W.2d at 264; Brown, 820 S.W.2d at 903; Armentrout, 779 S.W.2d at 119; Ozuna, 766
S.W.2d at 903; Knight v. Trent, 739 S.W.2d 116,120 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ);
Speck v. Ford Motor Co., 709 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no
writ). If the trial court fails to set and conduct a hearing on a motion to reinstate, the dismissal
order will be reversed on appeal. See Reed v. City of Dallas, 774 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied) (reversing and ordering trial court to conduct hearing; dissent argued court should have reversed and remanded for trial on merits). A dismissal for
want of prosecution does not preclude the filing of another suit, and therefore, a dismissal of
the case "with prejudice" is improper. Melton v. Rylander, 727 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Tex. App.Dallas 1987, writ refd n.r.e.); Willis v. Barron, 604 S.W.2d 447, 447-48 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). If the trial court dismisses the case "with prejudice," the appellate court will reform the judgment to strike "with prejudice" from the judgment. Melton, 727
S.W.2d at 303.
307. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15, art. V, § 10.
308. TEx. R. Civ. P. 216a.
309. Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 371 (Tex. 1991) (per curium); Weng Enters.,
Inc. v. Embassy World Travel, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1992, no writ).
310. Squires v. Squires, 673 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ);
cf. Huddle v. Huddle, 696 S.W.2d 895, 895 (Tex. 1985) (noting that trial court did not abuse
discretion in denying request for jury trial when fee was timely paid but request was not made
until one day before trial).
311. Halsell, 810 S.W.2d at 371; Weng Enters., Inc., 837 S.W.2d at 222; Brawner v. Arellano, 757 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, orig. proceeding) (citing Peck v.
Ray, 601 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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entire record and order to determine the condition of the trial docket
when the litigant made the untimely request." 2
Without a statement of facts or order reflecting the trial docket status, the appellate court "must assume that the trial court found the
jury docket too crowded to accommodate [the] . . . untimely request."3 3' The trial court's decision will be set aside only upon the
showing of an abuse of discretion. 1 4 "The decision, in order to be an
abuse of discretion, must be so arbitrary and unreasonable as to
31 5
amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law."
S.

Judicial Notice

Pursuant to Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence, a trial
court "upon its own motion may, or upon the motion of a party shall,
take judicial notice of the constitutions, public statutes, rules, regulations, ordinances, court decisions, and common law of every other
state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States. ' 31 6 The party
seeking judicial notice should furnish the court enough information
"to enable it properly to comply with the request, and shall give all
parties such notice, if any, as the court may deem necessary, to enable
all parties fairly to prepare to meet the request. ' 3 Determination of
whether a party has complied with these requirements is within the
discretion of the trial court.
The sufficiency of a motion to take
31 9
judicial notice "is a question best answered by the trial court.
However, "once the law has been invoked by proper motion, the trial

312. Brawner, 757 S.W.2d at 529 (citing Peck v. Ray, 601 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
313. Id.
314. See id. at 528 (noting factors constituting on abuse of discretion).
315. Wright v. Brooks, 773 S.w.2d 649, 651 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied)
(citing King v. Guerra, I S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1927, writ ref'd). "A
refusal to grant a jury trial is harmless error only if the record shows that no material issues of
fact exist and an instructed verdict would have been justified." Halsell, 810 S.W.2d at 372;
Weng Enters., Inc., 837 S.W.2d at 222.
316. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 202.
317. Id.
318. Daugherty v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1989) (finding
that failure to plead statute or regulation is not proper ground for trial court's refusal to judicially notice it).
319. Keller v. Nevel, 699 S.W.2d 211, 211 (Tex. 1985). The appellate courts may also
take judicial notice of their own records. Victory v. State, 138 Tex. 285, 288, 158 S.W.2d 760,
763 (1942); Birdo v. Holbrook, 775 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, writ
denied).
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court has no discretion-it must acknowledge that law."'320
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 201, a trial judge may
also take judicial notice of a fact if it is "one not subject to reasonable
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned.I32 Facts that are notorious and indisputable,322 or well
known and easily ascertainable, 323 may be judicially noticed. A trial
judge's mere personal knowledge of a fact does not permit the taking
of judicial notice of the fact. 324 The test on review is whether the fact
325
to be judicially noticed is "verifiably certain.1
T.

Class Certification

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a):
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.32 6

Additionally, the purported class must establish the requirements of
Rule 42(b). 327 For the certification of a class, "the burden of proof is
on the plaintiffs to establish the right to maintain the action as a class
action. ' 328 Because the class proponents are not required to make an
320. Keller, 699 S.W.2d at 212; Eppenauer v. Eppenauer, 831 S.W.2d 30, 31 n.1 (Tex.

App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).
321. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 201(b); e.g., Hartley v. Coker, 843 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1992, n.w.h.); Besing v. Smith, 843 S.W.2d 20, 21 (Tex. 1992) (Mauzy,
J., dissenting).
322. Harper v. Killion, 162 Tex. 481, 483, 348 S.W.2d 521, 522 (1961); Levit v. Adams,
841 S.W.2d 478, 485 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 36 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 677 (Mar. 24, 1993) (per curiam).
323. Barber v. Intercoast Jobbers & Brokers, 417 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. 1967); Levit, 841
S.W.2d at 485.
324. Eagle Trucking Co. v. Texas Bitulithic Co., 612 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. 1981).
325. Id.; Levit, 841 S.W.2d at 485; Butts Retail, Inc. v. Diversified Foods, Inc., 840
S.W.2d 770, 774 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied).
326. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
327. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (providing elements necessary to maintain class action).
328. Clements v. LULAC, 800 S.W.2d 948, 952 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no
writ).
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extensive evidentiary showing in support of a motion for class certification, the trial court may make its decision based on the pleadings or
other material in the record.3 29 The determination of whether a party
is a proper representative of a class and whether a suit should be certified as a class action is reviewed under the abuse of discretion stan-

dard of review. 33° Trial courts abuse their discretion by failing to
apply the law properly to the undisputed facts.331
U.

Recusal

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a, a party may file a
motion to recuse the trial judge at least ten days before the date set for
trial or other hearing.332 Upon a party's filing of the motion, the trial
judge must "either recuse himself or request the presiding judge of the
administrative judicial district to assign a judge to hear such mo-

tion.

'3 3 3

Rule 18a(f) provides that if the motion is denied, the order

will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 334 An order granting a

motion is not reviewable.335
V.

Management of Docket

Trial courts are given wide discretion to manage their dockets.336
329. Id. (citing National Gypsum Co. v. Kirbyville Indep. Sch. Dist., 770 S.W.2d 621,
627 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Life Ins. Co. of the Southwest v. Brister,
722 S.W.2d 764, 770 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
330. Parker County v. Spindletop Oil & Gas Co., 628 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Tex. 1982);
Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Snell, 847 S.W.2d 367, 371 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ); Angeles/Quinoco Sec. Corp. v. Collison, 841 S.W.2d 511, 512 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1992, no writ); Clements, 800 S.W.2d at 952. In the absence of controlling Texas law, the
appellate court, in reviewing the trial court's order, will look to federal law since Rule 42 is
patterned after its federal counterpart. DresserIndus., Inc., 847 S.W.2d at 372 n.3; Adams v.
Reagan, 791 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).
331. Angeles/Quinoco Sec. Corp., 841 S.W.2d at 512. The reviewing court is required to
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's action. DresserIndus., Inc., 847
S.W.2d at 371-72.
332. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(a). If a judge is assigned to a case within the ten-day period,
then the motion must "be filed at the earliest practicable time prior to the commencement of
the trial or other hearing. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(e). The grounds disqualification are set forth in
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11 and TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b.
333. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(c), (d).
334. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(f); e.g., J-IV Inv. v. David Lynn Mach., Inc., 784 S.W.2d 106,
107 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ); CNA Ins. Co. v. Scheffey, 828 S.W.2d 785, 792-93
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied).
335. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(f).
336. Clanton v. Clark, 639 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1982); Employers Ins. of Wausau v.
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A trial court's order relevant to the management of its docket is re337
viewed for an abuse of discretion.
W. Gag Orders
A trial court may issue a gag order that prohibits discussion of a
case outside of the courtroom. The order is reviewed as presumptively unconstitutional. 338 To rebut this presumption, a party must
show that the order is supported by specific findings based on evidence establishing that (1) an imminent and irreparable harm to the
judicial process will deprive the litigants of a just resolution of their
dispute, and (2) the order represents the least restrictive means available to prevent the harm. 339 The specific findings may be challenged
for their sufficiency. It appears that the two-part constitutional test is
a question of law; and the trial court's findings are to be reviewed de
novo.
X.

Sealing Court Records

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a dictates very specific guidelines
a trial court must follow in determining whether to seal court
records. 3 ° Court records are presumed to be open to the public.341
Any order on a motion to seal or unseal public records must be supported by specific findings of fact that the requirements of Rule 76a(l)
have been met.342 A party seeking to seal records must establish entitlement to the order by a preponderance of the evidence.3 43 Any orHorton, 797 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ); see also Eichelberger v.
Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979) (recognizing inherent power of trial courts "to
aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the administration of justice, and in the preservation of
its independence and integrity").
337. Clanton, 639 S.W.2d at 931; Employers Ins. of Wausau, 797 S.W.2d at 680.
338. Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 10 (Tex. 1992, orig. proceeding).
339. Id. The supreme court has not addressed whether the Davenport test is also applicable to situations not involving a gag order in civil proceedings (that is the difference between
the right of access and the right to be free from prior restraint). Dallas Morning News v. Fifth
Court of Appeals, 842 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Tex. 1992, orig. proceeding).
340. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a; Chandler v. Hyundai Motor Co., 844 S.W.2d 882, 884-85 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 24 (Tex. 1992,
orig. proceeding); Chandler v. Hyundai Motor Co., 829 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Tex. 1992) (per
curiam); Upjohn Co. v. Freeman, 847 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ)
(noting that Rule 76(a) provides guiding rules and principles for sealing court records).
341. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(l); Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 23.
342. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(6).
343. See Freeman, 847 S.W.2d at 591-92 (rejecting clear and convincing standard of
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der relating to the sealing or unsealing of court records is subject to
immediate appellate review 3 " under the abuse of discretion standard
of review.345
Y.

Dismissal of In Forma PauperisProceedings

When a plaintiff files an affidavit of inability to pay under Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 145 (in forma pauperis), the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 13.001 dictates that the trial court
has broad discretion to dismiss the suit as frivolous or malicious.34 6
In determining whether the action is frivolous, "the court may consider whether: (1) the action's realistic claim of ultimate success is
slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact; or (3) it is
clear that the party cannot prove a set of facts in support of the
claim. ' 347 The supreme court has analogized Section 13.001 to its
federal counterpart, which allows dismissal of frivolous or malicious
actions in federal court.348 Of the three factors set forth in Section
13.001, the supreme court has essentially approved only the second
factor as constitutionally sound-whether the claim has an arguable
basis in law or fact. 349 Therefore, before dismissing a petition under
Section 13.001(b)(2), the petition must be examined judicially "for a
determination of its basis in law and fact." 35 0 A claim that has no
legal basis is one that is based upon an "indisputably meritless legal
theory,"35 'and a claim that has no factual basis is one that arises out
proof); Upjohn Co. v. Marshall, 843 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding) (rejecting clear and convincing standard of proof).

344. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(8).
345. Freeman, 847 S.W.2d at 590 (citing Dunshie v. General Motors Corp., 822 S.W.2d
345, 347 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, no writ)).
346. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 13.001(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1993); Carson

v. Gomez, 841 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Thomas v.
Pankey, 837 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, no writ); Onnette v. Reed, 832 S.W.2d
450, 452 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
347. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 13.001(b) (Vernon Supp. 1993).

348. Johnson v. Lynaugh, 796 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d) (1988)).
349. Id. The supreme court observed that the United States Supreme Court has only
approved the same federal factor as appropriate. Id. (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
327 (1989)). Further, the court noted that the Fifth Circuit doubted the validity of the third
factor in § 13.001(b)(3). Id. (citing Payne v. Lynaugh, 843 F.2d 177, 178 (5th Cir. 1988)).
350. Carson, 841 S.W.2d at 494 (citing Spellmon v. Sweeney, 819 S.W.2d 206, 210 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1991, no writ)).
351. Thomas v. Holder, 836 S.W.2d 351, 352 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, no writ) (quoting
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327).
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of fantastic or delusional scenarios.35 2
V.

TRIAL RULINGS

A.

Conduct of Trial in General
Rulings that relate to the conduct of a trial are largely within the
broad discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion.35 3 The appellate court will review the entire record for an abuse of discretion 354 and then determine
whether any error constituted probable prejudice to the opposing
5
party.

35

B.

Motion In Limine
For preservation of error on appeal for the wrongful exclusion of
evidence, the record must reflect that the party opposing the motion
in limine offered the excluded evidence during the trial and obtained
an adverse ruling from the court.356 If there is a claim of the wrongful
admission of evidence, the record must reflect that the party seeking
to suppress the evidence made a proper objection when the evidence
was actually offered during the trial on the merits.3 57 In either event,
the standard of review is based on the rule of evidence invoked.358
C.

Voir Dire and Challengesfor Cause
The Texas Supreme Court has instructed the trial courts that

352. Id.
353. Schroeder v. Brandon, 141 Tex. 319, 325, 172 S.W.2d 488, 491 (1943); Pitt v. Bradford Farms, 843 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ); Marriage of D
M B & R L B, 798 S.W.2d 399, 406 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ); In re Estate of Hill,
761 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); Adams v. Petrade Int'l, Inc.,
754 S.W.2d 696, 718 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Looney v. Traders &
General Ins. Co., 231 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
see Kreymer v. North Tex. Mun. Water Dist., 842 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992,
no writ) (noting that trial court has broad discretion concerning extent of cross examination
allowed).
354. Pitt, 843 S.W.2d at 706-07; Adams, 754 S.W.2d at 718.
355. Pitt, 843 S.W.2d at 706, 708 (citing Silcott v. Oglesby, 721 S.W.2d 290, 293 (Tex.
1986)).
356. CLS Associates, Ltd. v. A- B_, 762 S.W.2d 221, 224 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no
writ); National Living Ctrs., Inc. v. Cities Realty Corp., 619 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
357. Wilkins v. Royal Indem. Co., 592 S.W.2d 64, 66-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no
writ).
358. See generally Part VII, infra.
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"broad latitude should be allowed to a litigant during voir dire examination [to] enable the litigant to discover any bias or prejudice by the
potential jurors so that peremptory challenges may be intelligently exercised." 359 Although voir dire examination is largely within the
sound discretion of the trial court, the trial court abuses this discretion when its denial of the right to ask a proper question prevents
determination of "whether grounds exist to challenge for cause or denies intelligent use of peremptory challenges." 3" To obtain a reversal, the complaining party must show that the trial court abused its
discretion and that the error was reasonably calculated to cause and
probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment.36 '
The question of whether bias and prejudice exists is ordinarily a
fact question.36 2 If the evidence shows that a prospective juror has a
state of mind in favor of or against a litigant or type of suit, rendering
him unable to act with impartiality and without prejudice, he is disqualified as a matter of law.363 However, when the evidence is not
conclusive as a matter of law, the reviewing court must consider the
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. 36 Once
bias or prejudice is established, a legal disqualification exists, and
re3 65
strike.
to
motion
a
overrules
court
the
if
results
versible error
D. Alignment of Parties and Allocation of PeremptoryStrikes
Questions regarding alignment and antagonism of the parties often
arise in multiple party litigation.366 Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 233, the trial judge is required to avoid antagonism between parties on the same side of a case before assigning to the parties the

359. Babcock v. Northwest Memorial Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex. 1989). Bias and
prejudice are statutory grounds for disqualification. TEX. GoV'T CODE ANN. § 62.105
(Vernon Supp. 1993).
360. Babcock, 767 S.W.2d at 709; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 228 (authorizing challenges for
cause).
361. TEX. R. Civ. P. 228.
362. Snap Shop v. Fortune, 365 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex. 1963); e.g., Powers v. Palacios,
794 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 813 S.W.2d
489 (Tex. 1991).

363. Gum v. Schaefer, 683 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
364. Id.
365. Compton v. Henrie, 364 S.W.2d 179, 181-82 (Tex. 1983).
366. Amis v. Ashworth, 802 S.W.2d 379, 385 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, orig. proceeding
[leave denied]) (Ramey, C.J., dissenting).
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number of peremptory challenges.3 67 A trial court may grant a motion to realign a party as a plaintiff only when the burden on the entire
case rests on the defendant or the defendant makes the required admissions before trial.36 8 On mandamus review, the appellate court reviews the record as it existed at the time the motion was heard to
determine if the court abused its discretion.36 9 On appellate review,
the appellate court is required to consider the entire record to determine if the court abused its discretion, and if the court's action constituted reversible error.3 7 °
The existence of antagonism between parties, per se, is a question of
law.371 In determining whether antagonism exists, the trial court
must consider the pleadings, information disclosed by pretrial discovery, information and representations made during voir dire of the jury
panel, and any information brought to the attention of the trial court
before the parties exercise their strikes.37 2 The antagonism must be
determined finally after voir dire and prior to the exercise of the
strikes. 373 "The existence of antagonism is not a discretionary matter;
it is a question of law determined from the above factors whether any
litigants on the same side of the docket are antagonistic with respect
' 374
to an issue that the jury will be asked to answer.
The nature and degree of the antagonism, and its effect on the
number of peremptory jury strikes allocated to each litigant or side,
however, are matters left to the discretion of the trial court.3 75 In
considering the number of peremptory challenges to be allocated between the litigants or sides, the trial court "must determine, based on
the information gleaned from pleadings, pretrial discovery, and representation made during voir dire examination, what antagonism, if

367. TEX. R. Civ. P. 233; Perkins v. Freeman, 518 S.W.2d 532, 533-34 (Tex. 1974);
Amis, 802 S.W.2d at 385 (Ramey, C.J., dissenting).
368. Amis, 802 S.W.2d at 384 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 266).
369. Id. at 384 n.7.
370. Id. at 383.
371. Garcia v. Central Power & Light Co., 704 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. 1986); Patterson
Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914, 919 (Tex. 1979); Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Wendt,
718 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1986, writ refd n.r.e.).
372. Webster v. Lipsey, 787 S.W.2d 631, 638 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990,
writ denied); Garcia, 704 S.W.2d at 736; Dunn, 592 S.W.2d at 919.
373. Garcia, 704 S.W.2d at 736.
374. Dunn, 592 S.w.2d at 919; American Cyanamid Co. v. Frankson, 732 S.W.2d 648,
652 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ refd n.r.e.).
375. Wendt, 718 S.W.2d at 769.
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any, exists between the parties. "376 "In multiple party cases, the trial
judge shall equalize the number of peremptory challenges so that no
litigant or side is given an unfair advantage and so as to promote the
ends of justice." 3" Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its
allocation of peremptory challenges is determined at the time the
court made its decision and not in hindsight. 37 ' Thus, if the trial
court's decision is based upon a reasonable assessment of the situation
before it at the time the challenges are made, there is no abuse of
discretion.3 79 If, however, the trial court has ignored the posture of
the parties, or has misconstrued or overlooked a vital factor, its decision should be reversed as an abuse of discretion. 380 The harmless
error rule applies to the allocation of peremptory challenges given to a
party; therefore, to obtain a reversal, the complaining party must establish, based on the entire record, that the trial was "materially unfair." 3 8 ' On the other hand, "when the evidence is sharply conflicting
and the trial is hotly contested,382the error results in a materially unfair
trial without showing more.
E.

Opening Statements

The trial court has broad discretion to limit opening statements
subject only to review for abuse of discretion.383 While it is error to
discuss evidence that is not eventually offered at the trial,384 the error
is reversible only if it was calculated to and probably did cause the
rendition of an improper judgment.385

376. Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Tex. 1986); e.g., Webster v. Lipsey, 787 S.W.2d 631, 638 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Wendt, 718

S.W.2d at 769.
377. TEX. R. Civ. P. 233; Wendt, 718 S.W.2d at 769.

378. Frankson, 732 S.W.2d at 653, 660 (citing Garcia, 704 S.W.2d at 737).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Garcia, 704 S.W.2d at 737; Lorusso v. Members Mut. Ins. Co., 603 S.W.2d 818, 82021 (Tex. 1980); Dunn, 592 S.W.2d at 920-21.
382. Garcia, 704 S.W.2d at 737; Dunn, 592 S.W.2d at 921.
383. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 530 S.W.2d 162, 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ

refd n.r.e.).
384. Id.

385. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Garza, 675 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
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F. Trial, Postverdict, and Postjudgment Trial Amendments
Pleading amendments within seven days of trial,38 6 or thereafter
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 63, and postverdict pleading
amendments under Rule 66, must be granted unless the opposing
party objects and presents evidence of surprise or prejudice. If the

amendment asserts a new cause of action or defense, it is prejudicial

on its face. 387 If the amendment is procedural in nature-for example, the amendment conforms the pleadings to the evidence at trial-

the trial court must grant the amendment. 388 However, if the
amendment is substantive in nature-for example, the amendment
changes the bases of a party's defense-the trial court has discretion
to grant or deny the amendment. 389 Abuse of discretion is the standard of review for the granting of a trial amendment. 390 To establish
an abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment, the complaining
party must present evidence of surprise or prejudice, 391 and must request a continuance.392 Mere allegations of surprise or prejudice are
insufficient.393
386. The "day of trial" means the day the case is scheduled for trial, not the day the case
actually begins trial. See H.B. Zachary Co. v. Gonzales, 847 S.W.2d 246, 246-47 & n.2 (Tex.
1993 orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (noting that trial setting date controls unless case is reset
more than 30 days from original date). The rule also applies to summary judgment proceedings because a summary judgment hearing is a trial. Goswami v. Metropolitan Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. 1988); Austin Transp. Study Policy Advisory Comm. v.
Sierra Club, 843 S.W.2d 683, 687 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ requested); Clade v. Larsen,
838 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
387. TEX. R. Civ. P. 63, 66; Chapin & Chapin, Inc. v. Texas Sand & Gravel Co., Inc.,
844 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam); Greenhalgh v. Service Lloyds Ins. Co., 787
S.W.2d 938, 939 (Tex. 1990). Surprise may be shown as a matter of law if the pleading asserts
a new and independent cause of action or defense. Bell v. Moores, 832 S.W.2d 749, 757 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
388. Chapin & Chapin, Inc., 844 S.W.2d at 665 (citing Greenhalgh, 787 S.W.2d at 939-

40).
389. Id. (citing Hardin v. Hardin, 597 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex. 1980)).
390. Greenhalgh, 787 S.W.2d at 940-41; Houston Cable TV, Inc. v. Inwood West Civic
Ass'n, 839 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ requested); Clade,
838 S.W.2d at 280; AMSAV Group, Inc. v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 796 S.W.2d 482, 490
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
391. Greenhalgh, 787 S.W.2d at 940-41; Houston Cable TV, Inc., 839 S.W.2d at 500;
Clade, 838 S.W.2d at 280.
392. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cook, 840 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992,
writ denied); James v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 836 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ); Louisiana & Arkansas Ry. Co. v. Blakely, 773 S.W.2d 595, 597 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied).
393. Wingate v. Hajdik, 795 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Tex. 1990) (Spears, J., dissenting).
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While the trend is to give trial courts wide latitude in allowing
amendments, postjudgment trial amendments are not permitted.394
G.

Evidence

Admitting and excluding evidence are matters "within the discretion of the trial court."3 95 To obtain reversal of a judgment, based on
error in the admission or exclusion of evidence, an appellant must
show that the trial court's ruling was in error and that the error was
calculated to cause and probably did cause rendition of an improper
judgment.396 The supreme court has recognized the impossibility of
prescribing a specific test for determining whether the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence was reasonably calculated to cause
and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. 97
The complaining party is not required to prove that "but for" the
error a different judgment would necessarily have resulted. 98 Instead, the complaining party must only show that the error "probably" resulted in an improper judgment.399 In making this
determination, the appellate court must review the entire record.'
"Reversible error does not usually occur in connection with evidentiary rulings unless the appellant can demonstrate that the whole case
° Further,
turns on the particular evidence admitted or excluded.""M
394. Boarder to Boarder Trucking, Inc. v. Mondi, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 495, 499 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
395. Tracy's v. Annie's Attic, Inc., 840 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ
denied).
396. TEX. R. App. P. 81(b)(1); Boothe v. Hausler, 766 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Tex. 1989); Gee
v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. 1989); West Tex. Gathering Co. v.
Exxon Corp., 837 S.W.2d 764, 775 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ granted).
397. McCraw v. Maris, 828 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Tex. 1992); Lorusso v. Members Mut. Ins.
Co., 603 S.W,2d 818, 821 (Tex. 1980); Ponder v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 840 S.W.2d 476,
479 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
398. McCraw, 828 S.W.2d at 758; Texas Power & Light Co. v. Hering, 148 Tex. 350, 353,
224 S.W.2d 191, 192 (1949).
399. McCraw, 828 S.W.2d at 758; King v. Skelly, 452 S.W.2d 691, 696 (Tex. 1970); LSR
Joint Venture No. 2 v. Callewart, 837 S.W.2d 693, 699 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
400. McCraw, 828 S.W.2d at 758 (citing Gee v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d at 396;

Lorusso, 603 S.W.2d at 821); e.g., Jamail v. Anchor Mortgage Servs., Inc., 809 S.W.2d 221,
223 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam).
401. West Tex. Gathering Co., 837 S.W.2d at 775 (citing Shenandoah Assoc. v. J & K
Properties, Inc., 741 S.W.2d 470, 494 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied)); Texaco, Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 837 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.));
see also Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
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error in the improper admission of evidence is usually deemed harmless if the objecting party subsequently permits the same or similar
evidence to be introduced without objection, 4°2 or if the evidence is
merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence.
H. Bifurcation of Trial on Punitive Damages

A trial court may generally order a bifurcated trial on punitive
damages under the "Wyoming Plan.'" Under the Wyoming Plan, if
the evidence at trial establishes a fact issue regarding punitive damages, the charge should include questions concerning the awarding of
both compensatory and punitive damages. 4 5 If the jury determines
that punitive damages should be awarded, it then hears evidence of
the defendant's net worth and returns a separate verdict setting the

amount of punitive damages."

6

A trial court's action ordering a bi-

furcated trial under Rule 174(b) is not an abuse of discretion,'" 7 and

will not be the basis for reversal unless the complaining party can
show reversible error under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
81(b).408
I.

Motion for Directed or Instructed Verdict

1. Jury Trials
A directed or instructed verdict is proper under Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 301409 when:
(1) a defect in the opponent's pleadings makes them insufficient to sup402. Richardson v. Green, 677 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Tex. 1984); Shenandoah Assoc., 741

S.W.2d at 494.

403. Jamail,809 S.W.2d at 223; McInnes v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 673 S.W.2d 185, 188
(Tex. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1107 (1985); Rampel v. Wascher, 845 S.W.2d 918, 922 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied); City of Austin v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 844

S.W.2d 773, 791 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
404. Miller v. O'Neill, 775 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1989, orig.
proceeding); see Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Tex. 1988) (Gonzales, J., dissenting) (favoring Wyoming Plan for Texas practice). Contra Greater Houston Transp. Co. v.
Zrubeck, No. 13-91-426-CV, 1993 WL 24002, at *37 n.8 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, Feb. 4,
1993, n.w.h.) (criticizing Wyoming Plan).
405. Id. (citing Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1132 (Wyo. 1981)).
406. Id.
407. Id. Contra Zrubeck, 1993 WL 24002, at *23 (stating that jury verdict would be set
aside only if clearly wrong and unjust).
408. TEX. R. App. P. 81(b).
409. TEX. R. Civ. P. 301.
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port a judgment; (2) the evidence conclusively proves a fact that establishes a party's right to judgment as a matter of law; or (3) the evidence
4'0
offered on a cause of action is insufficient to raise an issue of fact.
In reviewing the granting of a directed or instructed verdict by the

trial court on an evidentiary basis, the reviewing court will "determine whether there is any evidence of probative force to raise fact

issues on the material questions presented."4"' The court considers
"all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against
whom the verdict was instructed,... and disregards all contrary evidence and inferences," and gives the losing party the benefit of all
reasonable inferences created by the evidence.4 12 Every reasonable intendment deductible from the evidence is to be indulged in the nonmovant's favor.41 3 If there is any conflicting evidence of probative
value on any theory of recovery, the issue is for the jury, and an instructed verdict is improper. The case must be reversed and remanded for the jury's determination on that issue.4 14 When no
evidence of probative force on an ultimate fact element exists, or when

410. Edlund v. Bounds, 842 S.W.2d 719, 723-24 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied);
M.N.Dannenbaum, Inc. v. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d 624, 629 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1992, writ denied); Kelly v. Diocese of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Duree, 798 S.W.2d
406, 408 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied); Rudolph v. ABC Pest Control, Inc., 763
S.W.2d 930, 932 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied); McCarley v. Hopkins, 687
S.W.2d 510, 512 (Tex. App--Houston. [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ); Rowland v. City of Corpus
Christi, 620 S.W.2d 930, 932-33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
411. Collora v. Navarro, 574 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex. 1978). Justice Cohen has suggested
that the scope of review for a directed verdict should be the evidence as it stood when the
motion for directed verdict was denied. Sipco Servs. Marine, Inc. v. Wyatt Field Serv. Co.,
No. 01-91-00916-CV, 1993 WL 82707, at *20 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], Mar. 25, 1993,
n.w.h.) (Cohen, J., concurring). Thus, if the defendant moved for a directed verdict at the
close of the plaintiff's case, then only the evidence to that point would be considered in reviewing the trial court's order. Id. If the defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of all
the evidence, then all the evidence would be reviewed on appeal. Id. Justice Cohen would
apply this rule to both nonjury and jury case. Id.
412. White v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 651 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. 1983); e.g., Qantel
Business Sys. v. Custom Controls, 761 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex. 1988); Collora, 574 S.W.2d at 68;
University Nat'l Bank v. Ernst & Whinney, 773 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1989, no writ); Rudolph, 763 S.W.2d at 932; Graziadei v. D.D.R. Mach. Co., 740 S.W.2d 52,
55-56 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied).
413. Trehnolm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 931 (Tex. 1983); Collora, 574 S.W.2d at 68;
University Nat'l Bank, 773 S.W.2d at 709.
414. White, 651 S.W.2d at 262; Jones v. Tarrant Util. Co., 638 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex.
1982); Collora, 574 S.W.2d at 68; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Page, 553 S.W.2d 98, 102
(Tex. 1977); Henderson v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. 1976).
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the probative force of slight testimony is so weak that only a mere
surmise or suspicion is raised as to the existence of essential facts, the
trial court has the duty to instruct the verdict.4"5 The reviewing court
may affirm a directed verdict even if the trial court's rationale for
granting the directed verdict is erroneous, provided it can be sup416
ported on another basis.
2.

Nonjury Trials

In a nonjury trial, the judge "serves the dual capacity of fact finder
and magistrate" and "has the power and the duty to weigh the evidence, draw inferences and make reasonable deductions from the evidence and to believe or disbelieve all or part of it."'4 17 Previously, the
granting of a motion for judgment in a nonjury trial was the legal
equivalent of the granting of a directed verdict in a jury trial.4" 8 Since
those two actions were deemed equivalent, the appellate standard of
review for reviewing the propriety of a directed verdict granted in a
jury trial was held to be equally applicable to review of a granted
motion for judgment in a nonjury trial.41 9 Thus, the "trial judge
could grant a motion for judgment at the close of the plaintiff's case
only when there was no evidence to support the plaintiff's cause of
action."'4 20 The trial judge who was unpersuaded by the plaintiff's
evidence, but could find some evidence supporting the claim, was required to hear the defendant's case before ruling on the factual sufficiency of the evidence. 42' The supreme court overruled that line of
cases in Qantel Business Systems, Inc. v. Custom Controls Co.,422 and
held that when the plaintiff rests his case, on motion for judgment by
the defendant, the judge "has the power to rule on both the factual
and legal issues" and "to make factual findings at that time if requested by a party. 4 23 On appeal, the legal and factual sufficiency of
415. Porterfield v. Brinegar, 719 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. 1986); Kelly, 832 S.W.2d at 9091; University Nat'l Bank, 773 S.W.2d at 709.
416. Kelly, 832 S.W.2d at 90.
417. Qantel Business Sys., Inc. v. Custom Controls Co., 761 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. 1988)
(Gonzalez, J. concurring).
418. Id. at 303.
419. Id. at 303-04.
420. Id. at 304.
421. Qantel Business Sys., Inc., 761 S.W.2d at 304.
422. 761 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1988).
423. Id.; e.g., Chase Commercial Corp. v. Datapoint Corp., 774 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
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the evidence to support the judgment may be challenged as in any
other nonjury case.424 The standards of review applicable in nonjury
cases are discussed in Part VII.
J. Charge of the Court
Great confusion exists regarding the standard of review for complaints about the court's charge to the jury. 425 The confusion is due to
the existence of different standards for different aspects of charge
practice, which courts sometimes
fail simplistically to limit to their
4 26
proper procedural context.

1. Questions
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 278 provides that "[t]he court shall
submit the questions... in the form provided by Rule 277, which are
raised by the written pleadings and the evidence.

4 27

The supreme

court has interpreted Rule 278 as providing "a substantive, non-discretionary directive to trial courts requiring them to submit requested
questions to the jury if the pleadings and any evidence support
them.

'4 2 8

Thus, as "long as matters are timely raised and properly

requested as part of a trial court's charge," a judgment must be reversed "when a party is denied proper submission of a valid theory of
recovery or a vital defensive issue raised by the pleadings and
evidence.

4 29

It seems, however, that the question of whether the charge has sub424. Qantel Business Sys., Inc., 761 S.W.2d at 304.
425. See State Dep't of Highways & Public Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 240-41
(Tex. 1992) (lamenting that "[t]he rules governing charge procedures are difficult enough; the
caselaw applying them has made compliance a labyrinth daunting to the most experienced trial
lawyer"). In Payne, the court severely criticized the traps involved in preserving error at the
charge stage of the trial. Id. at 240. The court stated:
The procedure for preparing and objecting to the jury charge has lost its philosophical
moorings. There should be but one test for determining if a party has preserved error in
the jury charge, and that is whether the party made the trial court aware of the complaint,
timely and plainly, and obtained a ruling. The more specific requirements of the rules
should be applied, while they remain, to serve rather than defeat this principle.
Id. at 241.
426. See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Human Serv. v. E. B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990).
"The standard for review of the charge is abuse of discretion, [which] occurs only when the
trial court acts without reference to any guiding principle." Id.
427. TEX. R. Civ. P. 278.
428. Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1992).
429. Exxon Corp. v. Perez, 842 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. 1992).
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mitted the controlling issues in the case-in terms of theories of recovery or defense-should be a question of law reviewable de novo.4 3 °
Other objections, such as whether the issue in question was not supported by the pleadings,4 3 whether there is no cause of action or defense under the substantive law,4 32 and whether the evidence is not
legally sufficient to support submission4 33 should also be reviewed de
novo because each complaint raises a question of law. Whether a trial
court should submit a theory by questions or instructions should be
reviewed under an abuse of discretion test, recognizing, however, that
there is a presumption in favor of broad-form submission of questions.4 34 Yet, when an element of a theory has been omitted in the
questions or instructions-either because the court believed that it
was established as a matter of law or because an element of the theory
of recovery was omitted-the appropriate standard of review should
be de novo.4 3 5
2.

Instructions and Definitions

The court should explain to the jury any legal or technical terms
contained in instructions and definitions.4 36 The essential question
the trial court must determine is whether the instruction or definition
aids the jury in answering the questions. 437 An appellate court will
review a trial court's decision to submit a particular instruction or

430. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Street, 379 S.W.2d 648, 651 (Tex. 1964) (reviewing
issue submitted to jury at trial court).
431. See, e.g., McLellan Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Sims, 376 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (discussing contention of issues unsupported by pleadings).
432. See id.
433. Elbaor, 845 S.W.2d at 244; Brown v. Goldstein, 685 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1985);
Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex. 1965).
434. TEx. R. Civ. P. 277; E. B., 802 S.W.2d at 649; Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d
245, 256 (Tex. 1974).
435. See State Dep't of Highways & Publ. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 239-40
(Tex. 1992) (noting plaintiffs failure to submit element of his theory of recovery over defendant's objection); McKinley v. Stripling, 763 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. 1989) (noting that plaintiff
refused to submit proximate cause issue in informed consent action after defendant properly
objected to omission of issue on element and, accordingly, waived issue and could not recover).
436. Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 578-79 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1992, no writ); Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Garcia, 758 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
437. Louisiana & Ark. Ry. Co. v. Blakely, 773 S.W.2d 595, 598 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1989, writ denied); Harris v. Harris, 765 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1989, writ denied).
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definition under an abuse of discretion standard. A trial court, accordingly, is given wide latitude to determine the sufficiency of explanatory instructions and definitions. 438 The trial court has
considerably more discretion in submitting instructions and definitions than it has in submitting jury questions. 39
When instructions or definitions are actually given, the question on
review is whether the instruction or definition is "proper."' 44 "An
instruction is proper if it finds support in any evidence of probative
value and if it might be of some assistance to the jury in answering the
questions submitted.""' The test of sufficiency for a definition "is its
reasonable clarity in performing [its] function." 42 This is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion test. 44 3 However, whether the terms are
properly defined or the instruction properly worded should be a question of law reviewable de novo. 4 A de novo standard of review
should be used when the complaint is that an explanatory instruction
or definition misstates the law 44 or directly comments on the weight

of the evidence. 446 If the instruction was improper, the reviewing
447
court must then determine whether the error was harmless.
438. Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 256 (Tex. 1974); M. N. Dannenbaum,
Inc. v. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d 624, 631 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ
denied).
439. Harris, 765 S.W.2d at 801 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
440. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277; Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d at 631; Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
441. Blakely, 773 S.W.2d at 598; see also Johnson v. Whitehurst, 652 S.W.2d 441, 447
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Steinberger v. Archer County, 621
S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
442. Harris, 765 S.W.2d at 801.
443. See id. (noting trial court's discretion and absence of reversible error).
444. See Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d at 631 (declaring that instruction is improper if it
misstates law); Villarreal v. Reza, 236 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1951,
no writ) (quoting Psimenos v. Huntley, 47 S.W.2d 62, 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1932, no
writ)) (noting that instruction that fails to properly instruct jury on burden of proof is
erroneous).
445. See, e.g., Harris, 765 S.W.2d at 801 (reviewing trial court's definition of "marital
property" de novo); Bennett v. Bailey, 597 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (applying de novo standard of review to trial court's definition of "unconscionable"); see also Wakefield v. Bevly, 704 S.W.2d 339, 350 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1985, no writ) (refusing to review proposed instruction before retrial on remand as instruction
could not be considered in light of evidence offered during retrial).
446. See City of Pearland v. Alexander, 483 S.W.2d 244, 249 (Tex. 1972) (holding jury
instruction erroneous as comment upon weight of evidence after de novo review); American
Bakers Ins. Co. v. Caruth, 786 S.W.2d 427, 434-35 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (holding
upon de novo review that trial court improperly commented on weight of evidence).
447. TEX. R. APP. P. 81(b)(1); Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d at 631.
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When the court refuses to submit a requested instruction or definition, the question on review is whether the request was reasonably
necessary to enable the jury to render a proper verdict." 8 When the
refusal is based on a determination that the request is unnecessary, the
abuse of discretion standard of review should apply." 9 Whether the
refusal to submit a requested instruction or definition requires reversal
is determined by applying the harmless error rule. 45" By contrast,
when the complaint is that the instruction or definition was raised by
the pleadings, supported by "some evidence," tendered in substantially correct form, or was an element of a ground of recovery or defense in broad-form submission, the complaint presents a legal
question, reviewable de novo.451
To determine whether an alleged error in the submission of instructions or definitions is reversible, "the reviewing court must consider
the pleadings of the parties, the evidence presented at trial, and the
charge in its entirety. '4 -2 "Error will be deemed reversible error only
if, when viewed in light of the totality of these circumstances, it
amounted to such a denial of the rights of the complaining party as
was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendi'
tion of an improper judgment."453
K.

Jury Arguments

To secure reversal of a judgment on the assertion of improper jury
448. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277; see Whitehurst, 652 S.W.2d at 447-48 (holding trial court's
refusal to submit proposed instruction not violative of Rule 277); Steinberger, 621 S.W.2d at
841 (holding that absent showing that denial of instruction caused improper jury verdict, trial
court did not err in refusing proposed instruction).
449. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Charles, 381 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding refused instruction not improper); Brooks v. Taylor, 359 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (upholding court's
denial of requested instruction).
450. St. James Transp. Co. v. Porter, 840 S.W.2d 658, 664 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (citing Gulf Coast State Bank v. Emenhiser, 562 S.W.2d 449, 453-54
(Tex. 1978)).
451. Plancencio v. Allied Indust. Int'l, Inc., 724 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. 1987); Ellison v.
Larson, 217 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1948), af'd, 147 Tex. 465, 217
S.W.2d 420 (1949); Ornelas v. Moore Serv. Bus Lines, 410 S.W.2d 919, 923 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. 1992)(holding
that defendant properly preserved error by submitting jury questions in "substantially correct
wording").
452. Island Recreational Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Tex. Say. Ass'n, 710 S.W.2d 551, 555
(Tex. 1986).
453. Id.; TEX. R. App. P. 81(b)(l).
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argument, an appellant must prove: "(1) [that there was] an error; (2)
that was not invited or provoked; (3) that was preserved by the proper
trial predicate, such as an objection, a motion to instruct, or a motion
for mistrial; and (4) [that] was not curable by an instruction, a prompt
44
withdrawal of the statement, or a reprimand by the [trial] judge.
Additionally, if the argument is incurable, the appellant must also
prove "that the argument by its nature, degree, and extent, constitutes
reversible error."4 5 There are only rare instances of incurable harm
from improper argument; for example, appealing to racial prejudice,
appealing to a jury to reward or penalize a litigant for belonging or
not belonging to a racial or ethnic group, or referring to a defendant
corporation as a killer of families.45 6 In those cases, the appellant
must prove also "that the argument by its nature, degree, and extent,
constituted reversibly harmful error" and "that the probability that
the improper argument caused harm is greater than the probability
that the verdict was based upon proper proceedings and evidence."'4 57
The length of the argument, whether it was repeated or abandoned,
and whether there was cumulative error are proper inquiries. 4 11 Finally, the reviewing court must evaluate the improper jury argument
in light of the whole case, beginning with voir dire and ending with
closing argument.45 9
L. Jury Deliberations
The scheduling of jury deliberations, the sequestrating of jurors, the
granting of jury breaks, and the like are reviewed for an abuse of dis454. Lone Star Ford, Inc. v. Carter, 848 S.W.2d 850, 853 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Texas Health Enters., Inc. v. Krell, 828 S.W.2d 192, 204 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi), vacated by agr., 830 S.W.2d 922 (1992); see TEX. R. Civ. P. 269 (stating procedure applicable argument before jury).
455. Carter, 848 S.W.2d at 853.
456. Haryanto v. Saeed, No. C14-92-00846-CV, 1993 WL 122593, at *4 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 20, 1993, n.w.h.); Carter,848 S.W.2d at 854-55; Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n v. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d 859, 863, 865 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
Justice Peeples's analysis of improper jury argument in Texas in Guerrero is comprehensive,
thorough, and well reasoned. See Haryanto, 1993 WL 122593, at *5 (approving court's analysis in Guerrero).
457. Carter, 848 S.W.2d 854-55.
458. Id.
459. Id.; Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115, 120 (Tex. 1984); Stan-

dard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 839-40 (Tex. 1979); Louisiana & Arkansas Ry.
Co. v. Capps, 766 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied).
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cretion. 46 Responses to jury notes are reviewed the same as regular
charge practice. 46' Whether to repeat testimony to the jury and the
extent of the repetition are discretionary, except that testimony must
be reread if the requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 287462
are met. In the absence of disagreement between jurors, the court is
not obligated to have testimony read back.463 The trial court has
broad discretion in deciding what portion of testimony is relevant to
the disputed point. 46
A trial court has discretion to issue a supplemental charge to the
jury ("verdict urging" or "dynamite" charge) or to return a jury for
further deliberations in an attempt to reach a verdict. Typically, the
complaining party will contend that the jury was coerced into reaching a particular verdict. To test a supplemental charge for coerciveness, a court must break down the supplemental charge into its
particulars and analyze each part for possible coercive statements.465
A potentially coercive charge will not constitute reversible error unless the charge, as a whole, retains its coercive nature when all of the
circumstances surrounding its rendition and effect are analyzed.466
Additionally, the trial court has discretion to determine the length of
time a jury is to be held in an effort to reach a verdict.467 While the
trial court has considerable latitude, if the complaining party can
show substantial evidence on appeal that it was altogether improbable
that the jury would reach a proper verdict if forced to continue deliberations, then the error is reversible.468
M. Jury Misconduct
When the evidence is conflicting on the question of alleged jury
misconduct during jury deliberations, the appellate court will pre460. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 282 (delineating process of jury deliberations).
461. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 286 (allowing jury to receive further instructions).
462. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 287 (considering juror disagreement over evidence).
463. Id.; Hill v. Robinson, 592 S.W.2d 376, 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ refd
n.r.e.).
464. Wirtz v. Orr, 575 S.W.2d 66, 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ dism'd);
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Scott, 423 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1968, writ dism'd by agr.).
465. Stevens v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 563 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Tex. 1978).
466. Id. at 229, 232.
467. Shaw v. Greater Houston Transp. Co., 791 S.W.2d 204, 205-06 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1990, no writ).
468. Id. at 206.
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sume that misconduct did not occur. 46 9 To establish jury misconduct,
the complaining party must show misconduct occurred that was material and that, based on the record as a whole, probably resulted in
harm. 47 ° A motion for new trial premised on jury misconduct "must
be supported by a juror's affidavit alleging that 'outside influences'
were brought to bear upon the jury." 47 ' To obtain a hearing without
a juror's affidavit, the party must disclose a reasonable explanation
and excuse as to why affidavits cannot be secured, and must also state
472
sufficient particularized allegations of material jury misconduct.

N. Conflicting Jury Findings
When determining whether jury findings irreconcilably conflict, the
appellate court applies a de novo standard of review.473 Because this
is purely a legal question, the trial court's granting of a new trial on
the express basis of irreconcilably conflicting jury findings can be
challenged by mandamus.474
In reviewing jury findings for conflict, the threshold inquiry is
whether the findings address the same material fact.47 A court may
not strike jury answers on the ground of conflict if there is any reasonable basis upon which the answers can be reconciled. 6 The reviewing court must reconcile apparent conflicts in the jury's findings "if
469. Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ);
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Phillips, 255 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. Civ. App,-Eastland 1953,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hudson v. West Cent. Drilling Co., 195 S.W.2d 387, 393 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
470. TEX. R. Civ. P. 327a; Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Tex. 1985);
Ramsey v. Lucky Stores, Inc., No. 01-90-00741-CV, 1993 WL 77566, at *26 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 18, 1993, n.w.h.); Bradbury v. State, 503 S.W.2d 619, 623 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1973, no writ); Phillips, 255 S.W.2d at 366.
471. Weaver v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 739 S.W.2d 23,24 (Tex. 1987); Ramsey, 1993
WL 77566, at *26-27; Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 850 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see TEX. R. Civ. P. 327 (regarding juror's ability to
testify about deliberations).
472. Ray Jones Lumber Co. v. Murphy, 139 Tex. 478, 483, 163 S.W.2d 644, 646 (1942);
Ramsey, 1993 WL 77566, at *27.
473. See Bender v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 600 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. 1980) (reviewing assertion of conflicting jury findings).
474. See Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Craik, 346 S.W.2d 830, 831-32 (Tex. 1961) (stating that
writ of mandamus would issue unless judge set aside order of mistrial that had been based on
conflicting jury findings).
475. Bender, 600 S.W.2d at 260.
476. Luna v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 724 S.W.2d 383, 584 (Tex. 1987); Bender, 600
S.W.2d at 260.
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reasonably possible in light of the pleadings and evidence, the manner
'
of submission, and the other findings considered as a whole."477
When the issues submitted lead to more than one reasonable construction, the reviewing court will generally adopt the construction
that avoids a conflict in the answers. 8
Appellate review is limited to the question of conflict, and the review of jury findings "is limited to a consideration of the factors
before the jury.

'4 79

Similarly, when no conflict exists, the appellate

court cannot use the jury's answer to one question to challenge the
insufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's answer to another
question.48 °
VI.

A.

POSTTRIAL PROCEEDINGS

Motion To DisregardJury Findings

A trial court may disregard a jury's finding and grant a motion to
disregard jury findings only when there is no evidence to support the
jury's finding.481 If the issue is immaterial or has no support in the
evidence, or the evidence establishes a contrary finding, then the court
may disregard an answer and substitute its own finding.48 2
In reviewing the grant of a motion to disregard jury findings, the
appellate court must consider all testimony in a light most favorable
to the verdict, indulging every reasonable inference deductible in its
favor.48 3 When some evidence supports the disregarded finding, the
reviewing court must reverse and render judgment unless the appellee
asserts crosspoints showing grounds for a new trial.48 4
477. Bender, 600 S.W.2d at 260.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. See Huber v. Ryan, 627 S.W.2d 145, 145-46 (Tex. 1981) (holding that jury's findings
of injury and zero damages for past pain and suffering could be reconciled).
481. Alm v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tex. 1986); Harris County v.
McFerren, 788 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Arch Constr., Inc. v. Tyburec, 730 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ refd
n.r.e.).
482. TEX. R. Civ. P. 301; Eubanks v. Winn, 420 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. 1967); McFerren,
788 S.W.2d at 78; U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Twin City Concrete, Inc., 684 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
483. Aim, 717 S.W.2d at 593; Schaefer v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 612 S.W.2d 199,
201 (Tex. 1980).
484. Basin Operating Co. v. Valley Steel Prods., 620 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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B.

Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
A trial court may disregard a jury's findings and grant a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, pursuant to Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure 301 and 324(c)485 only when there is no evidence
upon which the jury could have made its findings.486 In reviewing the
grant of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the reviewing court must determine whether there is any evidence upon
which the jury could have made the finding. The record is "reviewed
in the light most favorable to the finding, considering only the evidence and inferences which support them and rejecting the evidence
and inferences contrary to the findings. '48 7 When there is more than
a scintilla of competent evidence to support the jury's finding, the
judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be reversed.488
C. Receipt of Additional Evidence
The trial court has discretion to reopen the evidence on an uncontested matter. The trial court automatically abuses its discretion if it
reopens, postverdict, the evidence on a contested matter in a jury case,
because to do so is contrary to law. 89
D. Newly Discovered Evidence
To obtain a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, 490 a
movant must show:
(1) that the evidence had come to his knowledge since the trial;
(2) that it was not owing to want of due diligence that it had not come
[to his attention] sooner;
(3) that it is not cumulative; and
(4) that [the new evidence] is so material that it would probably pro485. TEX. R. Civ. P. 301; TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(c).

486. Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. 1990); Exxon Corp. v.
Quinn, 726 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex. 1987); Navarette v. Temple Indep. Sch. Dist., 706 S.W.2d 308,
309 (Tex. 1986); Williams v. Bennett, 610 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex. 1980); Lone Star Ford, Inc. v.
McCormick, 838 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied); WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Berry, 833 S.W.2d 587, 590 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ requested);
Sun Power, Inc. v. Adams, 751 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
487. Navarette, 706 S.W.2d at 309; Williams, 610 S.W.2d at 145.
488. Southern States Transp., Inc. v. State, 774 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex. 1989); Navarette,
706 S.W.2d at 309.
489. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 270 (allowing additional testimony only before jury verdict
rendered).
490. TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(1).
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duce a different result if a new trial were granted.4 91
Further, the newly discovered evidence must be admissible, competent evidence.4 9 2
Whether a motion for new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence will be granted or denied lies "within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be disturbed absent
a manifest abuse of discretion. '49 3 When a trial court refuses to grant
a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, every reasonable presumption will be made to affirm the trial court's decision.4 94 In reviewing the trial court's decision refusing a new trial, appellate courts
recognize the well-established principle that motions for new trial
based on newly discovered evidence are not favored by the courts, and
are reviewed with careful scrutiny.49 5
E. Motion for New Trial, Generally
"A trial court has broad discretion in granting a new trial, before or
after judgment."4 96 In addition to the reasons stated in Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 320,49 1 a trial court may, in its discretion, grant a new
trial "in the interest of justice. '491 While trial courts have discretion
to grant a new trial, which "they have in all cases governed by equitable principles, it is not an unbridled discretion to decide cases as they
might deem proper without reference to any guiding rule or princi-

491. Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. 1983); Rankin v. Atwood Vacuum Mach. Co., 831 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992), writ deniedper
curiam, 841 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. 1992); Pan Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Erbauer Constr. Co., 791
S.W.2d 146, 151 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 805 S.W.2d
395 (Tex.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 86, 116 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1991); Sifuentes v. Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 754 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ); Eikenhorst v.
Eikenhorst, 746 S.W.2d 882, 886 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist] 1988, no writ).
492. Nguyen v. Minh Food Co., 744 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ
denied).
493. Jackson, 660 S.W.2d at 809; Eikenhorst, 746 S.W.2d at 886; Southwest Inns, Ltd. v.
General Elec. Co., 744 S.W.2d 258, 264 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied).
494. Nguyen, 744 S.W.2d at 622.
495. Id.
496. Champion Int'l Corp. v. Twelfth Court of Appeals, 762 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tex. 1988,
orig. proceeding); see also Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex.
1985, orig. proceeding); Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. 1983).
497. TEX. R. Civ. P. 320 (stating new trial granted for good cause on motion of party or
court's own notion).
498. Champion Int'l Corp., 762 S.W.2d at 899; Johnson, 700 S.W.2d at 918.
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ple."49' 9 The grant of a new trial is never reviewable, unless it was

void because (1) jurisdiction was lacking, or (2) the order was based
expressly solely on the ground of irreconcilably conflicting jury answers." ° In either event, mandamus is available in place of traditional appellate review.5"' The standard is de novo because these are
questions of law.
The denial of a motion for new trail is reviewable by appeal. The
standard of review depends on the complaint preserved by the motion
for new trial.5 2 Sufficiency of the evidence challenges, of course, 50are
3
governed by the legal and factual sufficiency standards of review.
F. Rule 324 Motion for New Trial
A motion for new trial is not a prerequisite to appeal in either a
jury or nonjury trial unless the complaint concerns matters that have
not otherwise been brought to the court's attention or for which additional evidence is needed. 5" Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 324(b)
requires that the following issues be raised by motion for new trial:
(1) a complaint on which evidence must be heard, such as one for jury
misconduct, newly discovered evidence, or failure to set aside a judgment by default;
(2) a complaint of factual insufficiency of the evidence to support a jury
finding;
(3) a complaint that a jury finding is against the overwhelming weight
of the evidence;
(4) a complaint of inadequacy or excessiveness of the damages found by
the jury; or
(5) incurable jury argument if not otherwise ruled on by the trial
court. 5 05

The reason for requiring that these matters first be brought to the
attention of the trial court is to give the trial court the opportunity to
499. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 392-93, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126
(1939).
500. Cummins v. Paisan Constr. Co., 682 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1984); Atchison, T. &
S.F.R.R. v. Brown, 750 S.W.2d 332, 333 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988, no writ).
501. See, e.g., Rogers v. Clinton, 794 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Tex. 1990) (finding mandamus proper
remedy to cure judge's order made after motion for new trial withdrawn).
502. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 324 (presenting prerequisites for motion for new trial).
503. See generally Part VII, infra.
504. TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(b).
505. TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(1)-(5).
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correct any errors that were not considered prior to the motion. 506 A
trial court has wide discretion in granting a new trial, and the trial
court's discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of
a manifest abuse of discretion.50 7
G. Motion To Correct, Reform, or Modify Judgment, or Judgment
Nunc Pro Tunc
After the trial court's plenary power over its own judgment terminates and the judgment becomes final, a nunc pro tunc is appropriate
only to correct clerical errors in entering the judgment.50 ' However,
it cannot correct judicial errors made in rendering the final judgment. 5" A judicial error is "the type of error which occurs in the
rendering of the judgment as distinguished from the entering of a
judgment." 5 10 In determining whether the trial court's attempted correction is a correction of a judicial error or a clerical error, the appellate court is "required to look to the judgment that was actually
rendered and not to the judgment that should or might have been
rendered." 5 1 ' The decision of whether an error in a judgment is a
judicial or clerical error is a question of law that is not binding on the
51 2
appellate court.

506. Stillman v. Hirsch, 128 Tex. 359, 369, 99 S.W.2d 270, 275 (1936); Mushinski v.
Mushinski, 621 S.W.2d 669, 670-71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ). The motion for
new trial may be overruled by signed order or by operation of law. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c);
Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. 1991).
507. Champion Int'l Corp. v. Twelfth Court of Appeals, 762 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tex.
1988); Grissom v. Watson, 704 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Tex. 1986); Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660
S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. 1983); Mitchell v. Bass, 26 Tex. 372, 377-78 (1862); Allied Rent-All,
Inc. v. International Rental Ins., 764 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988,
no writ); Fillinger v. Fuller, 746 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, no writ).
508. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 316 (providing means of correcting clerical errors in record); see
also Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell, 450 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1970) (stating that judicial
errors in rendition of judgment may not be corrected by nunc pro tunc judgment); Crocker v.
Synpol, Inc., 732 S.W.2d 429, 436 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ) (noting that trial
court may only correct clerical errors after rendering final judgment).
509. Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 231-32 (Tex. 1986).
510. Crocker, 732 S.W.2d at 436; e.g., Knox v. Long, 152 Tex. 291, 295, 257 S.W.2d 289,
291 (1953).
511. Crocker, 732 S.W.2d at 436; e.g., Coleman v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491, 495, 151 S.W.
1040, 1041 (1912).
512. Finlay v. Jones, 435 S.W.2d 136, 138 (Tex. 1968); Seago v. Bell, 764 S.W.2d 362, 364
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ); Crocker, 732 S.W.2d at 436.
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H. GuardianAd Litem Attorney's Fees
When an attorney is appointed as a guardian ad litem pursuant to
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 173, he is entitled to a reasonable fee to
be taxed as costs pursuant to Rules 131 and 141.13 Generally, ad
litem fees are assessed against the losing party.514 The same factors
that determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees also control an
award for ad litem fees. 5 5 In applying those considerations, the
award of guardian ad litem attorney's fees is a matter within the
sound discretion of the trial court. 516 When an ad litem fee is unreasonable or excessive, the appellate court may fix the amount of the
7
5 '1

fee.

I.

Remittitur

The remittitur process arises out of the trial court's almost unbridled discretion to grant new trials. 51 8 Professors Powers and Ratliff
correctly observe that when a trial court believes that a jury's award
of damages is excessive, it can use its autonomy to force the plaintiff
to make what amounts to a settlement offer.519 In such a situation,
the trial court typically denies the defendant's motion for new trial on
the condition that the plaintiff remit a specified amount of damages so
that the trial judge may sign a lesser judgment. 520 The plaintiff has
two choices: she may remit the suggested amount unconditionally or
she may have a new trial. 521 Because the trial court has no authority
to change the jury's award, the trial court judge cannot compel a remittitur, but may only "suggest" it.522 Like the trial courts, the
513. TEX. R. Civ. P. 173; see Dover Elevator Co. v. Servellon, 812 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) (remanding case to assess guardian ad litem fees as costs pursuant
to Rules 131 and 141).
514. Dover Elevator Co., 812 S.W.2d at 367 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 131 and 141).
515. Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co., 739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1987).
516. Id.
517. Hirczy v. Hirczy, 838 S.W.2d 783, 787 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, n.w.h.);
Celanese Chem. Co. v. Burleson, 821 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991,
no writ).
518. William Powers, Jr. & Jack Ratliff, Another Look at "No Evidence" and "Insufficient
Evidence", 69 TEX. L. REV. 515, 564 (1991).

519. Id.
520. Id.
521. Larson v. Cactus Util. Co., 730 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1987) (holding that if plaintiff
rejects "suggestion," trial court may grant new trial).
522. William Powers, Jr. & Jack Ratliff, Another Look at "No Evidence" and "Insufficient
Evidence", 69 TEX. L. REV. 515, 564 (1991).
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courts of appeals "also have the power to suggest a remittitur in lieu
of a new trial, whether or not the trial court has done so., ' 523 The
court of appeals may order a remittitur if the evidence is factually
insufficient to support the award, and the court of appeals's order is
reviewable by the supreme court to determine if the court of appeals
applied the correct legal standard. 524 Therefore, while the supreme
court lacks jurisdiction to review or to order a remittitur, it does have
jurisdiction to determine if the court of appeals applied the proper
25
standard of review.5
In either ordering a remittitur or in reviewing a trial court's order
of remittitur, the proper standard of review is factual sufficiency, not
abuse of discretion. 526 The court of appeals must "examine all the
evidence in the record to determine whether sufficient evidence supports the damage award and remit only if some portion is so factually
insufficient or so against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence as to be manifestly unjust."52 7 The courts of appeals must
also comply with Pool v. Ford Motor Co.528 if they either order or
5 29
affirm a suggestion of a remittitur of damages.
1. Actual Damages
If there is legally insufficient evidence to support an award of actual
damages, a take-nothing judgment for that amount should be rendered by the trial court or the appellate court, without suggesting a
remittitur.53 ° When the evidentiary support for part of an actual
damages award is factually insufficient, the trial court or the court of
appeals should "suggest a remittitur of that part of the verdict."5 3'
523. Id.
524. See generally Part VII for a discussion of the factual insufficiency of the evidence
standard of review.
525. Pope v. Moore, 711 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Tex. 1986).
526. See Snoke v. Republic Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 S.W.2d 777, 777-78 (Tex. 1989)
(applying factual sufficiency standard to attorney's fees); Larson v. Cactus Util. Co., 730
S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1987) (applying factual sufficiency standard to actual damages); Pope,
711 S.W.2d at 624 (applying factual sufficiency standard to punitive damages); see also TEX. R.
Civ. P. 315 (providing for remittitur generally); TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(2) (discussing factual
insufficiency to support jury findings); TEX. R. App. P.85 (providing for appellate review of
remittitur request).
527. Pope, 711 S.W.2d at 624.
528. 711 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. 1986).
529. Id. See Part VII(B) for a discussion of Pool.
530. Larson v. Cactus Util. Co., 730 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1987).
531. Id. The trial judge may only "suggest" a remittitur, she may not order a remittitur.
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The party that prevailed in the trial court should then be given the
option of either accepting the remittitur or having the case remanded
for a new trial.532
a.

Unliquidated Damages

The process of awarding damages for amorphous, discretionary
damages, such as mental anguish and pain and suffering, is inherently
difficult because the injury constitutes a subjective, unliquidated, non-

pecuniary loss. 533 It is "necessarily an arbitrary process, not subject
to objective analysis. '534 Because there are no objective guidelines to
assess the money equivalent to such injuries, the jury is given a great

deal of discretion in awarding an amount of damages it determines
appropriate.535 One court observed that once there is some amount of
mental anguish-or pain and suffering--established by the evidence,
the award of damages is "virtually unreviewable. ' '1 36 The court adHighlands Ins. Co. v. Baugh, 605 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ).
If the plaintiff rejects the "suggestion," the trial court may grant a new trial. Larson, 730
S.W.2d at 641.
532. Larson, 723 S.W.2d at 641; see TEx. R. App. P. 85(c) (stating appellate court guidelines upon finding that trial court erred in failing to suggest remittitur).
533. Duron v. Merritt, 846 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, n.w.h.);
Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 844 S.W.2d 808, 826 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ
requested); Baylor Med. Plaza Servs. Corp. v. Kidd, 834 S.W.2d 69, 78 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied); Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias, 831 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1992, no writ).
534. LaCoure v. LaCoure, 820 S.W.2d 228, 234 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied);
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d 590, 601 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990,
writ denied); Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc. v. Nabhan, 808 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1991, no writ); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dominguez, 793 S.W.2d 66, 73 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1990, writ denied); e.g., Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Smith, 822 S.W.2d 67, 78 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gros, 818 S.W.2d
908, 915 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ).
535. Hicks v. Ricardo, 834 S.W.2d 587, 591 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no
writ); Kidd, 834 S.W.2d 69, 78 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ); BaptistMemorial Hosp.
Sys., 822 S.W.2d at 78; La Coure, 820 S.W.2d at 234; Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d at 601; see Greater
Houston Transp. Co. v. Zrubeck, No. 13-91-426-CV, 1993 WL 24002 at *20-22 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi, Feb. 4, 1992, n.w.h.) (holding that award of discretionary damages such as
mental anguish "will be shunted to the discretionary domain of the jury"); Duron, 846 S.W.2d
at 26 (holding that it is within jury's province "to resolve the speculative matters of pain and
suffering, future pain and suffering, future disfigurement, and future physical impairment" and
award damages accordingly); Marshall v. Superior Heat Treating Co., 826 S.W.2d 197, 200
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, no writ) (holding that damage awards for past and future
physical pain, mental anguish, and physical impairment are "particularly within the province
of the jury").
536. Arias. 831 S.W.2d at 85.
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ded that while the damages are clearly reviewable under a sufficiency
of the evidence review, the court is "simply acknowledging the difficulties inherent in an appellate court's review of discretionary dam'
ages." 537
Nevertheless, a challenge to a damages award for these
types of unliquidated and intangible injuries is reviewed as any other
5 38
challenge based upon the sufficiency of the evidence.
b.

Zero Damages

The zero-damages rule provides that in cases involving unliquidated damages, the jury must award some amount of money for every
element of damage proved, or the case will be reversed and remanded
for a new trial.5 39 Based on the zero-damages rule, some courts have
concluded that once the fact of an injury is either established by the
evidence or acknowledged by the jury by a finding of some resulting
damages-such as medical expenses-the jury's failure to award damages for pain and suffering or some other intangible injury is regarded
as against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. 5" In
contrast, other courts have upheld jury findings of no damages for
intangible injuries, despite other findings and evidence of injury and
some resulting damages, by simply concluding that the failure to find
damages was not against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence.54
The zero-damages rule has been criticized as contrary to supreme
537. Id. at 85 n.2
538. Larson v. Cactus Util. Co., 730 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1987). In Another Look at
"No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence", the authors noted the difficulty in cases involving
intangible damages for appellate courts to point to specific testimony that demonstrates excessiveness or inadequacy as required by Pool. Williams Powers, Jr. & Jack Ratliff, Another Look
at "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence", 69 TEX. L. REV.515, 567 (1991). "Nevertheless, common sense suggests that courts should have some authority to review excessive or
inadequate damage awards. It would be unwise to permit a jury to make any award it thinks
fit without limit, even though it is dealing with damages that resist exact calculation or quanti-

fication." Id.
539. Raul A. Gonzalez & Rob Gilbreath, Appellate Review of a Jury's Finding of "Zero
Damages", 54 TEX. B.J. 418, 418 (1991).
540. See, e.g., Blizzard v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 756 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1988, no writ) (denying additional damages for pain and suffering); Hammond
v. Estate of Rimmer, 643 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.)
(awarding damages due to obvious pain and suffering); Taylor v. Head, 414 S.W.2d 542, 544
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, writ refd n.r.e.) (granting damages upon finding of pain
and suffering); Bolen v. Timmons, 407 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, no
writ) (reversing trial court after arbitrarily fixing damages unsupported by evidence).
541. Blizzard, 756 S.W.2d at 805.
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court standards of evidentiary review and as adverse to the enforcement of those standards as required by Pool 542 and the rule has now
been rejected by the courts.543 Accordingly, a challenge to an award
of zero damages is reviewed as any other challenge based upon the
sufficiency of the evidence.'"
2.

Punitive Damages

An appellate court also reviews punitive damages for factual sufficiency in a motion for new trial.5 45 When reviewing an award of punitive damages, the reviewing court must consider whether the
punitive damages are "reasonably proportional to the actual damages" and "whether the defendant was justly punished under the cir'
cumstances of the case." 546
"Actual damages are used to indicate the
reasonableness of punitive damages under the rule that punitive damages must be rationally related to actual damages. ' 547 This ratio,
however, is merely a tool to assist the courts in determining when a
542. Raul A. Gonzalez & Rob Gilbreath, Appellate Review of a Jury's Finding of "Zero
Damages", 54 TEX. B.J. 418, 420 (1991).
543. Pilkington v. Kornell, 822 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied);
Schmeltekopf v. Johnson Well Serv. of Luling, 810 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991,
no writ). But cf. Hyler v. Boytor, 823 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992,

no writ) (holding that in challenge to finding of zero damages "the relevant determination...
is whether the indicia of inquiry is more subjective than objective"); Blizzard, 756 S.W.2d at
805 (concluding that more evidence of outward signs of pain make it more likely that appellate
court will reverse jury finding of no damages for pain and suffering).
544. D.E.W., Inc. v. Depco Forms, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1992, no writ); Marshall v. Superior Heating Treating Co., 826 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1992, no writ); Pilkington, 822 S.W.2d at 225; Elliott v. Dow, 818 S.W.2d 222, 224
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ); Paschall v. Peevey, 813 S.W.2d 710, 714-15
(Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ). Some authors stated the rule that has been adopted by the
courts as follows:
To require a new trial under Pool, however, the reviewing court must conclude, after
weighing all the evidence, including the evidence in support of the $0 finding, that the
element of damages was so abundantly established that the discrepancy between the evidence and the finding of zero dollars is manifestly unjust. The evidence must do more
than establish a threshold level of proof that the plaintiff experience an element of damages; it must establish that element of damages so thoroughly that it would be manifestly
unjust to tolerate the award of $0. The zero damages rule should be discarded because it
interferes with the jury's role as a finder of fact.
Raul A. Gonzalez & Rob Gilbreath, Appellate Review of a Jury's Findingof "Zero Damages",
54 TEX. B.J. 418, 420 (1991).
545. TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(2); Pope v. Moore, 711 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. 1986).
546. Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Zrubeck, No. 13-91-426-CV, 1993 WL 24002, at
*31 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, Feb. 4, 1993, n.w.h.).
547. Wright v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 725 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. 1987).
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punitive damages award is the product of passion on the part of the
jury, rather than reason.-"' There is no exact formula by which punitive damages are measured to actual damages. 54 9
Besides considering the ratio of punitive to actual damages, the appellate court may also review: "the nature of the wrong, the character
of the conduct involved, the degree of the culpability of the wrongdoer, the situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned,

. . .

the

extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice in propriety,"55 and the extent to which punitive damages will punish and
deter similar conduct, taking into account the financial resources of
the offender.55 '
An award of punitive damages "rests in the jury's discretion and
will not be set aside as excessive unless the amount is so large as to
indicate that it is the result of passion and prejudice, or that the evidence has been disregarded. '

552

Punitive damages do not depend

upon the rules of fair compensation, but are based on the rules of just
punishment. 5 3 Thus, "when a jury honestly attempts to assess an
amount which punishes a wrongdoer, which does not oppress him,
but which is great enough to cause him and others similarly situated
to refrain from similar acts in the future, the judgment should not be
disturbed by an appellate court.

'554

How this standard of review will be applied in light of evidence of a
defendant's net worth 55 and the ability of witnesses to testify to ulti548. Id.

549. Tatum v. Preston Carter Co., 702 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Tex. 1986); see InterFirst Bank
Dallas, N.A. v. Risser, 739 S.W.2d 882, 909 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ dism'd by agr.)
(discussing "reasonable relationship test"). The ratio of actual damages to punitive damages
has been substantially reversed by the Tort Reform Act. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 41.007 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1992) (providing, in most cases, that exemplary damages may not exceed greater of $200,000 or four times amount of actual damages).
550. Tatum, 702 S.W.2d at 188; Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex.

1981).

551. Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 471 (Tex. 1988).
552. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Joseph, 769 S.W.2d 603, 607 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1989, no writ); see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Berry, 833 S.W.2d 587, 595 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ) (holding that punitive damages award may not be oppressive).
553. Joseph, 769 S.W.2d at 608.
554. Id. (citing Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Neeley, 443 S.W.2d 573, 580 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 452 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1970)).
555. Lunsford, 746 S.W.2d at 473. In one case, the court reduced a $15,000,000 punitive
damages award to $660,000 and stated, "The Courts today are faced with a real dilemma: Is
the evidence factually sufficient to support the trial court's judgment upholding the jury award
of $15 million in punitive damages against Appellant? Our answer is no, but why? Because it
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mate issues 556 remains to be settled. Also, the constitutional challenges to punitive damages, whether requiring clear and convincing
evidence or applying other meaningful standards, will surely affect
55 7
this standard of review.

3. Attorney's Fees
558
An award of attorney's fees must be based upon some statutory
or contractual authority. 59 Attorney's fees may not be recovered in
tort cases.5 60 In reviewing the reasonableness of an award of attorney's fees, which may include a legal assistant's time under certain
conditions, 6 1 the reviewing court should consider the time and labor
involved, the nature and complexities of the case, the value of the
interest involved, the extent of the responsibilities assumed by the at-

just is." State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d 590, 605 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1991, writ denied).

556. Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 365 (Tex. 1987).
557. See General Chem. Corp. v. De La Lastra, 815 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1991), writ granted, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 508, 509 (Feb. 26, 1992) (granting writ to
consider whether present Texas system and practice with respect to exemplary damages denied
defendant due process rights guaranteed by United States and Texas Constitutions); Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 814 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991), writ granted, 35 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 204, 204 (Dec. 11, 1991) (considering whether system denied defendant due process
rights); see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1992),
cert. granted, -

U.S.

-,

-

113 S. Ct. 594, 594, 121 L. Ed. 2d 532, 533 (1992) (granting

certiorari to determine whether award of punitive damages against defendant in absence of
procedural safeguards approved in Pacific Mutual Insurance Co. v. Haslip, - U.S. -I, 111 S.
Ct. 1032, 113 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1991), violated defendant's procedural due process rights and
whether excessive and disproportionate punitive damage award violated defendant's substantive due process rights). In one case, the West Virginia Supreme Court concluded that postHaslip decisions fell into three categories: (1) really stupid defendants; (2) really mean defendants; and (3) really stupid defendants who could have caused a great deal of harm by their
actions but who actually caused minimal harm. TXO Prod. Co., 419 S.E.2d at 887-88.
558. E.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (Vernon 1986) (providing for
award of attorney's fees in declaratory judgment actions); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 38.001(1)-(8) (Vernon 1986) (providing for award of attorney's fees if claim is for
rendered services, performed labor, furnished material, freight or express overcharges, lost or
damaged freight or express, killed or injured stock, sworn account, or oral or written contract).
An award of attorney's fees in a declaratory judgment action is within the discretion of the
trial court. International Ins. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 841 S.W.2d 437, 447 (Tex. App.Dallas 1992, writ denied) (citing Oake v. Collin County, 692 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Tex. 1985)).
559. Southern Concrete Co. v. Metrotec Fin., Inc., 775 S.W.2d 446, 449 (Tex. App.Dallas 1989, no writ).
560. Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 518 S.W.2d 795, 803-04 (Tex. 1974).
561. Gill Sav. Ass'n v. International Supply Co., 759 S.W.2d 697, 702-05 (Tex. App.Dallas 1988, writ denied) (identifying factors for including legal assistant's time in attorney's
fee award).
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torney, the benefits resulting to the client from the attorney's services,- 62 other employment lost by the attorney because of the
undertaking, the contingency or certainty of compensation, whether
5 6a
the employment is casual or for an established and regular client,
and whether the fee would be reasonable for a litigant to pay his attorney. 64 A "short hand version of these considerations is that the trial
court may award those fees that are 'reasonable and necessary' for the
' 565
prosecution of the suit.
To determine whether an attorney's fee award is excessive, "the reviewing court may draw upon the common knowledge of the justices
of the court and their experiences as lawyers and judges. '5 66 When
multiple causes of action or multiple parties are involved, the party
who asserts the causes must separate those hours for which fees may
be recovered from those hours for which fees cannot be recovered,
and must indicate from which party the fees may be recovered. 67 An
exception to the duty to segregate exists when the attorney's fees are
rendered in connection with claims that arise out of the same transaction and that are so interrelated that their prosecution or defense entails proof or denial of essentially the same facts.5 68 Moreover, a trial
court may not grant an unconditional award of appellate attorney's
fees; such an award must be conditioned upon the appellant's unsuccessful appeal.5 69
The appropriate standard of review of an award of attorney's fees
or a trial court's order of remittitur on attorney's fees is sufficiency of
the evidence. 570 Therefore, the trial court's remittitur will be affirmed
(or suggested by the court of appeals) "when the evidence is factually

562. Smith v. Renz, 840 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
563. City of Fort Worth v. Groves, 746 S.W.2d 907, 918 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988,
no writ).
564. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. ABC Steel Prods. Co., 582 S.W.2d 883, 889 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
565. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Tex. 1991).
566. Groves, 746 S.W.2d at 918; Argonaut Ins. Co., 582 S.W.2d at 889.
567. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 822 S.W.2d at 10-11; Southern Concrete Co., 775 S.W.2d
at 449; Bullock v. Kehoe, 678 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
568. Stewart Title, 822 S.W.2d at 11.
569. See Rittgers v. Rittgers, 802 S.W.2d 109, 115 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ
denied) (noting that party may not be penalized for taking successful appeal by taxing him
with attorney's fees).
570. Stewart Title, 822 S.W.2d at 12; Snoke v. Republic Underwriters Ins. Co., 770
S.W.2d 777, 777-78 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam); Larson v. Cactus Util. Co., 730 S.W.2d 640, 641
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insufficient to support the verdict." '5 7
J.

Court Costs
Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 131,72 "the successful party

in a suit is entitled to recover from his adversary all costs incurred in
the suit, except where otherwise provided. ' 573 Pursuant to Rule 141,
the trial court may assess the costs, other than as provided by law or
the rules, for good cause stated on the record. 74 "Good cause" is an
"elusive concept" to be determined on a case-by-case basis.5 75 The
trial court's determination of good cause and its assessment of court
costs is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 76
K.

Exercise of Plenary Power
A trial court has plenary power over its judgement until it becomes

final.5 77 Once a trial court loses plenary power over its judgment, the
judgment becomes final and any attempt to exercise further jurisdic-

tion over the judgment, except to correct clerical errors, will be set
5 78
aside as void.

(Tex. 1987). See generally Part VII and VIII for a discussion of challenges to the sufficiency of
the evidence of jury and nonjury findings.
571. Snoke, 770 S.W.2d at 778.
572. TEX. R. Civ. P. 131.
573. Id.; Rogers v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 686 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex. 1985); Contemporary Health Management, Inc. v. Palacios, 832 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1992, no writ).
574. TEX. R. Civ. P. 141
575. See Rogers, 686 S.W.2d at 601 (lengthening of trial unnecessarily is sufficient good
cause to assess costs against successful defendant); Gleason v. Lawson, No. 13-91-523-CV,
1993 WL 55229, at *8 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, Mar. 5, 1993, n.w.h.) (stating that Rules
131 and 141 should not be used to penalize party for refusal to enter into settlement negotiations when party has not been ordered or encouraged to do so).
576. State v. Castle Hills Forest, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1992, n.w.h.); State v. Brown, 802 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ);
San Antonio Housing Auth. v. Underwood, 782 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1989, no writ); see Scholl v. Home Owners Warranty Corp., 810 S.W.2d 464, 468 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1991, no writ) (holding it abuse of discretion to allocate costs contrary to Rule
131 without including in record explanation of allotment as required by Rule 141).
577. Fruehauf Corp. v. Carillo, 848 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam) (citing
Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex. 1978); TransAmerican Leasing Co. v. Three
Bears, Inc., 567 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tex. 1978)).
578. See Graham Nat'l Bank v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 747 S.W.2d 370, 370 (Tex. 1987)
(rendering trial court order void because plenary power expired); Times Herald Printing Co. v.
Jones, 730 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex. 1987) (finding trial court had no jurisdiction to consider
motion to unseal because plenary power lost).
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Supersedeas Bond

Generally, if a party loses at the trial court, a writ of supersedeas
will stay execution of the judgment pending appeal and will guarantee

the appellee the benefits of his judgment if affirmed.5 79 To obtain a

writ of supersedeas, a party deposits with the clerk a "good and sufficient" supersedeas bond or deposit.5 8 ° In cases when the judgment is

for other money, property, or foreclosure, the decision of whether and
under what circumstances to permit supersedeas lies within the dis" '
cretion of the trial or appellate court.58
579. See Edlund v. Bounds, 842 S.W.2d 719, 732 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied)
(discussing purpose of supersedeas bond); Cooper v. Bowser, 583 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1992, no writ) (noting what amount of supersedeas bond is acceptable and acceptable alternative).
580. TEX. R. ApP. P. 47(a). A few judgments are stayed without the requirement of
posting a supersedeas bond or deposit. Specifically, those exempt from filing a bond include:
the State Bar of Texas, any county in Texas, any state department, any state department head,
water districts and the like. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 6.001-.003 (Vernon 1986
& Supp. 1993); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 12.003 (Vernon 1992); TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. §§ 21.011-.16 (Vernon 1984); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 29 (Vernon 1980) (executors, administrators, or guardians in their fiduciary capacity); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 6.001-.002 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993) (incorporated cities and towns); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 6.001 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993) (Veteran's Administration, any national mortgage association, any national mortgage savings and loan insurance
incorporation created as national relief organization). Exempt entities supersede the judgment
by filing a notice of appeal. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 6.001 (Vernon 1986 &
Supp. 1993); Ammex Warehouse Co. v. Archer, 381 S.W.2d 478, 481-82 (Tex. 1964); Weber v.
Walker, 591 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
581. TEX. R. APP. P. 47. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47 sets forth the applicable
rules for superseding a judgment involving money, land or property, foreclosure on real estate,
foreclosure on personal property, other judgments, conservatorship or custody, the state and
municipality, a state agency, or a subdivision of the state in its governmental capacity. TEX.
R. APP. P. 47(b)-(h). Section 52.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides
that a trial court may set the security for less than the amount of the judgment, interests, and
costs in a money judgment (other than in a bond forfeiture proceeding), "a personal injury or
wrongful death action, a claim covered by liability insurance, or a workers' compensation
claim," if, after notice and a hearing, the trial court finds that complete security "would cause
irreparable harm to the judgment debtor" and that less than complete security "would not
substantially decrease the degree to which a judgment creditor's recovery under the judgment
would be secured after the exhaustion of all appellate remedies." TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 52.001(l)(2) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993). To the extent Chapter 52 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code conflicts with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Chapter 52 controls. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.005 (Vernon Supp,
1993). Under Rule 47(f), an appellant may supersede execution on a judgment for other than
money or the recovery of property or foreclosure by filing a bond in the amount fixed "by the
trial court as will secure the judgment creditor for any loss or damage occasioned by the
appeal." TEX. R. APP. P. 47(f). However, the trial court has discretion to "decline to permit
the judgment to be suspended on filing by the judgment creditor of security to be ordered by
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The numerous rules for posting an appropriate supersedeas bond
depend upon the type of judgment and are beyond the scope of this
Article. 582 Unless the decision of whether to allow a supersedeas
bond is committed to the trial court's discretion, the right to supersedeas is absolute and enforceable by mandamus, even though the trial
court may retain discretion in fixing the amount of the bond. 8 '
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(b) governs the suspension of
interlocutory orders pending review by the appellate courts. Under
this rule, the trial court may suspend an interlocutory order pending
an appeal if the appellant files a supersedeas bond or makes a deposit
pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47. 584 Denial of supersedeas "may be reviewed for abuse of discretion on motion by the
appellate court."5 8 Similarly, an appellate court may issue any necessary temporary orders to preserve the rights of the party until disposition of the appeal and may require such security as it deems
appropriate. However, if the appellant's right may be adequately protected by supersedeas, then the appellate court may not suspend the
trial court's order.

586

If the trial court improperly sets the amount of the bond or the
clerk improperly approves it, or if it is believed an initially sufficient
bond has become insufficient, the remedy is by motion in the court of
appeals once appellate jurisdiction has attached.58 7 If a party con-

the trial court in such an amount as will secure the judgment debtor in any loss or damage
caused by any relief granted if it is determined on final disposition that such relief was improper." Id. "The rule was intended to permit a trial court to deny supersedeas of an injunction, conditioned upon the setting of a bond sufficient to protect the appealing party's
interests." Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 87, 88 (Tex.
1986). The trial court's decision is reviewed under an abuse discretion standard. Id.
582. See Roger Townsend & Sarah B. Duncan, Stay of Judgments, in STATE BAR OF
TEXAS PROF. DEV. PROGRAM, 1 ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE M (1987) (discussing rules for posting supersedeas bonds).
583. State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 832-33 (Tex. 1980); Man-Gas Transmission v. Osborne Oil, 693 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ); Continental Oil Co. v. Lesher, 500 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, orig.
proceeding [leave denied]); Jennings v. Berry, 153 S.W.2d 725, 726-27 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1941, no writ).
584. TEX. R. APP. P. 43(b).
585. Id; Reyes v. Atkins, 619 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
586. TEX. R. APP. P. 43(c).
587. TEX. R. APP. P. 49; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.003 (Vernon Supp.
1993); Culbertson v. Brodsky, 775 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, writ dism'd
w.o.j.); Bank of E. Tex. v. Jones, 758 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
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tends that the trial court's order setting the amount of the bond is
excessive, the party may have the trial court's order reviewed by motion in the court of appeals. 8 Upon review of the amount of the
bond, if the appellate court finds that the bond is insufficient, the
court "shall" require an additional bond;589 however, upon finding the
bond excessive, the court "may" reduce the amount of the original
bond. 9 o
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47(k) gives the trial court continuing jurisdiction, even beyond the expiration of its plenary power
and perfection of the appeal, to monitor and modify the security.5 9'
Any changes ordered by the trial court, however, must be communicated to the court of appeals.5 92 The review of and changes to security remain also with the appellate court. 93 Thus, in carrying out that
review, the appellate court can issue any necessary temporary orders,
or remand the matter to the trial court for evidentiary
594
determinations.
M.

Turnover Orders

Under the turnover statute,5 95 the trial court has the discretion "to
aid a diligent judgment creditor to reach certain types of property of a
judgment debtor.

5 96

The trial court's decision to grant or deny a

5 97
turnover order is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

588. TEX. R. App. P.49; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.004 (Vernon Supp.
1993). The district clerk's determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the tendered
supersedeas bond is reviewed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Universal
Transp. & Distrib. Co. v. Cantu, 75 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1934, orig.
proceeding [leave denied]).
589. TEX. R. App. P. 49(a); Gullo-Haas Toyota, Inc. v. Davidson, Eagleson & Co., 832
S.W.2d 418, 419 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
590. TEX. R. App. P. 49(b).
591. TEX. R. App. P. 47(k); Gullo-Haas Toyota, Inc., 832 S.W.2d at 419.
592. TEX. R. App. P. 47(k).
593. Id.
594. TEX. R. App. P. 49(b); see Culbertson, 775 S.W.2d at 455 (setting aside order of trial
court regarding amount of supersedeas and remanding to trial court with instructions to conduct hearing and consider evidence relating to sufficiency of supersedeas bond).
595. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993).
596. Criswell v. Ginsberg & Foreman, 843 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992,
n.w.h.).
597. Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991); Associated
Ready Mix, Inc. v. Douglas, 843 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, orig. proceeding);
Criswell, 843 S.W.2d at 306.
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CHALLENGES TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IN
JURY TRIALS

When an appellant challenges both the legal and factual sufficiency
of the evidence supporting a jury's finding, the appellate court should
first review the legal sufficiency challenge.598
A.

Legal Insufficiency

In a jury trial, challenges to the legal sufficiency of the evidence are
preserved by:
(1) a motion for instructed verdict;
(2) a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict;
(3) an objection to the submission of the issue to the jury;
(4) a motion to disregard the jury's answer to a vital fact issue; or
(5) a motion for new trial specifically raising the complaint.599
"Legal sufficiency points of error assert a complete lack of evidence
on an issue,"' and are designated as "no evidence" points, or "matter of law" points, depending upon whether the complaining party
had the burden of proof."° Challenges to the legal sufficiency of the
evidence points of error:
must and may only be sustained when the record discloses: (1) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules
of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to
prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no
more than a mere scintilla; and
(4) the evidence established conclusively
6 °2
the opposite of a vital fact.
598. Glover v. Texas Gen. Indem. Co., 619 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Tex. 1981).
599. T.O. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. 1992); Cecil v.
Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 510-11 (Tex. 1991); Aero Energy, Inc. v. Circle C Drilling Co., 699
S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex. 1985); Pipgras v. Hart, 832 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1992, writ denied); Salinas v. Fort Worth Cab & Baggage Co., 725 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex.
1987); Tribble & Stephens Co. v. Consolidated Servs., Inc., 744 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1987, writ denied); see Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points ofError,38 TEX. L. REV. 361, 362 (1960) (listing challenges to legal sufficiency).
600. Raw Hide Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Maxus Exploration Co., 766 S.W.2d 264, 275 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied).
601. Id.
602. Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assoc., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660, 666 n.9 (Tex.
1990) (citing with approval, for first time, Chief Justice Calvert's formulation in Robert W.
Calvert's, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 TEX. L. REV. 361,
362-63 (1960)); e.g., TEX. R. App. P. 74(d); Caskey v. Bradley, 773 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ); Otis Elevator Co. v. Joseph, 749 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex.
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1. No Evidence
If an appellant is attacking the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding of an issue on which she did not have the burden of proof, she
must demonstrate on appeal that there is no evidence to support the
adverse finding." 3 In reviewing "no evidence" points, the reviewing
court' considers only the evidence and inferences that tend to support the finding, and disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary. 6°5 If there is any evidence of probative force to support the
finding, the point must be overruled and the finding upheld.'
Accordingly, if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the
6 7
finding, the no evidence challenge fails. 0
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ); Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 678
S.W.2d 278, 288 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
603. See TEX. R. App. P. 74(d) (stating requisites for points of error); see Croucher v.
Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983) (explaining that it is appropriate for party without
burden of proof to complain of no evidence to support jury finding); Hickey v. Couchman, 797
S.W.2d 103, 109 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied) (stating that party without
burden of proof challenges insufficiency of evidence); Raw Hide Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Maxus
Exploration Co., 766 S.W.2d 264, 276 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied) (explaining
appropriate challenges to sufficiency of jury findings). See generally Robert W. Calvert, "No
Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 TEX. L. REV. 361, 364-68 (1960)
(discussing requirements necessary to prove legal insufficiency).
604. The courts of appeals and the supreme court have jurisdiction to review challenges
to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Choate v. San Antonio & A.P. Ry., 91 Tex. 406, 409,
44 S.W.2d 69, 72 (1898).
605. Weirich v. Weirich, 833 S.W.2d 942, 945 (Tex. 1992); Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores,
Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex. 1992); State v. $11,014.00, 820 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. 1991)
(per curiam); Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. 1990); Lewelling v.
Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex. 1990); Best v. Ryan Auto Group, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 670,
671 (Tex. 1990); Responsive Terminal Sys., Inc. v. Boy Scouts of Am., 774 SW.2d 666, 668
(Tex. 1989); Southern States Transp., Inc. v. State, 774 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex. 1989); Sherman
v. First Nat'l Bank, 760 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. 1988); Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752
S.W.2d 518, 522 (Tex. 1988); Jacobs v. Danny Darby Real Estate, 758 S.W.2d 174, 175-76
(Tex. 1988); Hurlbut v. Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Tex. 1987); Stafford v.
Stafford, 726 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1987); Aim v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 593
(Tex. 1986); Larson v. Cook Consultants, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 567, 568 (Tex. 1985); King v.
Bauer, 688 S.W.2d 845, 846 (Tex. 1985); Tomlinson v. Jones, 677 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex. 1984);
Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex. 1982); Glover v. Texas Gen. Indem. Co., 619
S.W.2d 400, 401 (Tex. 1981); McClure v. Allied Stores, 609 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex. 1980); Ray
v. Farmers' State Bank, 576 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. 1978); Garza v. Alviar, 295 S.W.2d 821,
923 (Tex. 1965); Benoit v. Wilson, 150 Tex. 273, 280-81, 239 S.W.2d 792, 796 (1951).
606. Southern States, 774 S.W.2d at 640; In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 664, 244
S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951). In one case, the supreme court even considered overruling a legal
insufficiency challenge that was raised posttrial. See Weirich, 833 S.W.2d at 946 (considering
telephone records discovered after trial).
607. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d at 16.
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What is a "scintilla" of evidence? "When the evidence offered to
prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere
surmise or suspicion of its existence, the evidence is no more than a
scintilla and, in legal effect, is no evidence.""6 The application of this
rule provides that "if reasonable minds cannot differ from the conclusion that the evidence offered to support the existence of a vital fact
lacks probative force," then it is the legal equivalent of no evidence." 9
In any other situation, the appellate court may not second guess the
fact finder, unless only one inference may be drawn from the evidence.61 0 Whether other possible inferences may be drawn from the
evidence is not a relevant inquiry.6" ' However, when the evidence
furnishes a rational basis for reasonable minds to reach differing conclusions as to the existence of the crucial fact, it amounts to more
than a scintilla
of evidence and the no evidence challenge should be
61 2
overruled.

61 3
Any ultimate fact may be provided by circumstantial evidence.
However, under a "no evidence" review, inference stacking is not permissible. "[A] vital fact may not be established by piling inference

upon inference.

' 61 4

Moreover, the legal equivalent of no evidence ex-

ists when "meager circumstantial evidence" gives rise to inferences
equally consistent with two different propositions. 6 5 The Texas
Supreme Court, in $56, 700 in US. Currency v. State,6 16 held that
608. Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983); Seideneck v. Cal
Bayreuther Assoc., 451 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tex. 1970); Joske v. Irvine, 91 Tex. 574, 581-82, 44
S.W. 1059, 1062 (1898).
609. Kindred, 650 S.W.2d at 63.
610. $11,014.00, 820 S.W.2d at 785 (citing Ross v. Green, 135 Tex. 103, 118, 139 S.W.2d
565, 572 (1940)).
611. Havner, 825 S.W.2d at 459.
612. Id.; Kindred, 650 S.W.2d at 63.
613. $11,014.00, 820 S.W.2d at 785; Farley v. M.M. Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 755
(Tex. 1975); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Krayer, 366 S.W.2d 779, 780 (Tex. 1963); Dallas
County Flood Control Dist. No. I v. Cross, 815 S.W.2d 271, 279 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991,
writ denied). A fact is established by circumstantial evidence when the fact may be fairly and
reasonably drawn from other facts proved in the case. Cross, 815 S.W.2d at 279-80.
614. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp., 435 S.W.2d 854,
858 (Tex. 1968); Texas Sling Co. v. Emanuel, 431 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Tex. 1968); see Robert W.
Calvert, "'No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points ofError, 38 TEX. L. REV. 361, 365
(1960) (citing Rounsaville v. Bullard, 154 Tex. 260, 265, 276 S.W.2d 791, 794 (1955); Lobley v.
Gilbert, 149 Tex. 493, 497, 236 S.W.2d 121, 123 (1951)) (concluding that vital fact may not be
established "by piling inference upon inference").
615. $56,700 in U.S. Currency v. State, 730 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. 1987).
616. 730 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1987).
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"when circumstances are consistent with either of two facts and nothing shows that one is more probable than the other, neither fact can
be inferred.

' 61 7

When an appellate court is faced with only two

equally plausible opposing inferences, it must find "no evidence" to
support the jury's finding of fact. Nevertheless, the reasonableness of
the inferences that could be drawn must be evaluated in light of all
facts and circumstances.61 8
2. As a Matter of Law
If an appellant is attacking the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which he had the burden of proof, he must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence conclusively established all vital
facts in support of the issue.61 9 In reviewing a "matter of law" challenge, the reviewing court employs a two-prong test. The court will
first examine the record for evidence that supports the finding, while
ignoring all evidence to the contrary.620 If there is no evidence to
support the finding, the reviewing court will then examine the entire
record to determine if the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law. 62 ' If the contrary proposition is established conclusively by
the evidence, the point of error will be sustained.622
Texas courts have repeatedly held that although a jury is the finder
617. Id. at 662; see also Litton Indus. Prod., Inc. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 324
(1984) (noting that inference may not be drawn when facts give rise to opposing inferences that
are equally reasonable and plausible); Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient
Evidence"Points of Error, 38 TEX. L. REV. 361, 365 (1960) (stating that vital facts may not be
inferred from meager facts).
618. See Simmons & Simmons Constr. Co., 155 Tex. 353, 359, 286 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Tex.
1955) (stating that even under "no evidence" standard of review, court must consider not only
facts and circumstances giving rise to inference, but also "facts and circumstances in derogation of that inference"); Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Burden, 146 Tex. 109, 123, 203 S.W.2d 522,
530 (1947) (evaluating facts and circumstances from which inference drawn).
619. Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989); Holley v. Watts, 629
S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1982); Hickey v. Couchman, 797 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1990, writ denied); Smith v. Central Freight Lines, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied); Ritchey v. Crawford, 734 S.W.2d 85, 86 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
620. Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 690; Holley, 629 S.W.2d at 696.
621. Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 690; Holley, 629 S.W.2d at 696-97; Texas & N.O.R. Co. v.
Burden, 146 Tex. 109, 123, 203 S.W.2d 522, 530 (1947); Raw Hide Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Maxus
Exploration Co., 766 S.W.2d 264, 276 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied).
622. Meyerland Community Improvement Ass'n v. Temple, 700 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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of fact, a jury may not disregard uncontroverted evidence. 623 Similarly, the appellate court must consider undisputed or uncontradicted
evidence and does not have "the right to disregard the undisputed
'624
evidence and decide such issue in accordance with [its] wishes.
Nevertheless, contradictory cases also hold that a jury's failure to
find a fact need not be supported by any evidence, since the jury is free
625
to disbelieve the witnesses of the party bearing the burden of proof.
The two lines of cases are impossible to reconcile. Given the scope of
review, which requires the court to disregard all evidence contrary to
the verdict, the latter line of cases is clearly correct when the appellant raises a "matter of law" challenge.
B. FactualInsufficiency
In a jury trial, a complaint that the evidence is factually insufficient
to support a jury finding must be raised in a motion for new trial.626
A motion for new trial, however, is not required in a nonjury case to
challenge the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence. 27 When reviewing a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence, the court
of appeals must consider all of the evidence. 628 "Factual sufficiency

points of error concede conflicting evidence on an issue, yet maintain
623. Kennedy v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 778 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989,
writ denied); Ralston Purina Co. v. Barkley Feed & Seed Co., 722 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Int'l Proteins Corp. v. Ralston Purina Co., 744 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1988); Berry v. Griffin, 531 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
624. Burden, 146 Tex. at 123, 203 S.W.2d at 530; see Nichols v. Nichols, 727 S.W.2d 303,
305 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that appellate court reviews evidence in light most favorable to appellant and disregards contrary inferences); Watts v. St.
Mary's Hall, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (disregarding contradictory evidence favorable to movant and considering uncontradicted evidence
favorable to movant); see also Cochran v. Wool Growers Cent. Storage Co., 140 Tex. 184, 190,
166 S.W.2d 904, 908 (1942) (stating that "where the testimony of an interested witness is not
contradicted by any other witness, or attendant circumstances, and the same is clear, direct
and positive, and free from contradiction, inaccuracies, and circumstances tending to cast suspicion thereon, it is taken as true, as a matter of law").
625. See Yap v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 424, 425 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1990, no writ) (upholding jury finding despite charge that finding was not supported by
evidence).
626. TEX. R. CIv. P. 324(b)(2), (3); TEX. R. App. P. 52(d).
627. TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(b); Farmer's Mut. Protective Ass'n v. Wright, 702 S.W.2d 295,
296-97 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, no writ).
628. Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. 1989); Lofton v. Texas
Brine Corp., 720 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex. 1986).
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that the evidence against the jury's finding is so great as to make the
finding erroneous. '629 Factual sufficiency points of error are designated as "insufficient evidence" points or "great weight and preponderance of evidence" points, again depending upon whether the
complaining party had the burden of proof.630 Although both points
are classified generally as "insufficient evidence" points, they are

distinct.631
In Pool v. Ford Motor Co.,632 the Texas Supreme Court held that

when an appellate court reverses a case on the ground of factual insufficiency, the appellate court must "detail the evidence relevant to the
issue in consideration, ....
clearly state why the jury's finding is factually insufficient or ...against the great weight and preponderance of

the evidence, [and] state in what regard the contrary evidence greatly
outweighs the evidence in support of the verdict. ' 633 Unfortunately,
the Pool requirement does not extend to affirmances by the court of

appeals when there has been a factual sufficiency or great weight challenge. The Pool requirement should be extended to those situations.
At a minimum, due process mandates that a court of appeals mention

some evidence that it believes is sufficient to support the jury's verdict.
The courts should not be permitted to conclude simply that it has
reviewed the evidence and finds it sufficient to support the jury's

finding.634

629. Raw Hide Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Maxus Exploration Co., 766 S.W.2d 264, 275 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied).
630. Id; see also Hurlbut v. Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 770 n.2 (Tex. 1987)
(Robertson, J., dissenting, joined by Ray & Mauzy, JJ.) (noting use of terms as legal labels).
631. Ritchey v. Crawford, 734 S.W.2d 85, 86 n.l (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987,
no writ) (citing Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error,
38 TEX. L. REV. 361, 366 (1960)). An "insufficient evidence" point simply asserts that the

"evidence adduced to support the vital fact, even if it is the only evidence adduced on an issue,
is factually too weak to support it." Id. A "great weight" point simply asserts that the evidence in support of a finding of the existence of a vital fact in response to a jury's affirmative
finding is insufficient because the great preponderance of the evidence supports its nonexistence. Id. The Calvert article does not fully discuss the problem of challenging a negative
finding on an issue. Id. Contra Blonstein v. Blonstein, 831 S.W.2d 468, 473 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.]), writ deniedper curiam, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 436 (Dec. 31, 1992) (stating
that standard of review is same for factual insufficiency challenges regardless of burden of
proof and whether court is reviewing affirmative or negative finding).
632. 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986).
633. Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635; e.g., Lofton, 777 S.W.2d at 385.
634. See generally TEX. R. App. P. 20 (requiring courts of appeals to write opinions for
their decisions).
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1. Insufficient Evidence
If a party is attacking the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding
on an issue to which she did not have the burden of proof, she must
demonstrate that there is insufficient evidence to support the adverse
finding.635 In reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence challenge, the
court of appeals 636 must first consider, weigh, and examine all of the
evidence that supports and that is contrary to the jury's determination.63 Having done so, the court should set aside the verdict only if
the evidence standing
alone is so weak as to be clearly wrong and
635
manifestly unjust.

2. Great Weight and Preponderance
If a party is attacking a jury finding concerning an issue upon
which he had the burden of proof, he must demonstrate that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.639 In reviewing a challenge that the jury finding is against the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence, the court of appeals
must examine the entire record to determine if there is some evidence
to support the finding, if the finding is so contrary to the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong
and manifestly unjust, or if the great preponderance of the evidence
635. See Hickey v. Couchman, 797 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990,
writ denied) (must claim insufficient evidence); Raw Hide Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Maxus Exploration Co., 766 S.W.2d 264, 275-76 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied) (must claim insufficient evidence or no evidence).
636. A court of appeals has conclusive jurisdiction over questions of fact. TEX. CONST.
art. V, § 6; Coulson v. Lake LBJ Util. Dist., 781 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex. 1989); see Cropper v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 648-49 (Tex. 1988) (noting that appellate court may
review questions of fact); Herbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. 1988) (explaining that
appellate review of factual sufficiency points is conclusive).
637. Plas-Tex, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. 1989); Sosa v.
City of Balch Springs, 772 S.W.2d 71, 72 (Tex. 1989); Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp., 720
S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex. 1986); Harco Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Villanueva, 765 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
638. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); Dyson v. Olin Corp.,
692 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Tex. 1985); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965); In re
King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 664-65, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951); Raw Hide Oil & Gas, Inc.,
766 S.W.2d at 276; Wilson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 753 S.W.2d 442, 448 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1988, writ denied); Otis Elevator Co. v. Joseph, 749 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
639. Hickey v. Couchman, 797 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ
denied); Raw Hide Oil & Gas, 776 S.W.2d at 275-76.
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Whether the great weight challenge is to
supports its nonexistence.'
a finding or a nonfinding, a court of appeals may reverse and remand
a case for a new trial when the court concludes that the finding or
nonfinding is against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence. 6"
In reviewing great weight points that complain of a jury's failure to
find a fact, the supreme court has admonished the courts of appeals to
be mindful that the jury was not convinced by a preponderance of the
evidence." 2 In such cases, the courts of appeals may not reverse simply because they conclude that the evidence preponderates toward an
affirmative answer. 1 3 The courts of appeals may only reverse when
the great weight of the evidence supports an affirmative answer.6
While the courts of appeals may "unfind" certain facts, they cannot
affirmatively find facts that would be the basis of a rendition. The
appellate courts may only reverse and remand for a new trial." 5
3.

Pool and the Constitutional Conflict Between the Right to
Trial by Jury and Courts of Appeals' Conclusive
Jurisdiction over Issues of Fact

In 1891, the Texas Constitution was amended to provide that "the
decision of [the courts of appeals] shall be conclusive on all questions
of fact brought before them on appeal or error. ' ' 61 6 This provision in
the constitution acts as a limitation on the judicial authority of the
supreme court and confines its jurisdiction to questions of law. 1 7 The
courts of appeals conclusive jurisdiction over issues of "fact," however, is complicated by the Texas Bill of Rights, which provides that
640. Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176; Dyson, 692 S.W.2d at 457; Taylor v. Goulding, 497 S.W.2d
944, 945 (Tex. 1973); In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. at 664-65, 244 S.W.2d at 661; Hopson v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 150 Tex. 1, 11, 237 S.W.2d 352, 358 (1951); Raw Hide Oil & Gas, 766 S.W.2d
at 276; Wilson, 753 S.W.2d at 448.
641. Ames v. Ames, 776 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. 1989); Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex. 1988).
642. Herbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. 1988).

643. Id.
644. Id.
645. Texas Nat'l Bank v. Karnes, 717 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. 1986); Carr v. Norstock
Bldg. Sys., Inc., 767 S.W.2d 936, 943 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ).
646. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6; see E-Z Mart Stores, Inc. v. Havner, 832 S.W.2d 368, 369
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied) (referring to provision as "factual conclusivity
clause").
647. Choate v. San Antonio & A.P. Ry. Co., 91 Tex. 406, 410, 44 S.W. 69, 69 (1898); E-Z
Mart Stores, 832 S.W.2d at 369.
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every person has a "right of trial by jury"6 4 and that this right "shall
remain inviolate." 649
In 1898, only seven years after the Texas Constitution was
amended, the supreme court recognized the potential constitutional
conflict and observed that Article V, Section 6, which give courts of
appeals conclusive jurisdiction over questions of fact, "was not to enlarge their power over questions of fact but to restrict, in express
terms, the jurisdiction of the supreme court and to confine it to questions of law."' 65 0 Equally important, the court also recognized that
the courts of appeals' jurisdiction does not give them the authority to
substitute their finding for a jury's finding when the record contains
evidence of, and gives equal support to, inconsistent inferences in support of the jury's finding.65 '
Almost seventy-five years later, in In re King's Estate,65 2 the
supreme court established that it might accept jurisdiction, not-withstanding Texas Constitution Article V, Section 6, to determine if a
correct legal standard had been applied by the courts of appeals.65 3
After In re King's Estate, the supreme court continued to review factual insufficiency points when the court of appeals utilized an incorrect legal principle.65 4 Subsequently, in Dyson v. Olin Corp.,655 the
648. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 10; see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 226a (requiring trial judge to
admonish jury that they "are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight
to be given their testimony .... ").
649. TEX. CONST., art. I, § 15.
650. Choate, 91 Tex. at 410, 44 S.W.2d at 69.
651. Id. at 409-10, 44 S.W.2d at 69. The court's admonition was often repeated prior to
the issue squarely confronting the supreme court in Cropper. Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex. 1988) (stating that courts of appeals may only "unfind" facts
and reverse, but cannot usurp jury's fact-finding function); see also Pool v. Ford Motor Co.,
715 S.W.2d 629, 633-35 (Tex. 1986) (finding that court of appeals may reverse trial court's fact
finding only if contrary to overwhelming weight of evidence); Dyson v. Olin Corp., 692 S.W.2d
456, 457 (Tex. 1985) (holding that court of appeals may only evaluate sufficiency of evidence to
support lower court's judgment but may not decide factual issues as basis for judgment); In re
King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 666, 244 S.W.2d 660, 662 (1951) (indicating that jury verdict
cannot be overturned by court of appeals simply because different inferences or conclusions
could have been derived by jury); Benoit v. Wilson, 150 Tex. 273, 281-82, 239 S.W.2d 792, 797
(1951).
652. 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951). In re King's Estate is a per curiam opinion
that dealt only with the scope of review; it simply held that a court of appeals must pass on all
dispositive points raised by an appellant. Id. at 664-65, 244 S.W.2d at 661-62.
653. Id. at 665, 244 S.W.2d at 661.
654. See Harmon v. Sohio Pipeline Co., 623 S.W.2d 314, 314-15 (Tex. 1981) (stating that
supreme court has jurisdiction to review appellate court's application of rules of law); Garza v.
Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823-24 (Tex. 1965) (indicating that supreme court has power to deter-
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supreme court again concluded that while it does not have jurisdiction over questions of fact, the supreme court does have jurisdiction to
determine whether the courts of appeals used the correct rules of law
in reaching their conclusions.656 As the court correctly recognized,
the use of the wrong rule of law, a purely legal question, is within the
supreme court's jurisdiction.657 More importantly, in a concurring
opinion, Justice Robertson expressly raised the issue of whether the
supreme court would continue to adhere to prior case law interpreting
Article V, Section 6. Justice Robertson expressed his view that Article V, Section 6 improperly allows the courts of appeals to usurp the
jury's fact-finding function.658
Justice Robertson's challenge to the continued viability of Article
V, Section 6 was raised subsequently in Pool. 659 While the supreme

court chose "to adhere to previous interpretations that harmonize the
two constitutional provisions" and reaffirmed the courts of appeals'
jurisdiction to review cases for factual insufficiency of the evidence, 66
the supreme court also held that it had the authority to review the
courts of appeals' opinions to determine if the intermediate courts applied the correct standard of review to the facts.661 In order to determine whether the courts of appeals applied the correct legal principles
to the facts, the supreme court held:
[T]he courts of appeals, when reversing on insufficiency grounds,
should, in their opinions, detail the evidence relevant to the issue in
consideration and clearly state why the jury's finding is factually
insufficient or is so against the great weight and preponderance as to be
manifestly unjust; why it shocks the conscience; or clearly demonstrates
bias. Further, those courts, in their opinions, should state in what regard the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence in support of
mine if appellate court had jurisdiction over issue); Puryear v. Porter, 153 Tex. 82, 93, 264
S.W.2d 689, 690 (1954) (declaring that supreme court may remand to appellate court for reconsideration of applicable rules of law).
655. 692 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1985).
656. Id. at 457.
657. See id. (stating that supreme court can, as matter of law, review appellate court's
application of rules of law).
658. Id. at 458 (Robertson, J., concurring).
659. Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 633. The Pools argued that the court of appeals exercised its
fact jurisdiction in a manner that undermined the jury verdict in violation of the constitutional
right of trial by jury. Id.
660. Id. at 634.
661. Id. at 634-35.
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the verdict.6 62
Pool clearly takes the court's earlier decision in Dyson one step further
by allowing the supreme court to review a court of appeals's application of the correct legal standard to the facts, instead of only determining whether the correct legal standard was utilized.663 Therefore,
the courts of appeals must do more than recite the Pool standard of
review, they must prove that they followed the standard. 6 "
The inherent constitutional conflict of the courts of appeals' jurisdiction over questions of fact vis-i-vis the right to trial by jury was
raised again and addressed in Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 6 6 5
The supreme court rejected the challenge to the courts of appeals'
constitutional obligation to review fact questions, and noted that the
right to jury trial and the appellate courts' right to review fact questions are two rights that have "peacefully co-existed for almost one
hundred fifty years" and are "thoroughly rooted in our constitution
and judicial system. ' 666 Since the supreme court could not amend the
constitution to remove the conflict, it concluded that it was "not prepared to sacrifice either [constitutional provision] for the benefit of the
667
other.
While the supreme court has continued to recognize the courts of
appeals' conclusive jurisdiction over questions of fact, 66 8 the supreme
court has circumvented its own constitutional limitation in two interesting and sharply divided cases. In Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp.,669
the supreme court, in a five to four decision, reversed the court of
appeals's decision for a second time, 670 holding once again that the

662. Id. at 635.
663. Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635.
664. Stewart v. Allied Bancshares, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 837, 838 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989,
writ denied).
665. 754 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Tex. 1988).
666. Cropper, 754 S.W.2d at 652.
667. Id.; see Herbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. 1988) (reiterating courts of
appeals' conclusive jurisdiction over questions of fact); Hurlburt v. Gulf At. Life Ins. Co., 749
S.W.2d 762, 770-71 (Tex. 1987) (Robertson, J., dissenting) (concluding courts of appeals' authority to review sufficiency of jury's fact finding should be eliminated).
668. See Coulson v. Lake LBJ Mun. Util. Dist., 781 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex. 1989) (stating
that "the task of weighing all of the evidence and determining its sufficiency is a power confined exclusively to the court[s] of appeals").
669. 777 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1989).
670. Id. at 387. The case was reversed for the first time in Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp.,
720 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam). The Lofton opinion on the first remand is
reported at 751 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. 1988).
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jury's finding was supported by factually insufficient evidence. 67' The
court presumably reversed the court of appeals's second opinion pursuant to Pool for a third review of the case. The fundamental problem
with the decision is that the court, as Justice Gonzalez predicted in
Pool,672 was using Pool to second guess the courts of appeals's constitutional prerogative to judge the factual sufficiency of the evidence in
a case. 673 While the supreme court again recognized its lack of jurisdiction to determine the factual sufficiency of the evidence,67 4 nevertheless, it explained in great detail why all of the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury's finding.67 5 It is clear from the supreme
court's "extensive, and unauthorized, analysis" 676 that while the court
was unwilling to overrule Herbert and Cropper, it was willing to review the court of appeals's factual sufficiency analysis.67 7 In his dissent in Lofton, Justice Hecht observed that the court, "[s]tymied by
the constitution," will "keep reversing the judgment of the court of
appeals until it reaches a result that the [c]ourt approves. ' 678 Subsequently, Justice Gonzalez reiterated Justice Hecht's concern in Lofton
by noting that what the supreme court "should avoid is the yo-yo
effect when a majority of the court keeps reversing the judgment of
the court of appeals until it reaches a result that the majority
679
approves."
In Aluminum Co. of America v. Aim, 680 the supreme court circumvented again the court of appeals's constitutionally binding conclu-

671. Lofton, 777 S.W.2d at 387.
672. Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 633. In his concurring opinion, Justice Gonzalez expressed fear
that the supreme court would use Pool "to second guess the courts of appeals, thereby interfering with their conclusive jurisdiction over questions of fact. Id. at 638 (Gonzalez, J.,
concurring).
673. Lofton, 777 S.W.2d at 387-88 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting); id. at 388-89 (Hecht, J.,

dissenting, joined by Phillips, C.J., & Cook, J.).
674. Id. at 387.
675. Id. at 386-87.
676. Id. at 388 (Hecht, J.,dissenting).
677. Lofton, 777 S.W.2d at 388 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
678. Id.
679. Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 286, 286 (Tex. 1993) (Gonzales, J.,
concurring opinion on denial of application for writ of error) (citing Lofton, 720 S.W.2d at 804
(per curiam) (remand for second factual sufficiency review)); Lofton, 777 S.W.2d at 387 (remand for third factual sufficiency review); see also William Powers, Jr. & Jack Ratliff, Another
Look at "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence", 69 TEX. L. REV. 515, 533-39 (1991)
(tracking supreme court's inconsistent findings in reversing courts of appeals' cases).
680. 785 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, - U.S. -, II1 S.Ct. 135, 112 L. Ed. 2d
102 (1990).
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sion that the jury's finding of gross negligence was supported by
factually insufficient evidence. 68 ' In another five to four decision, a
deeply divided court reversed the court of appeals's conclusion and
held that Alcoa was grossly negligent as a matter of law.682 Ignoring
the evidence of care introduced by Alcoa,6 8 3 the court avoided the
court of appeals's analysis of the factual sufficiency of the evidence
and concluded that Alcoa was grossly negligent as a matter of law, a
legal issue over which the supreme court has jurisdiction.6 8 4 It appears the dissenters accurately summarized the real meaning of the
supreme court's decision: Whenever a majority of the court is dissatisfied with a court of appeals' conclusion on a factual sufficiency
point, it may impose any result it chooses "merely by holding that a
party proved the necessary facts conclusively, i.e., as a matter of
68 5
law."
While most practitioners and courts assume that the inherent conflict between the court of appeals's constitutional and conclusive prerogative to review factual insufficiency challenges and a person's
constitutional right of trial by jury had been resolved, it is clear that
the justices on the supreme court at the time of Lofton and Alm were
deeply divided on the issue. The recent concurring and dissenting
opinions on denial of application for writ of error in Havner v. E-Z
Mart Stores, Inc. 686 indicate that the questions surrounding the courts
of appeals' constitutional conclusive jurisdiction over questions of fact
may not be finally resolved.68 7 In any event, appellate practitioners
must be aware of the potential conflict on the court and understand

681. Id. at 141 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting, joined by Phillips, C.J., Cook & Hecht, JJ.).

682. Id. at 140.
683.
684.
685.
686.

Id. at 143 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
Aim, 785 S.W.2d at 141 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
Id. at 143 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
Compare 846 S.W.2d 286, 186 (Tex. 1993) (Gonzalez, J., concurring on denial of

application for writ of error) (reaffirming that supreme court must not second-guess courts of
appeals' factual sufficiency review) with id. at 288 & n.5 (Doggett, J., dissenting on denial of
application for writ of error, joined by Gammage & Spector, JJ.) (lamenting the court's refusal
to consider plaintiff's points of error objecting to the "legal standard employed by the court of
appeals' in its factual sufficiency review). See also May v. United Servs. Ass'n of Am., 844
S.W.2d 666, 674 (Tex. 1992) (Doggett, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of reweighing evidence to determine its factual sufficiency).
687. See William Powers, Jr. & Jack Ratliff, Another Look at "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence", 69 TEX. L. REV. 515, 557 (1991) (noting that "[a]fter Cropper, the power of
courts of appeals to order new trials on factual sufficiency grounds seems to be settled, at least
for the time being") (emphasis added).
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that the inherent constitutional conflict remains. Because of this vexing problem, appellate practitioners should brief the facts and the appropriate legal standard in detail and with complete accuracy when
raising factual sufficiency points to a court of appeals. If a court of
appeals reverses a jury finding or nonfinding for factual insufficiency,
and uses any language that may be construed as an "inappropriate
standard of review" or as a "legal conclusion," an able opponent will
surely seek review in the supreme court. Given the supreme court's
decisions in Lofton, Aim, and E-Z Mart, appellate practitioners
should not assume that the supreme court will not review in some
manner the court of appeals's disposition of the factual challenge.
VIII.

CHALLENGES TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IN

NONJURY TRIALS

In any case or issue tried to the court without a jury, any party may
request the court to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law.688
A.

Findings of Fact Filed
1. With Statement of Facts

While findings of fact in a case tried to the court have the same
force and dignity as a jury's verdict upon jury questions,689 the trial
judge's "findings of fact are not conclusive when a complete statement
of facts appears in the record. ' 690 The judge's "findings of fact are
reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence by the same
standards that are applied in reviewing the evidence supporting a
jury's answer. "691 Although a trial court's conclusions of law may
688. TEX. R. Civ. P. 296.
689. City of Clute v. City of Lake Jackson, 559 S.W.2d 391, 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
690. Middleton v. Kawasaki Steel Corp., 687 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1985), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 699 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1985); Stephenson v. Perlitz,
537 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Where a trial court
files its findings of fact late, "the error is harmless error absent some showing that the late filing
injured the complaining party." Ford v. Darwin, 767 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1989, writ denied).
691. Zieben v. Platt, 786 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no
writ); e.g., Southern States Transp., Inc. v. Texas, 774 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex. 1989); Criton
Corp. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 809 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991,
writ denied); Burrows v. Miller, 797 S.W.2d 358, 360-61 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no writ);
Autohaus, Inc. v. Aguilar, 794 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990), writ denied per
curiam, 800 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1991); NCL Studs, Inc. v. Jandl, 792 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

101

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 24 [2022], No. 4, Art. 5

1146

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 24:1045

not be challenged for factual insufficiency, the trial court's conclusions drawn from the facts may be reviewed to determine their
correctness.69 2

2.

Without Statement of Facts

If no statement of facts is made part of the record on appeal, the
reviewing court presumes that sufficient evidence was introduced to
support the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law and
the judgment based upon the findings and conclusions.6 93
B.

Findings of Fact Not Requested and Not Filed

1. With Statement of Facts
If findings of fact or conclusions of law are neither filed nor requested, the judgment of the trial court implies all necessary findings
of fact to support it are present,694 provided: (1) "the proposition is
one raised by the pleadings and supported by the evidence"; and (2)
"the trial judge's decision can be sustained on any reasonable theory
that is consistent with the evidence and the applicable law, consider'
ing only the evidence favorable to the decision."695
To prevail, "the
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp. v. Universal
Health Servs., Inc., 778 S.W.2d 492, 497 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 854 (1990); Valencia v. Garza, 765 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989,
no writ); Okon v. Levy, 612 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ refd n.r.e.);
First Nat'l Bank v. Kinabrew, 589 S.W.2d 137, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ refd
n.r.e.).
692. Mercer v. Bludworth, 715 S.W.2d 693, 697 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986,
writ refd n.r.e.).
693. Mays v. Pierce, 154 Tex. 487, 493, 281 S.W.2d 79, 82 (1955); Tripp Village Joint
Venture v. MBank Lincoln Centre, N.A., 774 S.W.2d 746, 751 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ
denied); Alexander v. Barlow, 671 S.W.2d 531, 535 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983,
writ refd n.r.e.).
694. Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992); Worford v.
Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990); Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex.
1989); Lemons v. EMW Mfg. Co., 747 S.W.2d 372, 373 (Tex. 1988); In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d
716, 717 (Tex. 1984); Burnett v. Motyka, 610 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Tex. 1980); Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Jefferson Constr. Co., 565 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1978); Buchanan v. Byrd, 519
S.W.2d 841, 842 (Tex. 1975); Stum v. Stum, 845 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1992, no writ); Giangrosso v. Crosley, 840 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1992, no writ); Oak v. Oak, 814 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ
denied); Schoeffler v. Denton, 813 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no
writ); Marynick v. Bockelmann, 773 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 788 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1990).
695. Austin Area Teachers Fed. Credit Union v. First City Bank - Northwest Hills, N.A.,
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appellant may show that the undisputed evidence negatives one or
more of the elements essential to the decision; or he may show that
the appellee's pleadings omit one or more of the essential elements,
and that the trial court was confined to the pleadings. ' '696 However,
when a statement of facts is a part of the record, the legal and factual
sufficiency of the implied findings may be challenged on appeal in the

same manner as jury findings or a trial court's findings of fact are
challenged.697 The applicable standard of review is the same as that
applied in the review of jury findings or a trial court's findings of
fact.69 8 When the implied findings of fact are supported by the evi-

dence, the appellate court must uphold the judgment of the trial court
on any theory of law applicable to the case.699 In this determination,

the appellate court will consider only the evidence most favorable to
the implied factual findings and will disregard all opposing or contradictory evidence. 7 °°
2.

Without Statement of Facts

When there are no findings of fact and conclusions of law, and no

statement of facts included in the record on appeal, the reviewing
court presumes that all facts necessary to support the judgment have
been found.7 0 Only in an exceptional case, "where fundamental error

825 S.W.2d 795, 801 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied); Brodhead v. Dodgin, 824 S.W.2d
616, 619-20 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied); Friedman v. New Westbury Village Assoc., 787 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ); Franklin v.
Donoho, 774 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ).
696. Austin Area Teachers, 825 S.W.2d at 801; Brodhead, 824 S.W.2d at 620; Franklin,
774 S.W.2d at 311.
697. Heine, 835 S.W.2d at 84; Roberson, 768 S.W.2d at 281; Las Vegas Pecan & Cattle
Co. v. Zavala County, 682 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex. 1984); Burnett, 610 S.W.2d at 736; Giangrosso, 840 S.W.2d at 769; Money of the United States in the Amount of $8,500 v. State, 774
S.W.2d 788, 791 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ); National Bugmobiles, Inc.
v. Jobi Properties, 773 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
698. Heine, 835 S.W.2d at 83-84; Roberson, 768 S.W.2d at 281; Las Vegas Pecan & Cattle
Co., 682 S.W.2d at 256; Burnett, 610 S.W.2d at 736; Money ofthe United States, 774 S.W.2d at
791; National Bugmobiles, Inc., 773 S.W.2d at 620.
699. Point Lookout West, Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1987); Allen v.
Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex. 1986); In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d at 717; Lassiter v. Bliss, 559
S.W.2d 353, 358 (Tex. 1978); Giangrosso, 840 S.W.2d at 769; Weng Enters., Inc. v. Embassy
World Travel, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ);
Marynick, 773 S.W.2d at 667; see also Lute Riley Motors, Inc. v. T. C. Crist, Inc., 767 S.W.2d
439, 440 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied) (stating that findings of fact and conclusions of
law not requested timely).
700. Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 513, 235 S.W.2d 609, 613 (1950).
701. Guthrie v. National Homes Corp., 394 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex. 1965); Commercial
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is presented, is an appellant entitled to a reversal of the trial court's
70 2
judgment."
C.

Findingsof Fact Requested Properly But Not Filed
1. With Statement of Facts

Pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 296 and 297, upon a
proper request by either party, the trial judge must present and file

written findings of fact and conclusions of law.7 °3 When the statement of facts is presented to the appellate court for review, harm is
presumed and the appellate court must reverse the judgment unless
the record affirmatively shows that no injury resulted from the trial
court's failure to comply with Rule

0
2 9 6 .7 1

"The test of whether there

is harm depends upon whether the circumstances of the particular
case would require an appellant to have to guess the reason or reasons
that the trial judge has ruled against [him or her]." 70 5 In factually

complicated situations, when there are two or more possible grounds
706
for recovery or defense, an undue burden is placed on an appellant
because the appellant is prevented from making a proper presentation
of the case to the appellate court.70 7

If the record does not show plainly that the appellant suffered no
injury by the trial court's failure to file findings of fact and concluCredit Corp. v. Smith, 143 Tex. 612, 616, 187 S.W.2d 363, 365 (1945); Stum v. Stum, 845
S.W.2d 407, 416 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, n.w.h.); Dueitt v. Dueitt, 802 S.W.2d 859, 864
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ); Cams v. Cams, 776 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 1989, no writ); Bard v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 767 S.W.2d 839, 845 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1989, writ denied); Ette v. Arlington Bank of Commerce, 764 S.W.2d 594, 595
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ); Cloer v. Ford & Calhoun GMC Truck Co., 553
S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
702. Cams, 776 S.W.2d at 604; Ette, 764 S.W.2d at 595.
703. TEX. R. Civ. P. 296, 297.
704. Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Magallanes, 763 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. 1989); Wagner v.
Riske, 142 Tex. 337, 343, 178 S.W.2d 117, 120 (1944); Sheldon Pollack Corp. v. Pioneer Concrete, 765 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied); Castle v. Castle, 734
S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ); Carr v. Hubbard, 664
S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lee v. Thornton, 658
S.W.2d 234, 235 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
705. Sheldon Pollack Corp., 765 S.W.2d at 845; e.g., In re O.L., 834 S.W.2d 415, 418
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
706. Guzman v. Guzman, 827 S.W.2d 445, 446-47 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi), writ
denied, 843 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. 1992).
707. In re O.L., 834 S.W.2d at 418; Eye Site, Inc. v. Blackburn, 750 S.W.2d 274, 277
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 796 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1990);
Anzaldua v. Anzaldua, 742 S.W.2d 782, 783 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied).
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sions of law as requested, the proper remedy is not to reverse the trial
court's judgment. Instead, the appellate court should abate the appeal and order the trial court to make the appropriate findings and
conclusions, and to certify those findings to the appellate court for
review pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 81(a).708
2.

Without Statement of Facts

When a party properly requests the trial court to file findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and a statement of facts is not presented to the
appellate court for review, the appellate court presumes that the evidence was sufficient and that "every fact necessary to support the
findings and judgment within the scope of the pleadings was proved at
trial."7°9
IX.

A.

OTHER EVIDENTIARY REVIEW STANDARDS

Clear and Convincing Evidence

The clear and convincing evidence standard is applied in limited
situations. Normally, the preponderance of the evidence standard
controls in most civil proceedings. However, in some cases, the
courts apply the clear and convincing evidence standard.
Termination of parental rights is one example. Because termination of parental rights is a drastic remedy and is of such weight and
gravity, due process requires the petitioner to justify termination by
"clear and convincing evidence."71 0 This standard is defined as "that
measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier
of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth or the allegations
sought to be established." 7 1 ' The clear and convincing standard is an
intermediate standard of proof, "falling between the preponderance
standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt stan708. TEX. R. App. P. 81(a); Magallanes,763 S.W.2d at 773; City of Los Fresnos v. Gonzalez, 830 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ); Electronic Power Design, Inc. v. R.A. Hanson Co., 821 S.W.2d 170, 171-72 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, no writ).
709. Saenz v. Saenz, 756 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
710. In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); Williams v. Texas Dep't of Human
Servs., 788 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1990, no writ); In re L.R.M., 763
S.W.2d 64, 65 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ) (quoting In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d at
847).
711. In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d at 847; Williams, 788 S.W.2d at 926; In re L.R.M., 763
S.W.2d at 65.
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dard of criminal proceedings."7 2 On appeal challenging the fact finding made on a clear and convincing standard, the appellate court
reviews the record to determine if the fact finder could reasonably
conclude that the fact was highly probable.7 13 The court must consider all of the evidence in making this determination.7 14 The court of
appeals will sustain a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
under this standard "if the fact finder could not have reasonably
found that the fact was established by clear and convincing
7 5

evidence. " 1
The more onerous requirement of clear and convincing evidence
has been mandated also by statute in civil involuntary commitments.71 6 Presumably, the intermediate appellate standard of review
applicable in involuntary termination of parent-child relationships, as
adopted in In re G.M., 7 17 is applicable in involuntary commitment
18
cases.
B.

7

Administrative Agency Rulings

The Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act (AP-

TRA) 7 19 sets forth six distinct bases for reversal of an administrative

order. 720 The traditional substantial evidence rule is simply one of the
712. In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d at 847; Williams, 788 S.W.2d at 925; In re L.R.M., 763
S.W.2d at 67.
713. Williams, 788 S.W.2d at 926; Wetzel v. Wetzel, 715 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tex. App.Dallas 1986, no writ).
714. In re D. E., 761 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
715. Neal v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 814 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1991, writ denied); Williams, 788 S.W.2d at 296; In re L.R.M., 763 S.W.2d at 64.
716. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034(a) (Vernon 1992).
717. 596 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1980).
718. See K.L.M. v. State, 735 S.W.2d 324, 326 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ)
(court of appeals must review all evidence to determine if evidence was sufficient to produce
firm belief or conviction in fact finder of allegations plead).
719. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19(e) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993).
720. Id. Section 19(e) provides:
The scope of judicial review of agency decisions is as provided by the law under which
review is sought. Where the law authorizes appeal by trial de novo, the courts shall try
the case in the manner applicable to other civil suits in this state and as though there had
been no intervening agency action or decision. Where the law authorizes review under
the substantial evidence rule, or where the law does not define the scope of judicial review,
the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence on questions committed to agency discretion but may affirm the decision of the
agency in whole or in part and shall reverse or remand the case for further proceeding if
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
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tests utilized by appellate courts in evaluating agency decisions under
APTRA.
1. Substantial Evidence Under the APTRA
In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support an
agency's decision, the basic inquiry of the reviewing court traditionally has been whether reasonable minds could have reached the same
conclusion that the agency reached. 7 2 ' In an appeal from an agency
order governed by the substantial evidence rule, the agency order is
presumed to be valid and it is the appellant's burden to overcome that
presumption.7 2 2 One endeavoring to reverse administrative findings,
conclusions, or decisions because of lack of substantial evidence assumes a heavy burden.723
At its core, the substantial evidence rule is a reasonableness test or
a rational-basis test.7 24 If the agency decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record, or if the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, the decision must be reversed. 725 The
scope of review is based upon the reliable and probative evidence in
the record as a whole.7 26 However, the agency's decision should be
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
in excess of the statutory of the agency;
made upon unlawful procedure;
affected by other error of law;
not reasonably supported by substantial evidence in view of the reliable and probative evidence in the record as a whole; or
(6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Id.
721. Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 79, 161 S.W.2d 1022, 1030
(1942); see also Dotson v. Tex. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 612 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tex.
1981); Auto Convoy Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Tex., 507 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Tex. 1974).
722. Texas Health Facilities Comm'n v. Charter Medical-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446,
452 (Tex. 1984); City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Comm'n, 407 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex.
1966).
723. See CharterMedical, 665 S.W.2d at 452-53 (discussing what appellant must show to
be successful on appeal).
724. Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pend Oreille Oil & Gas Co., 817 S.W.2d 36, 41 (Tex.
1991); CharterMedical, 665 S.W.2d at 452; see William H. Chablee, Comment, Administrative
Law: Journey Through the Administrative Process and Judicial Review of Administrative Actions, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 155, 182-83 (1984) (discussing supreme court's decision in Charter
Medical).
725. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. Gulf States Util. Co., 809 S.W.2d 201, 210-11 (Tex.
1991).
726. Id. at 211.
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affirmed if (1) the findings of the underlying facts in the order fairly
support the agency's findings of ultimate fact and conclusions of law,
and (2) the evidence presented at the hearing reasonably supports the
findings of underlying facts.7 27 Resolution of factual conflicts and ambiguities is within the province of the agency, and the goal of the substantial evidence rule is to protect that function. 72 The reviewing
court is concerned, then, with the reasonableness of the agency order
and not the correctness of the order.7 29 In applying this test, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment as to the weight of the
evidence for that of the agency.730
2.

Arbitrary and Capricious Standard

"Substantial evidence" and "arbitrary and capricious" are two
sides of the same coin. If an agency decision is not supported by substantial evidence, then it is deemed to be arbitrary and capricious.73
However, a decision may be supported by substantial evidence, yet
still be arbitrary and capricious and may, therefore, be reversed. 2
3. Standard of Review Under Non-APTRA Cases
The standard of review for most non-APTRA administrative deci727. Texas Water Comm'n v. Customers of Combined Water Sys., Inc., 843 S.W.2d 678,
681 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, n.w.h.); see also Public Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. GTE-SW, 833

S.W.2d 153, 159 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied) (substantial evidence test refers simply
to such relevant evidence as reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support conclusion).
728. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n v. Mini, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
729. Pend Oreille Oil & Gas Co., 817 S.W.2d at 41 (citing Texas State Bd. of Dental

Examiners v. Sizemore, 759 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1988); CharterMedical, 665 S.W.2d at 452;
Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex.
1984)),
730. See id. (stating that court may not usurp agency's decision).
731. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. Gulf State Util. Co., 809 S.W.2d 201, 211 (Tex.
1991); Texas Health Facilities Comm'n v. Charter-Medical Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 454
(Tex. 1984).
732. See Lewis v. Metropolitan Say. & Loan Ass'n, 550 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Tex. 1977) (find-

ing that reversal warranted when denial of due process prejudiced substantial rights of litigant); Railroad Comm'n v. Alamo Express, Inc., 158 Tex. 68, 73, 308 S.W.2d 843, 846 (1958)
(reversing when agency failed to make findings of fact but based decision on findings in another
case); see also Public Util. Comm'n v. South Plains Elec. Coop., Inc., 635 S.W.2d 954, 957

(Tex. App.-Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that arbitrary and capricious action will
require reversal); Starr County v. Starr Indust. Servs., Inc., 584 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that arbitrary administrative action cannot
stand).
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sions is de novo review, unless a statute specifically limits review to
the agency record or provides for pure de novo review. A trial court's
de novo review of an administrative agency decision requires the
court to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support the

agency's ruling, but the reviewing court must examine the evidence
33
presented at trial and not the record compiled by the agency.
X.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Conclusions of law, which are always reviewable,13 1 "will be upheld
on appeal if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. '7 35 Conclusions of law will not be reversed
unless they are erroneous as a matter of law. 736 "Incorrect conclusions of law will not require reversal, however, if the controlling find737
ing of facts will support a correct legal theory.9
XI.

PRESUMPTIONS FROM AN INCOMPLETE RECORD

There can be no appeal in the absence of a transcript.738 Without a
complete statement of facts or a complete transcript, the appellate

court will presume that the evidence before the trial court supported

its judgment.7 39 Stated another way, when an appellant fails to bring

forward a complete record on appeal, it is presumed that the omitted
733. Mary Lee Found. v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 817 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied) (citing Mercer v. Ross, 761 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex.
1986)); Arrellano v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 810 S.W.2d 767, 770 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1991, writ denied).
734. Westech Eng'g, Inc. v. Clearwater Constructors, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1992, writ denied); Middleton v. Kawasaki Steel Corp., 687 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 699 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1985); Muller
v. Nelson, Sherrod & Carter, 563 S.W.2d 697, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no
writ).
735. Kotis v. Nowlin Jewelry, Inc., 844 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1992, no writ); Westech Eng'g, Inc., 835 S.W.2d at 196; Simpson v. Simpson, 727
S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
736. Westech Eng'g, Inc., 835 S.W.2d at 196; Mercer v. Bludworth, 715 S.W.2d 693, 697
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ refd n.r.e.).
737. Kotis, 844 S.W.2d at 922; Westech Eng'g, Inc., 835 S.W.2d at 196; Valencia v.
Garza, 765 S.W.2d 893, 898 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
738. Western Credit Co. v. Olshan Enter., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
739. Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co., 739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1987); The Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806, 806-07 (Tex. 1968); Murray v. Devco, Ltd., 731
S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. 1986); Haynes v. McIntosh, 776 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1989, error denied); E.B. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 766 S.W.2d 387, 388 (Tex.
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portions are not relevant to the disposition of the appeal.74 This presumption precludes the reviewing court from finding reversible error74 1 because a reviewing court must examine the entire record to
determine whether an error was "reasonably calculated to cause, and
probably did cause, the rendition of an improper judgment. ' 742 An
incomplete statement of facts prevents the reviewing court from determining whether a particular trial court ruling is reversible error in the
context of the entire case.743
When there is no statement of facts, appellate court review is limited generally to complaints involving: errors of law, erroneous pleadings or rulings thereon, an erroneous charge, irreconcilable conflicts
of jury findings, summary judgments, and fundamental error. 7 "
However, when the appellant, through no fault of his own, is unable
to obtain a statement of facts, the appellate court may reverse the
judgment.745
There is an exception to the general rule requiring a complete statement of facts on appeal. Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
53(d), an appellant may bring forward a partial statement of facts if
he includes in his request for a partial statement of facts, a statement
of the points to be relied upon appeal. When an appellant complies
with this rule, there is a presumption on appeal that nothing omitted
from the record is relevant to any of the specified points or to the
disposition of the case on appeal.746 However, the failure of the appellant to comply with Rule 53(d) will preclude the reviewing court from
finding reversible error.747

App.-Austin 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 802 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1990); Collins v. Williamson Printing Corp., 746 S.W.2d 489, 492-93 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
740. Guthrie v. National Homes Corp., 394 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex. 1965); Protechnics
Int'l, Inc. v. Tru-Tag Sys., Inc., 843 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992,
n.w.h.).
741. Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam),
742. TEX. R. App. P. 81(b).
743. Christiansen, 782 S.W.2d at 843.
744. Protechnics Int'l, Inc., 843 S.W.2d at 735; Collins, 746 S.W.2d at 491; see also Bexar
County Criminal Dist. Attorney v. Mayo, 773 S.W.2d 642, 643 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1989, no writ) (stating that conclusions of law will not bind appellate court if erroneous).
745. Smith v. Smith, 544 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tex. 1976).
746. Producers Constr. Co. v. Muegge, 669 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Tex. 1984); EB., 766
S.W.2d at 388.
747. Christiansen, 782 S.W.2d at 843; Kwik Wash Laundries, Inc. v. McIntyre, 840
S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
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ARBITRATION AWARDS

Arbitrations under state law may be conducted under the common
law, 48 or pursuant to the Texas General Arbitration Act. 49 Statutory
arbitration is cumulative of the common law.750 An arbitration award
under the common law may be set aside by a court only if the decision
is "tainted with fraud, misconduct, or gross mistake as would imply
bad faith and failure to exercise honest judgment." 7 5

In addition to

the common law grounds for setting aside an arbitration award, the
statute authorizes a court to vacate an award if: the arbitrators exceed their powers, the arbitrators refuse to postpone a hearing when a
party shows sufficient cause for a postponement, the arbitrators refuse
to hear evidence material to the controversy, or so conduct the hearing as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party.7 52 The statute
also authorizes a court to vacate an award "if there was no arbitration
agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings" to compel or stay arbitration "and the party did not participate
in the arbitration proceeding without raising the objection. ' 7 53 Under
the statute, an award may be modified by a court if (1) the arbitrators
miscalculated the figures; (2) the arbitrators inaccurately described
any person, thing, or property; (3) the arbitrators made an award on
an issue not submitted to them; (4) the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the issues submitted; or (5) the award is
imperfect in form only. 5
Because arbitration awards are favored by the courts as a means of
disposing of disputes, the courts indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the award.755 An arbitration award has the
748. Riha v. Smulcer, 843 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ
requested).
749. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 224 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
750. Riha, 843 S.W.2d at 292 (citing House Grain Co. v. Obst, 659 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
751. Id.
752. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 237, § A(2)-(3) (Vernon).
753. Id. § A(5). Like the common law, Section 1 provides that an award may be vacated
if "procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means," and Section 2 provides that an
award may be vacated if any party's rights are prejudiced because an arbitrator was not impartial, was corrupt, or was guilty of misconduct or willful misbehavior. Id. § A(l)-(2); Riha, 843
S.W.2d at 292.
754. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 238, § A(1)-(3) (Vernon 1973).
755. Riha, 843 S.W.2d at 292, 294; Bailey & Williams v. Westfall, 727 S.W.2d 86, 90
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); House Grain Co. v. Obst, 659 S.W.2d 903, 905
(Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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same effect as a trial court judgment, and the reviewing court may not
substitute its judgment for the arbitrator's merely because it would
have reached a different result.1 6 The scope of review is the entire
record.7 57

XIII.

FRIVOLOUS APPEALS

If an appeal is taken for delay and without sufficient cause, the
supreme court or court of appeals may award each prevailing appellee
or respondent an amount not to exceed 10% of the amount of damages awarded to such appellee or respondent as damages against such
appellant or petitioner.75 8 If there is no money damage award, then
the court may award each prevailing appellee or respondent a damages award amount not to exceed ten times the total taxable costs. 759
The damages may be awarded on motion of a party or by the court
sua sponte. 760 Because meritless litigation constitutes an unnecessary
burden on the court and the parties to litigation, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 84 shifts to the appellant the part of the prevailing
party's expenses and burdens of defending a frivolous appeal. 6
"[T]he right to an appeal is a sacred and valuable right."7 62 As a
result, a court will only assess frivolous appeal damages "with prudence, caution and after careful deliberation. ' 763 As long as the argument, even if unconvincing, has a reasonable basis in law and
constitutes an informed, good faith challenge to the trial court's judgment, Rule 84 damages are not appropriate.7M Thus, an appellant's
756. Riha, 843 S.W.2d at 293-94 (citing Westfall, 727 S.W.2d at 90).
757. Id. at 294.
758. TEX. R. App. P. 84, 182(b); see Ramirez v. Pecan Deluxe Candy Co., 839 S.W.2d
101, 108 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied) (recognizing that court must make two findings: that appeal was brought for delay and that such appeal was without sufficient cause).
759. TEX. R. App. P. 84; see TEX. R. App. P. 182(b) (stating that supreme court may
award damages it deems "appropriate").
760. Dolenz v. A-_ B_, 742 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied).
761. Roever v. Roever, 824 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ); Dolenz
v. American Gen. Fire & Cas. Co., 798 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ
denied).
762. Loyd Elec. Co. v. Millett, 767 S.W.2d 476, 484 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no
writ); see also Masterson v. Hogue, 842 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, no writ)
(discussing right to appeal); In re Estate of Kidd, 812 S.W.2d 356, 360 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1991, no writ) (noting party's right to appeal).
763. Masterson, 842 S.W.2d at 699; Loyd Elec. Co., 767 S.W.2d at 484.
764. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Midland Cent. Appraisal Dist., 826 S.W.2d 124, 125
(Tex. 1992) (per curiam).
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right to appellate review will not be penalized, absent a clear showing
that the appellant had no reasonable ground to believe the judgment
would be reversed.76 5 The court must look at the case from the point
of view of the advocate and determine whether the appellant had reasonable grounds to believe that the case would be reversed.76 6
"Whether the matter is groundless and without sufficient cause must
be decided on the basis of objective legal expectations. ' 767 Some
courts have phrased the basis of a damages award simply as lack of
merit, rather than performing expressly the two-part analysis indicated by the language of the rule. Thus, an appellant's conscious indifference to settled rules of law has been held to warrant damages.7 68
Pointing out errors in an appellant's brief that are inconsistent with
the record will not suffice to show entitlement to damages. 769 However, an appellant's complete failure to advance arguments in support
of his position may result in damages.770 Some courts have held that
the failure to file a statement of facts alone demonstrates that the appeal has been taken without sufficient cause. 7 7 1 Although one court
has stressed that before damages are authorized, the court must determine that an appeal was taken solely for delay,7 72 most courts have
not been so strict.77 3

765. Beago v. Ceres, 619 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no
writ). An unconvincing argument does not constitute a frivolous appeal. Smith v. Renz, 840
S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
766. Roever, 824 S.W.2d at 677; Kidd, 812 S.W.2d at 360; Naydan v. Naydan, 800
S.w.2d 637, 643 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ); Gaines v. Frawley, 739 S.W.2d 950, 956
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
767. Goad v. Goad, 768 S.W.2d 356, 360 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990); see Roever, 824 S.W.2d at 677 (finding personal, rather than
legal, expectations of prevailing party insufficient).
768. In re Estate of Diggs, 733 S.W.2d 681, 687 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, writ denied); Bullock v. Sage Energy Co., 728 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref d
n.r.e.).
769. Gaines, 739 S.W.2d at 956.
770. Burdett v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 739 S.W.2d 663, 664-65 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1987, no writ).
771. E.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Armstrong, 774 S.W.2d 755, 756-57 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ). Contra A.T. Lowry Toyota, Inc. v. Peters, 727
S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
772. Gaines, 739 S.W.2d at 957.
773. Lewis v. Deaf Smith Elec. Co-op., Inc., 768 S.W.2d 511, 514 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1989, no writ) (quoting Bainbridge v. Bainbridge, 662 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1983, no writ)). "An appeal should not be taken, however, to delay execution of the judgment
or to prolong the litigation in the hope of obtaining a more favorable result through negotiation. Besides the damage to the appellee, such an appeal requires judicial time and effort that
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APPEAL BY WRIT OF ERROR

To appeal by writ of error, the appealing party must show that (1)
the petition for writ of error was filed within six months after the final
judgment was rendered; (2) by a party to the suit; (3) who was not a
participant at trial; and (4) the error is apparent on the face of the
record." 4 A writ of error constitutes a direct attack on a default judgment, and when appropriate, affords review of the trial proceedings
within the same scope as an ordinary appeal. 7" Generally, "the same
standards of review and powers of disposition as govern ordinary di'
rect appeals govern review of a default judgment."776
However, like
summary judgments, "the usual presumption of the validity of the
judgment does not apply when the reviewing court reviews a judg'777
ment by writ of error.
The phrase, "face of the record," simply refers to the entire record
7 78
of a case in court up to the point at which reference is made to it.

On appeal by writ of error, the reviewing court is not limited to a
would be better spent on meritorious cases." Id.; see also Goad, 768 S.W.2d at 360 (finding
that sanctions may be invoked when there is attempt to further delay resolution of litigation),
cert denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990); Dolenz, 742 S.W.2d at 86 (stating that "spurious litigation,
unnecessarily burdening parties and courts alike, should not go unsanctioned"); Dallas County
Appraisal Dist. v. The Leaves, Inc., 742 SW.2d 424, 431 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied). The rule does not require that the "delay found by the court result from any particular
motivation, financial or otherwise; it is the fact of delay that is important, not the reason." The
Leaves, Inc., 742 S.W.2d at 431.
774. General Elec Co. v. Falcon Ridge Apartments, 811 S.W.2d 942, 943 (Tex. 1991);
Stubbs v. Stubbs, 685 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Tex. 1985); Brown v. McLennan County Children's
Protective Servs., 627 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex. 1982); see TEX. R. APP. 45 (stating requirements
for appealing by writ of error); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§

51.013 (Vernon 1986)

(stating time period for taking writ of error to court of appeals). See generally W. Wendell
Hall, Appellate Review of Default Judgments by Writ of Error,45 TEX. B.J. 192, 192-94 (Feb.
1988) (discussing procedure used to attack default judgments); W. Wendell Hall, Appeal, Writ
of Error, or Bill of Review. . . Which Should I Choose?, 1 THE APPELLATE ADVOCATE IV
(Summer 1988) (discussing appellate procedures under Texas law).
775. Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. 1965); Robert S. Wilson Investments No. 16 Ltd. v. Blumer, 837 S.W.2d 860, 861 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no
writ); First Dallas Petroleum, Inc. v. Hawkins, 727 S.W.2d 640, 644-45 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1987, no writ).
776. Stubbs, 685 S.W.2d at 644; Lakeside Leasing Corp. v. Kirkwood Atrium Office Park
Phase 3, 750 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
777. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965); Lakeside Leasing Corp., 750
S.W.2d at 849.
778. Barnes v. Barnes, 775 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no
writ); First Dallas Petroleum, Inc., 727 S.W.2d at 643.
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review of the transcript, 7 9 but may refer to all of the papers on file in
the case, including the statement of facts, to test the validity of the
judgment.780 In the absence of a statement of facts, the reviewing
court may assume that every fact necessary to support the judgment,
within the limits of the pleadings, was proved at trial.78 1 Therefore,
when an appellant fails to bring forward a statement of facts, or when
there is no evidence that a statement of facts was not made, the appellant may be held to have failed to establish "error on the face of the
2
,78

record.

XV.

BILL OF REVIEW

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(f) provides that "on expiration
of the time within which the trial court has plenary power, a judgment cannot be set aside by the trial court except by bill of review for
sufficient cause ... 783 A bill of review "is the proper method to
attack a judgment when the trial court had jurisdiction to render
judgment on the merits.

' 784

The purpose of the bill of review pro-

ceeding is to attack directly 785 the former judgment and secure entry
of a correct judgment. 86
779. Morales v. Dalworth Oil Co., 698 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985,
no writ).
780. DSC Finance Corp. v. Moffitt, 815 S.W.2d 551, 551 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam). Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to challenge a judgment on appeal by writ of error. General
Elec. Co., 811 S.W.2d at 944; see Garcia v. Arbot Green Owners Ass'n, 838 S.W.2d 800, 803
n.2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (holding that "appropriate remedy
when extrinsic evidence is necessary to the challenge of a judgment is by motion for new trial,
TEX. R. Civ. P. 320, 324(b)(1), or by [equitable] bill of review"); Blumer, 837 S.W.2d at 862
n.1 (finding same).
781. Jaramillo v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 694 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1985, no writ).
782. Id.; Salazar v. Tower, 683 S.W.2d 797, 799-800 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984,
no writ).
783. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(f).
784. Holloway v. Starnes, 840 S.W.2d 14, 18 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
785. A direct attack differs from a collateral attack in that a collateral attack is proper
only if the judgment is void. See Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1987) (stating
that void judgment may be collaterally attacked). A judgment is void only when the court had
no personal jurisdiction over the party or her property, no subject matter jurisdiction, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act as a court. Id. (citing Browning
v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1985)). Errors other than lack of jurisdiction render the
judgment voidable. Id. In a collateral attack, extrinsic evidence may not be used to establish
the lack of jurisdiction. Holloway, 840 S.W.2d at 18.
786. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex. 1973).
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Attacking a judgment by bill of review is an onerous burden. 78 7 It
is an independent equitable proceeding designated to prevent manifest
injustice,7"' which permits a trial court to set aside a judgment that is
no longer appealable, subject to a motion for new trial,78 9 or subject to
appeal by writ of error. 79 ° The "burden on the complainant is harsh
because of the justifiable public policy that judgments must become
final at some point. ' 791 Therefore, the grounds on which bills of review are granted are narrow and restricted and will not be relaxed
merely because of an apparent injustice.7 92
The rules do not define "sufficient cause" for purposes of a bill of
review, but the courts have established several requirements to be entitled to relief by bill of review. 93
The narrow essentials that must be alleged and proven are: (1) a meritorious defense to the cause of action alleged to support the judgment;
(2) that a party was prevented from making by fraud, accident, or
wrongful act of the opposing party; and (3) [that was] unmixed with
any fault or negligence on that party's own part.794
A bill of review complainant must exhaust all legal remedies available before she may pursue a bill of review to achieve the same result.7 915 From the date a complainant learns of the judgment, or by
the exercise of due diligence would have learned of it, she must pursue
all legal remedies still available. 796 A bill of review is not merely an
alternative of review on motion for new trial or upon appeal, and may
787. See W. Wendell Hall, Appeal, Writ of Error,or Bill of Review. . . Which Should I
Choose?, 1 THE APPELLATE ADVOCATE IV to V (Summer 1988) (discussing bill of review

requirements).
788. French v. Brown, 424 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1967).
789. Ortega v. First RepublicBank, 792 S.W.2d 452, 453 (Tex. 1990); State v. 1985 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 772 S.W.2d 447, 448 (Tex. 1989); Transworld Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Briscoe,
722 S.W.2d 407, 407-08 (Tex. 1987); Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1979).

790. General Elec. Co. v. Falcon Ridge Apartments, 811 S.W.2d 942, 944 n.2 (Tex.
1991).
791. Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d at 407-08; Steward v. Steward, 734 S.W.2d 43, 434 (Tex.

App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
792. Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d at 407-08; Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 569, 226
S.W.2d 996, 998 (1950).

793. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 406.
794. Beck v. Beck, 771 S.W.2d 141, 141 (Tex. 1989); Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d at 408; Baker,
582 S.W.2d at 404, 406-07 (Tex. 1979); Hanks v. Rosser, 378 S.W.2d 31, 34 (Tex. 1964);
Alexander, 148 Tex. at 568-69, 226 S.W.2d at 998.
795. See French, 424 S.W.2d at 895 (noting that party was not entitled to seek equitable

relief because party neglected legal remedy).
796. Rizk v. Mayad, 603 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex. 1980).
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be urged successfully only when there remains no other method of
assailing the judgment. 97 Accordingly, if a party permits a judgment
to become final by neglecting to file a motion for new trial or to invoke the right of appeal or appeal by writ of error, then the party is
precluded from proceeding on petition for bill of review, unless the
complainant shows a good excuse for failure to exhaust adequate legal
remedies. 798
In State v. 1985 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 99 the supreme court set
forth the necessary steps to be followed in a bill of review proceeding.
First, the petitioner must invoke the equitable powers of the court by
filing a petition alleging "factually and with particularity that the
prior judgment was rendered as a result of fraud, accident or wrongful
act of the opposite party" or as the result of reliance on erroneous
information provided by an official court functionary, S° unmixed
with the petitioner's own negligence.8 0 1 The petitioner must further

allege, with particularity, sworn facts sufficient to constitute a defense
and, as a pretrial matter, present prima-facie proof to support the contention.10 2 Before conducting an actual trial on the issues, the trial
court must determine whether the complainant's defense is barred as
a matter of law. 0 a The supreme court has directed that the petitioner
be required to present "prima-facie proof of a meritorious defense as a
pretrial matter" to assure that "valuable court time is not wasted by
conducting a spurious 'full-blown' trial on the merits. ' ' 8 1 A trial of

the issues is required if a prima-facie meritorious defense has been

shown.80 5 If the trial court deems that a prima-facie defense has not

been established, it may dismiss the case." 6 The petitioner must open

797. See generally 5 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE IN DISTRICT AND COUNTY

COURTS §§ 29.6-29:12 (rev. 1992) (discussing when bill of review is appropriate).
798. French, 424 S.W.2d at 895; Steward, 734 S.W.2d at 435.
799. 772 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. 1989).
800. Id. at 448 (citing Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408); Levit v. Adams, 841 S.W.2d 478, 481
n.5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 677
(Mar. 24, 1992) (per curiam).
801. 1985 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 772 S.W.2d at 448 (citing Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408).
802. Id. A prima-facie meritorious defense is shown when the trial court determines that
the complainant's defense is not barred as a matter of law, and that he will be entitled to
judgment if no evidence to the contrary is introduced. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 409.
803.
804.
805.
806.

Id.
Beck, 771 S.W.2d at 142 (citing Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408-09).
Id.
Id.
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and assume the burden of proof on this issue.10 7
Second, the court will conduct a trial if a prima-facie defense has
been shown.808 At this trial, the petitioner must open and assume the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the judgment was rendered as the result of fraud, accident, wrongful act of the
opposite party, or official mistake, unmixed with any negligence of his
own."° "If the petitioner meets this burden, the factfinder will then
determine whether the bill of review defendant, the original plaintiff,
has proved the elements of his original cause of action. ' 810 Once the
appellate court finds that a judgment is wrongfully obtained because it
is unsupported by the weight of the evidence, "equity is satisfied and
the court should grant the requested relief."81 ' If the complainant's
bill of review is granted, the case proceeds to trial on the issues outlined above, which are reviewed under the same standards as any
other trial.
There is an exception to the general rule. A party need not show a
meritorious defense if the service of the petition was invalid and the
defendant was not given notice at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner so that the defendant lacked the opportunity to be
heard as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 12 Such a requirement, in the absence of notice, violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.813
XVI.

CONCLUSION

Essential to a successful appeal for an appellant or an appellee are
application of the appropriate standard of review to the proper scope
of review to show error or lack of error and a forceful and persuasive
brief that demonstrates the harmfulness or harmlessness of the error.
807. Id.
808. 1985 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 772 S.W.2d at 449.

809.
810.
811.
812.

Id. (citing Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 409).
Id.
Id.
Peralta v. Heights Medical Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86 (1988); Lopez v. Lopez, 757

S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. 1988); Bronze & Beautiful, Inc. v. Mahone, 750 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex.

App.-Texarkana 1988, no writ).
813. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d at 723; see Richmond Mfg. Co. v. Fluitt, 754 S.W.2d 359, 360
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ) (finding due process of law is afforded when defendant is properly served with citation, and requiring her to allege facts in her motion for new trial
does not conflict with Peralta).
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While standards of review are by their very nature imprecise, they
provide a focus for the appellate court by identifying the fundamental
questions in the case. They also provide a structure for persuasive
argument. Although there are certainly no guarantees of a successful
outcome in the appellate process, the appellate advocate will be most
effective when he or she focuses on the applicable standard of review
and demonstrates for the appellate court how that standard mandates
the advocated result.
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